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4.1 Characteristics of beneficiaries
4.1.1  Social categories of beneficiaries
The first AALS farmers in Hardap obtained their land in 1992, and the most recent in 2003. 
In Omaheke, the first AALS farmer obtained his farm in 1992 and the most recent, a woman, 
in 2000. Thus in both regions the oldest AALS beneficiaries have been farming as such for 
17 years.
All 10 AALS farming households interviewed in Hardap Region were male-headed. Eight 
of the household heads were married with a civil marriage certificate, one was widowed 
and one was single. One farm was registered in a wife’s name while her husband waited for 
his AALS loan to be approved. All the others farms were registered in the names of the 
household heads. The AALS farm sizes ranged from 3 500 ha to 20 000 ha. 
In Omaheke, three male and two female household heads made up the AALS interview 
sample.
The average age of the Hardap household heads was 52 years, with a median of 50. Twenty 
per cent were over 60 years of age. The average age of the Omaheke household heads was 
also 52, the youngest being 48 and the oldest 57.
In Hardap, five farmers stated that they had received tertiary education, while the lowest 
standard of formal education attained was Standard 5 (Grade 7 under the new system). The 
other four attained standards ranging from Standard 6 to 8 (Grades 8-10). In Omaheke, 
two interviewees stated that they had completed their tertiary education while the other 
three had completed Standard 10 (Grade 12). 
Compared to group resettlement scheme and FURS farmers in both regions, AALS farmers in 
both regions are better educated in terms of formal schooling. None of the AALS farmers had 
obtained specific agricultural training, but one in Hardap had attended a short course of 
general agricultural training, and one in Omaheke said that the degree in Natural Sciences 
which she had obtained in the USA helped her to be a better farmer. 
All of the AALS farmers are or have been civil servants, and a few indicated that they had 
acquired business experience in the past.
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Table 7: Education levels of AALS farmers
Highest levels of  
formal education
Full-time farmers Part-time farmers
# % # %
Standard 5 / Grade 7 1 16.7
Standard 6 / Grade 8 2 33.3
Standard 8 / Grade 10 1 16.7 1 25
Tertiary education 2 33.3 3 75
Total 6 100 4 100
The majority of AALS farmers (9 in total) stated that they had farmed in communal areas 
before buying their own farm, while four said that they had commercial farming experience 
as a result of having rented land in the past. Two farm owners in Hardap were farm workers 
on commercial agricultural farms before becoming AALS farmers. The oldest AALS farmer, 
a pensioner aged 69, started farming in the 1960s, while the youngest, aged 38, started in 
1994.
Table 8: Main occupation of AALS beneficiaries before farming under the AALS
Occupation %
Wage employment 20
Farmer 50
Self-employed 20
Pensioner/retired 10
Total 100
Many of the AALS farmers interviewed were born and bred in communal areas. A few of 
the older farmers had little formal education and became involved in livestock farming 
at an early age. This type of AALS farmer is typified by Godfrey16 who was born at Pos 3, 
Epukiro, in 1942. He can read and write in Otjiherero, but never attended school. When 
his parents wanted to send him to school as a teenager, it was too late for him to catch up. 
Instead of going to school, he looked after his parents’ cattle while they worked elsewhere. 
When his parents died, he continued to farm on his own in the reserve and even had his 
own borehole.
Some AALS beneficiaries opted out of a professional career to farm instead, Tobias being 
one of them. He was born and raised in the small village of Aranos. He attended primary 
school in Mariental and went on to obtain a teaching diploma. He worked in three different 
towns as a teacher, the last being Aranos. While working there he farmed in the Gibeon 
communal area. In 1984 he bought his first small livestock with money he had earned from 
teaching. He took the animals to the Gibeon communal area where his brother-in-law looked 
after them. He resigned as a teacher in 1999 and bought a farm under the AALS in Hardap 
where he settled in November 2000.
16 The respondents’ names have been changed to protect their privacy, and this report refers only to first 
names – Western in origin but nonetheless common first names in indigenous communities in Namibia.
Section B ● 4. Affirmative Action Loan Sch me (AALS
60 ● Livelihoods after land reform: Namibia country report (2010)
Kristof cut short his schooling on account of political work. He was born in 1955 on 
a large commercial sheep farm where his parents worked. He attended the farm school 
until Std 3, whereafter he went to school in Mariental. He did not complete Std 8 due to 
his involvement in politics. He went on to receive some agricultural training in Windhoek. 
In 1975, still involved in politics, he took a job as a mine operator in Erongo Region. In 1979 
his parents encouraged him to obtain a right to farm in the communal area in the south. He 
applied to the Witbooi Tribal Authority and was given permission to farm in the Gibeon area. 
This enabled his parents to transfer small stock to that area from time to time. Initially his 
mother’s sister looked after the animals. In 1981 he left the mine’s employ with the intention 
of leaving the country to join the armed struggle and further his studies, but this plan did 
not materialise. Instead, he moved to the communal area where he remained permanently 
until 1992 when he bought his AALS farm. In the late 1990s he was elected to a regional 
government position which he holds to date.
4.1.2  Motivation for buying a commercial farm
The majority of the AALS farmers in both Hardap and Omaheke stated that they applied 
for an AALS farm because they wanted to get out of the communal areas. The reason for 
this was that their livestock herds had become too big, resulting in increased competition 
with other communal farmers’ herds for grazing, and related to this, they were not able to 
exercise any control over their livestock on communal land. Some interviewees applied for 
an AALS farm simply because of their passion for farming, and others did so because they 
wanted to be self-employed.
Godfrey wanted to leave the Epukiro communal area because he felt that he had no control 
over his livestock. Cattle walked unrestricted all over the communal lands, covering distances 
of up to 40 km. He decided to buy a farm primarily to ensure that he had more control 
over his livestock. Also, he was under the impression that any communal farmer with more 
than 200 head of cattle had to leave the communal area and buy a farm under the AALS. He 
expected to receive additional subsidies and support from the government to enable him to 
establish himself as a commercial farmer. This expectation stemmed from his knowledge 
that before Independence, government supported white landowners until they were able to 
stand on their own feet. However, after buying the farm, no support was forthcoming even 
though he asked for it.
Kristof also found farming in the communal area difficult. Due to the absence of fences, 
livestock owners were not able to control their livestock and stock losses were frequent. 
In addition, the quality of grazing was poor and most of the communal farmers did not have 
the financial means to buy supplementary feed. But, having bought his commercial farm, 
he found that the quality of grazing there is also poor as the farm is “op die vloere” (on the 
plains) with brackish soils. Having discovered this problem, he began to think that farmers 
in the communal areas were better off than him because they were farming without debt. 
Like Kristof, many people were very optimistic when they bought an AALS farm, but soon 
realised that they would have to cover all of the costs of maintenance, which is not the case 
for communal farmers.
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Bernard bought a farm through the AALS in order to get out of the Epukiro communal 
area where he farmed together with family members. While their social relations were good, 
they overstocked the area. In addition, the presence of gifblaar, a noxious plant, caused big 
livestock losses, with up to 80 animals dying every year as a result of eating it. In addition, 
livestock grazed all over the communal area, which led to losses due to stock theft. If 400 
calves were born in a year, only 200 were not lost to poisoning or theft. All these factors 
led Bernard to buy a farm at the age of 50, and his commercial farming experience has not 
been disappointing: he has been able to control his livestock and hence dramatically reduce 
the losses. In fact, of 250 calves born, he can sell 250.
For many, the prospect of owning their own piece of land was the driving force behind the 
decision to buy a farm and take on large debt. This notion has several facets. 
In the first place, the AALS farmers hoped to improve their livelihoods through improved 
agricultural production. They considered the preconditions for this to be much better on 
commercial farms with their internal camps, boundary fences and the exclusive use rights 
of the owner. 
Tobias, a retired teacher, bought a commercial farm because it had always been his dream 
to own land and not to have to farm for too long on communal land. He expected to move 
forward and improve his standard of living beyond that of a teacher. To some extent these 
expectations were met. He soon experienced an improved standard of living and a feeling 
of self-satisfaction. The fact that he was working for himself made it all worthwhile.
Apart from the direct economic benefits, owning a farm is seen to provide permanency 
and security for the owners and their children in a society where little is certain, least of all 
finding and keeping a job. 
Kristof, a high-ranking regional government official, articulated this well in stating that his 
political work is temporary whereas owning a farm is permanent. For as long as he is able 
to pay for his land, nobody can take it from him. By acquiring the farm, he had created 
an employment opportunity for himself and an opportunity for his family to look after 
themselves. Family members of his generation as well as his children would have a home 
(“heenkome”) which they could fall back on in times of unemployment or when there is no 
other place to go. He feels that he has to protect his land primarily because it provides 
security for his family. 
Tobias echoed this sentiment in identifying another very important aspect of owning a 
farm, i.e. being able to leave something to his children which they can always fall back on.
Several AALS farmers bought their farm for the love of farming and a dislike of urban life. 
For Kristof, life in town is very fast and one is not secure in one’s own house. While the 
latter is also true to some extent on a farm, Kristof still finds that life is better on the farm 
as he loves farming, and his hope of having more time for himself, his family and animals 
has been fulfilled. 
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4.1.3  AALS farmers’ relationships with pre-settlement homes
Despite all the AALS beneficiaries having farmed in at least one communal area at some 
stage before buying a farm, none of them kept any livestock on communal land. Some stated 
that not even during drought years did they take their livestock to communal areas. Instead, 
they tried to hire land in the commercial sector and bought supplementary feed.
Most AALS farmers maintain social relationships with relatives, friends and acquaintances 
in communal areas, but only one AALS farm owner allowed a family member, his son, to 
graze a few cattle on his farm, because the son had helped his aging father on the farm for 
15 years. No other family members in the reserve were allowed to keep cattle on his farm.
4.2 Production systems and output types / 
  ‘productivity’
The AALS initially provided loans only to full-time farmers, but soon after its inception in 
1992, it was decided that the scheme should also serve part-time farmers. This status of AALS 
beneficiaries impacts on the farming operations of both categories, chiefly because part-
time farmers have access to a fixed income stream from formal employment. Their income 
is not entirely subject to the risks associated with farming and utilising natural resources. 
Their more secure income enables them to take more risks and gives them easier access 
to additional loans. They purchase more livestock than full-time farmers but their farming 
inputs are less. Full-time farmers, conversely, are subject to variable incomes as determined 
by climatic conditions which in turn determine the farming outputs. On all AALS farms, 
decisions, rights and responsibility rest squarely on the owner on account of the fact that they 
obtain freehold rights over their land. Tenure security is therefore not an issue. 
The AALS beneficiaries in both regions bought farms ranging in size from 4 000 ha to 
11 000 ha. All of these farms had boundary fences and internal camps. Bernard’s farm in 
Omaheke, for example, is 5 873 ha in size, with 21 camps, 3 boreholes and 5 water points. 
Wilfred’s 11 000 ha farm in Hardap had 22 camps. All of the AALS beneficiaries in the 
sample obtained the freehold title to which they were entitled after buying their farm. 
Most of them bought a going concern, the few exceptions being farms which had not been 
utilised for a number of years. In the mid 1990s in particular, many farms deserted by white 
farmers during and after the drought in Hardap were bought by AALS beneficiaries.
In Hardap there is a pronounced difference in the average sizes of farms bought by part-time 
and full-time farmers. For part-time farmers the sizes ranged from 5 000 ha to 20 000 ha, 
and for full-time farmers from 3 500 ha to 11 000 ha. The main reason for the former having 
larger farms is that they have access to off-farm incomes and better collateral. However, 
despite having smaller farms on average, full-time farmers had more livestock – large and 
small. The impression that full-time farmers farm more intensively than part-time farmers 
is supported by the finding that the joint livestock sales of part-time farmers were less 
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than 10% of the sales of their full-time counterparts. A possible reason for this is that large 
farms require more management inputs which were lacking among part-time farmers. 
Smaller farming units of full-time farmers appear to have been the most productive because 
the farmers are permanently on the farm.
Answers to the question of whether AALS farmers had enough land for farming depended 
on whether they farmed full time or part time. In Omaheke, three part-time farmers said 
that they had enough land and could not make use of more land. The full-time farmers in 
that region said that they could use more land. Regarding the quality of grazing, part-time 
farmers said that it ranged from good to extremely good, and for full-time farmers it was 
not so good to extremely good.
All full-time AALS farmers in Hardap said that they had sufficient land, and 83% said that 
they did not want to manage more land. Only 50% utilised all of their land, while the other 
half said that they could increase production if they could further develop their water 
infrastructure and reduce predators. Half of the full-time farmers perceived overgrazing as 
a problem, while none of the part-time farmers reported any overgrazing. 
4.2.1  Production systems
Production systems and types of output of AALS farmers did not appear to differ markedly 
from those of the previous white landowners. The main agricultural activity among AALS 
beneficiaries was the rearing of livestock for commercial purposes, and to a limited extent 
own consumption. Extensive small-stock farming was the main farming activity in Hardap, 
while cattle farming predominated in Omaheke.
Growing Hoodia at Sekretarispan resettlement farm, Hardap.
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All of the AALS farmers surveyed in the two regions employed animal husbandry practices 
as recommended for commercial production: bulls were purchased and used during fixed 
breeding seasons; a weaning system was used to ensure that females had sufficient time 
to recuperate for their next offspring; fences were maintained and erected; and rotational 
grazing was practised. However, the fact that part-time farmers were not permanently on 
their farm came at the cost of less control over and less-effective management of their 
farming operations. Full-time farmers’ animal husbandry practices were better than those 
of their part-time counterparts due to their permanent presence. 
In Omaheke, cattle herd sizes ranged from 80 to 270 head. The herd of 80 belonged to a full-
time farmer who was struggling to enlarge the herd as he had to sell cows (i.e. females, 
not bulls) regularly to repay his Agribank loan. The other full-time and part-time farmers 
sampled in both regions had in excess of 200 cows per herd and were increasing their herd 
sizes continuously. All of them had purchased bulls in the preceding year to introduce new 
genetic lines. 
However, it appears that full-time and part-time farmers’ capacities to acquire livestock 
differ markedly. Due to their off-farm income stream, part-time farmers are able to purchase 
more livestock and spend more on bulls than full-time farmers. The average initial investment 
of part-time farmers amounted to N$375 000 for 12 bulls, 10 heifers, 38 cows and 24 goats. For 
one bull, part-time farmers paid prices ranging from N$10 000 to N$20 000, compared to a 
range of N$4 000 to N$5 000 paid by full-time farmers. The latter, however, did not have 
sufficient funds to increase their herds with purchases of cows and heifers. Only two new 
cows in total were purchased by the full-time farmers sampled.
Part-time farmers used their own financial resources and/or borrowed funds from relatives 
to purchase livestock. They also used income from the sale of their livestock (i.e. small stock). 
Their approach appears to have differed slightly to that of full-time farmers in that they 
sold females which did not produce a calf each year, thereby maximising productivity and 
increasing herd fertility. Full-time farmers gave their unproductive cows a second chance, 
keeping them longer. Part-time farmers had high turnovers of sales and purchases. These 
factors enabled part-time farmers to increase their herds at a faster rate than the annual 
natural growth rate.
A striking feature of livestock production in Omaheke was that all the AALS farmers had a 
weaner production system, meaning that they sold their weaners and did not keep any for 
producing slaughter-grade oxen. The main reason for this was cash-flow constraints due to 
having to pay back a hefty Agribank loan. The weaner production system enables farmers 
to sell calves as soon as they are weaned rather than only three years later. This system is 
preferable especially for full-time farmers who do not have access to off-farm income. 
As a full-time farmer, being able to increase his cash flow quickly was Godfrey’s main reason 
for producing weaners rather than oxen. He could sell weaners faster than oxen which take 
longer to reach a marketable age and are more expensive to raise. In terms of profitability, 
it is preferable to produce oxen, but cash-flow needs forced Godfrey to go on with weaners.
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Bernard, also a full-time farmer, stopped producing oxen in favour of weaners for the same 
reason. He needed to sell livestock as soon as possible to obtain enough cash to run his 
farm. Given his precarious financial situation, producing oxen was too risky. Although his 
farm is relatively large, the grazing was of poor quality and bush encroachment was an 
increasing problem. Farmers in Omaheke also face the constant threat of veld fires, and 
rains are unreliable. These factors increase the risk of producing oxen which take longer to 
be ready for the market.
All of the AALS farmers consider farming with oxen to be more profitable and hence more 
desirable than farming with weaners, and this would be their preference, but, like Bernard, 
several said that they needed better grazing, more rainfall and less annual variation in 
rainfall to be able to take the risk. Once Bernard’s Agribank loan has been repaid, he might 
start to farm with oxen. Apart from the financial benefits, he pointed out that ox production 
is also better for the veld, as oxen loosen the soil through trampling.
4.2.2  Marketing
The frequency of AALS farmers’ marketing of livestock was determined by auction prices 
and the condition of the livestock, i.e. they tended to sell when the animals were at or close 
to maximum weight. In both regions, some AALS farmers tended to limit their marketing 
to cover just the annual repayment of the Agribank loan and their basic needs.
All the AALS farmers were knowledgeable about the market prices they could expect for 
their livestock. Because the full-time farmers’ were working with more limited resources, 
their genetic stock was generally of lower quality, with the result that they earned less than 
part-time farmers earned from their cattle sales. In Omaheke, the prices realised by full-
time farmers ranged from N$2 500 to N$3 500 for a heifer and N$2 500 to N$4 000 for a 
cow, whereas part-time farmers obtained N$500 to N$1 500 more per heifer and per cow.
The marketing channels of AALS farmers were identical to those of white commercial farmers. 
Kristof in Maltahöhe District sold his livestock either to a private buyer or took the animals 
to marketing agents in Mariental. There were no longer auctions in Maltahöhe, which Kristof 
said was due to changes that occurred in the farming sector in the wake of the drought in 
the 1990s. Because of the drought, many farmers lost and/or sold their livestock and moved 
to other parts of the country. Others introduced game farming and tourism on their farm. 
All this meant that there were no longer enough animals to warrant regular auctions in 
Maltahöhe. However, the growing number of AALS farmers in the district brought in livestock 
again, which, together with improved rainfall conditions after 1996, increased the livestock 
numbers to the extent that regular auctions became feasible again in this district.
Tobias also sold livestock regularly, his most important markets being firstly auctions and 
secondly private buyers. He complained that because buyers ‘sat with the money’ and paid 
what they wanted to pay, he as the farmer was a price-taker – a complaint not limited to 
AALS farmers. His protestations that buyers should pay what he demanded fell on deaf ears. 
Having to hire someone to transport his livestock to the market further reduced his earnings.
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Marketing channels for weaners in Omaheke depended on the number of animals marketed. 
When farmers marketed on a large scale, they usually sold to established agents such as 
Agra and Karoo Ochse, or directly to Meatco, the meat processing company. Godfrey sold 
weaners once or twice a year to Agra or Karoo Ochse, while his grown cattle were sold to 
Meatco only once a year. Although located close to the Epukiro communal area, he did 
not sell livestock there as the prices were generally lower than in Gobabis. Only in times of 
emergency did he resort to selling in the communal area.
Transporting livestock to markets was a major problem for many farmers. If they did not 
own a truck, they had to hire transport. Transport costs impacted negatively on sales, 
especially if a farmer sold only a few weaners (e.g. 10) at a time. An alternative to hiring 
transport was to contact marketing agents such as Agra, which would send its own trucks 
to collect the animals if the number of animals offered by several farmers in an area was 
high enough. But the farmers still had to cover the transport costs, which were only slightly 
less than the costs of hiring transport individually.
4.2.3  Diversification
Despite the agro-ecological conditions restricting options for successful diversification in 
both Omaheke and Hardap, some AALS farmers still attempted to diversify, with varying 
success. An option available to farmers in Omaheke only is rainfed cultivation of maize and 
some other crops. Whether to plough or not depends on the rains. Bernard and his family, 
for example, ploughed approximately 7 ha whenever the rainy season looked promising. 
They planted mainly maize and beans, and had their own mill to produce mealie-meal for 
their farm workers and own consumption as well as for sale.
Godfrey also ploughed some land and planted maize and beans. Until his tractor broke 
down, he used it for ploughing, but it was a very costly machine to run, so instead he took 
to using mules to plough, which is much cheaper. Hiring a tractor from a neighbour costs 
approximately N$4 000 for ploughing 1.5 ha.
The most lucrative market for Bernard’s mealie-meal and beans was the adjacent Epukiro 
communal area, located only 32 km from his farm, whereas Gobabis is 142 km away. By 
selling in Epukiro he saved on transport costs and was therefore able to sell his produce at 
much lower prices than buyers have to pay in Gobabis. There is also much more competition 
in Gobabis than in the communal area. The situation was very different for cattle, with prices 
in Gobabis being better than those paid in the region’s communal areas. Therefore, Bernard 
and his family sold their livestock through established agents in Gobabis rather than in the 
communal area. 
In Hardap, Kristof sought to diversify his farming operations, partly in response to regular 
drought. In his initial years as an AALS farmer, he had to confine his agricultural production 
to goat farming only, although he owned sheep and cattle as well. In 1996 he was forced 
to sell all his cattle due to the drought. When the market for karakul weakened, he started 
to cross his karakul sheep with dorper sheep to concentrate on mutton production. A 
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comparison of his livestock numbers in 1992 and 2008 shows that the ratio of goats to 
sheep had remained more or less the same, but the number of cattle was down virtually to 
zero. When he moved onto the farm with his family in 1992, he had 570 goats, 320 sheep 
and 65 head of cattle. At the time of this interview in early 2008, he had 414 goats, 251 
mixed sheep and just 4 head of cattle. He was about to purchase a few more head of cattle 
with the aim of concentrating on cattle and goat farming, rains permitting. 
Kristof also explored agricultural production options other than livestock production. He 
started growing vegetables, but this proved to be an intensive activity which he could not 
entrust to somebody else. As he could not be on the farm permanently, his crops failed, so he 
stopped this activity altogether. In view of the regular periods of drought, he had thought 
that it might be feasible to farm with pigs in combination with growing vegetables, and he 
purchased some pigs, but when he stopped growing vegetables, he had nothing to feed the 
pigs, and pig farming was not profitable if their feed had to be purchased, so he stopped 
farming with pigs.
For Tobias in Hardap, goat farming was the most important agricultural activity. He also 
had some dorper sheep, acquired a few cattle and later cultivated a small vegetable garden 
for own consumption. He also intended turning one part of his farm into a wildlife area to 
generate additional income. In his view, the advantage of farming with game was that game 
survived drought whereas livestock died. He had applied to the Ministry of Environment 
and Tourism to support him in this regard, and was confident that he would be able to 
generate an income from game, e.g. through commercial hunting. 
Despite a general awareness of the advantages of farming with game, no AALS farmer in the 
sample had ventured into this line of production. The reasons for this may include the fact 
that farms have to conform to minimum standards for keeping wild animals, and most 
AALS beneficiaries are unable to incur and sustain the costs of this conformation.
Goat farming in Hardap.
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4.2.4  Skills
The change from communal to commercial farming required new skills and adaptations 
which many AALS farmers did not have or could not make. Some were born in communal 
areas and had never done anything but farming in those areas. Others were employed in 
town and their income enabled them to buy livestock. Once bought, they took the livestock 
to a communal area and placed it in the care of a trusted person, normally a family member. 
Whatever the case, access to communal land had enabled most of the AALS beneficiaries to 
accumulate livestock.
The first implication of buying a freehold farm with a commercial loan, albeit at subsidised 
interest rates, is that livestock production and farm finances have to be managed tightly 
to ensure sufficient revenues for servicing the loan. Many AALS farmers began to farm 
commercially with very little support for meeting this requirement of tight management.
Some AALS farmers complained of having had either insufficient or incorrect knowledge of 
conditions on their farm at the time of buying it. For example, a farmer in Hardap sustained 
heavy losses by purchasing a somewhat mountainous farm which not well suited for sheep 
production, and this reduced his herd to a third of what it was when he purchased and 
settled on the farm. Kristof in Hardap stated that many AALS beneficiaries in the region 
bought farms that were left unutilised after the drought of the mid 1990s. His own farm had 
belonged to someone who worked at sea at Lüderitz and did not utilise the farm. As a result, 
when Kristof bought the farm, the grazing looked very good. He only realised later that his 
initial impression was wrong and its quality was actually poor.
Several AALS beneficiaries felt that they would have benefited had Agribank given better 
advice about the condition of the farm that they were going to buy. One farmer, whose farm 
is situated 50 km south of Mariental, only found out after buying the farm that the existing 
infrastructure needed some serious repairs. By the time he discovered this, he did not have 
enough money to fix the wind pump and kraal fences. He ascribes this situation to not 
having enough understanding of what to look out for before buying his farm, and it appears 
that Agribank was not very helpful in giving him advice at the time of the purchase. 
Many AALS farmers lacked management skills to utilise their farm to the optimum. One of 
them suggested that the AALS should be revised as follows:
“[Provide for] agricultural training and improved administration, including accounting 
skills because those are very important. The [white] commercial farmers that are still 
farming today did not become successful overnight … they were given the chance to 
learn through trial and error. We must get the same chances and government must help 
us to become successful.” 
All the AALS farmers affirmed that they would be able to increase their overall production 
with the assistance of knowledgeable extension officers and by acquiring sound financial 
management skills (i.e. budgeting, setting benchmarks, and general aspects of accounting). 
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4.2.5  Finances
Many AALS beneficiaries, in particular full-time farmers, indicated that they experienced a 
constant cash-flow problem. The main reason for this was that they were indebted and had 
to repay a big Agribank loan. All AALS farmers in the sample had been farming for just 
over nine years on average, meaning that they were less than one year short of having to pay 
the full interest rate on the loan. In 2007 this rate was 12.68%. In expressing dissatisfaction 
with the interest rates charged by Agribank, one interviewee demanded that AALS farmers 
be entitled to the same conditions that white farmers enjoyed before Independence when 
they paid interest of only 4%.
A major cost factor for many beneficiaries was the state of infrastructure on their farm. 
Water infrastructure, in particular, was in need of rehabilitation on many farms, and this 
was a task that the beneficiaries themselves had to undertake during their first year of 
occupation when they had little cash. Tobias in Hardap discovered only after buying his 
farm that the water installations were in bad shape. The previous owner allegedly made the 
pumps look good and perhaps even replaced the first two lengths of piping in the borehole. 
Reservoirs filled to the brim gave the impression that the water infrastructure was in good 
working condition. To rehabilitate the infrastructure, Tobias had to use his own money as 
the Agribank loan did not provide for rehabilitating or repairing infrastructure.
These unanticipated problems aside, Tobias did not have problems with repaying his loan, 
provided that the rains and therefore the condition of his livestock were good. It was only 
in periods of drought that payment became difficult for him because the livestock did not 
yield sufficient revenues. His annual repayment amount until 2007 was N$25 700, and this 
increased to N$30 500 for the period 2008-2012. Thereafter the amount will be N$40 000 
per annum. While the prices he could fetch for sheep and cattle were low, goat prices were 
always good, being around N$450 per goat. The value of his repayments as from 2008 thus 
amounts to the price fetched for the sale of about 70 goats per annum. Farming was his only 
income-generating activity, but his children occasionally supported him and his wife with 
cash, food and clothing.
Beneficiaries said that once Agribank had granted them a loan to buy a farm, they were not 
eligible for any other farm-related loan, and many, especially full-time farmers, therefore 
struggled to maintain their infrastructure. A former AALS farmer who farmed 30 km south-
west of Maltahöhe summed up the difficulties he had faced and his views on Agribank. His 
farm infrastructure had to be repaired at a cost of N$28 000, which he had to pay from his 
own funds as he was not eligible for additional assistance from Agribank. He considered 
himself lucky in that he was still drawing an off-farm income at the time and was able to 
sell some of the animals already purchased for the farm. But he lost his farm in 2007 after 
defaulting on his loan. In his opinion, the only thing that interests Agribank is ownership:
[The bank] is not concerned about what you are doing on the farm because they know 
that you need to start paying your loan from the fourth or fifth year and that is where 
they are making their money.
Section B ● 4. Affirmative Action Loan Sch me (AALS
70 ● Livelihoods after land reform: Namibia country report (2010)
The tight financial position of some beneficiaries meant that they could do no more than 
maintain the infrastructure erected by the previous farm owners. Capital investments were 
made only if they were inescapable.
Many beneficiaries suggested that AALS farmers should have access to additional loans 
to help them with infrastructure repairs. Another option proposed was that rather than 
advance capital for repairs, Agribank could send its field workers to repair infrastructure and 
simultaneously provide infrastructural inputs, including training on infrastructure repair 
and maintenance, and then charge the costs of these services to the farmers’ loan accounts. 
According to the farmer who made this proposal, beneficiaries can apply to Agribank for an 
additional loan, but only after 10 years, and the decision as to whether or not to grant the 
loan would depend on how the applicant had fared with repaying the initial loan.
Beneficiaries with sufficient collateral had obtained loans from commercial banks to buy 
vehicles and cover the costs of infrastructure maintenance and/or replacement. Some had 
used a commercial bank loan also to pay their children’s school fees. A few had resorted to 
informal lending. Several part-time farmers had borrowed amounts as high as N$260 000 
to N$300 000 from relatives for purchasing livestock. Full-time farmers borrowed much 
smaller amounts from commercial banks and relatives.
4.2.6  Drought
Regular drought is the single most serious threat to livestock farming in both Hardap and 
Omaheke. Despite drought being a constant threat in Hardap, less than 10% of the AALS 
respondents there singled it out as a major problem. A possible reason for this is that the 
immediate focus of respondents there was on water infrastructure which is easier to manage 
than drought. However, the qualitative interviews left no doubt that drought was a major 
issue for all AALS farmers in both regions. Many did state that they had suffered major 
livestock losses as a result of drought.
In Hardap, a number of farmers said that it was difficult to get into full production as drought 
reduced their land’s carrying capacity. Although drought presents the single biggest shock 
to livelihoods in Hardap, unseasonal weather conditions cause big losses from time to time. 
In October 2007, a late frost with accompanying heavy rain occurred in both Hardap and 
Karas. Some AALS farmers in Mariental District reported heavy losses of small stock, and 
farmers in the Bethanie area in Karas reportedly lost as many as 2 000 sheep. 
To minimise the negative impact of drought on livestock, production systems should be 
designed to enable farmers to manage drought better. Such systems would include, among 
other things, systems of flexible and rotational grazing. In theory, large-scale commercial 
farms with their internal camps facilitate rotational grazing, and evidence suggests that 
many AALS farmers are practising rotational grazing. Other drought mitigation strategies 
employed by AALS farmers have been hiring grazing if available and purchasing feed for 
their livestock. 
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Selling all their livestock at the onset of a drought does not appear to be a universally 
accepted strategy among AALS farmers, as Godfrey’s testimony suggests. His first response 
to drought was to look for opportunities to hire grazing in the region. In addition, he bought 
fodder, lick and grass, financing these purchases by selling those cattle whose condition 
was still reasonably good. The practice of many established commercial farmers of selling 
livestock at the onset of drought, banking the money and then purchasing livestock again 
after the drought was foreign to him. He argued that he kept cattle, not money. The reason 
for his thinking that selling all livestock due to drought is not a good idea is that a farmer 
needs cash after the drought. Selling all his livestock and banking the money would mean 
running the risk of having used half of the money when the time is right for buying new 
livestock.
Significantly, while Godfrey stated that he does not take his livestock to graze in the adjacent 
communal area because he cannot control his livestock there, at the same time he said 
that during a very bad drought it is much easier to farm in a communal area than on a 
commercial farm, and likewise it would be much easier for him to graze his livestock in the 
communal area. The reason for this is that even though commercial farms, including his 
own farm, have several camps which enable the farmers to practise rotational grazing and 
save some grazing for drought periods, the livestock are limited to grazing within the camp 
or farm boundaries, whereas communal areas have the advantage that livestock can graze 
wherever they find something to eat.
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4.3 Typology of livelihood strategies in relation 
to land reform 
Most full-time AALS farmers in Hardap and Omaheke appeared to be focusing on land-
based livelihood strategies involving livestock production. In the usually arid western parts 
of Hardap, AALS farmers tend to farm only with small stock, i.e. sheep and/or goats, whereas 
the pattern of higher rainfall in the eastern parts of the region enable farmers there to 
farm with both large and small stock, i.e. cattle as well as sheep and/or goats. In Omaheke 
the full-time farmers focus predominantly on farming with large livestock as a land-based 
livelihood strategy. Some combine large-stock production with small-stock production.
Livestock production for part-time farmers in both regions is similar to that of full-time 
farmers. However, part-time farmers seem to have an advantage over full-time farmers in 
that they are employed elsewhere, e.g. by the government, and therefore earn additional 
money which they can use to cover operational costs on the farm.
4.4 Livelihood trajectories 
The majority of AALS farmers have one thing in common, i.e. they had previously farmed in 
one or more communal areas. Virtually all of them have experienced communal farming 
in one way or another before buying their own farm, whether growing up in a communal 
area and witnessing farming practices there or farming themselves in a communal area. 
As indicated earlier, 60% of all the AALS farmers interviewed stated that they had applied 
for an AALS loan because they wanted to get out of the communal areas. The main reasons 
for this were that their livestock herds had grown too big for communal land, and related 
to this, they were not able to exercise any control over their own livestock on communal 
land. 
While AALS farmers have much in common in terms of farming origins, their life histories, 
personal experiences and therefore their development paths as farmers are dissimilar. 
The livelihood trajectories (or pathways) discussed in this section have been formulated in 
order to categorise the development paths of AALS farmers in an attempt to understand 
the different paths better.
Based on its findings and observations on the AALS in Hardap and Omaheke, the research 
team developed four livelihood trajectories pertaining to AALS farmers. The first is the 
‘ideal’ trajectory, which reflects the ideal development path for a farmer under the AALS. 
This trajectory corresponds closely to the AALS policy objectives. Because personal and 
farming experiences hardly ever accord with what is considered ideal, it was necessary 
to capture deviations from the ideal, hence the ‘cyclical’, ‘part-time’ and ‘broekskeur en 
vasbyt ’ trajectories. There is also an ‘expansionist’ trajectory, which represents the aspirations 
of most AALS farmers, but none of them has achieved it as yet, so it is not discussed in 
this report.
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4.4.1 The ‘ideal’ trajectory 
Livestock owner in a communal area
Buys a farm through the AALS
Almost immediately becomes a successful medium- or large-scale commercial farmer
The ‘ideal’ trajectory reflects the model AALS development path as envisioned by AALS 
policy. In short, this trajectory pertains to a full-time communal farmer or someone who 
works elsewhere on a full-time basis, who keeps a large herd of livestock on communal 
land. Farmers in this category purchased commercial farmland with the assistance of the 
AALS to free up space for smaller, upcoming communal farmers as envisaged by AALS 
policy, and/or they moved out of the communal area due to ever-increasing competition 
with other livestock farmers there for grazing. The ‘ideal’ trajectory entails that the new 
commercial farmer becomes a medium to large commercial farmer, and one who never 
defaults on loan repayments to Agribank and produces enough to cover costs. In fact, this 
category of farmer is so successful that he/she is able to repay the entire Agribank loan well 
within the prescribed 25 years set by AALS policy.
The ideal is not commonly attained in any endeavour or aspect of life, but some of the 
AALS farmers are close to attaining this ‘ideal’ livelihood trajectory.
Johannes and his wife Christina lived alone on a farm of approximately 4 100 ha situated 
30 km south of Gochas, a town on the Auob River in Hardap. Occasionally their grand-
children stayed with them. Neither of them came from Hardap: Johannes was born and 
raised in Aries in the Northern Cape in South Africa, and Christina was born in Omaruru and 
raised at Okombahe, both in today’s Erongo Region, Namibia. Johannes came to Namibia as 
a young man and settled in Omaruru where he met and married Christina. Both having 
communal farming experience, Johannes and Christina decided to farm in the Okombahe 
communal area. Seeking additional income, Johannes found employment at Uis Iscor tin 
mine in Erongo where he worked for 16 years while Christina continued farming. They 
farmed mainly with goats and karakul sheep, with some success until karakul pelt prices 
fell in the 1980s. When the mine closed in 1990, Johannes decided to go on early pension 
and the mine gave him a retrenchment package. Immediately after receiving the payout, 
he and Christina decided to become commercial farmers. They wanted to farm with sheep 
and were looking for a suitable farm. Through an agent they bought the farm in Hardap. 
Johannes put most of his pension money down as security for an AALS loan. After some 
delay from Agribank’s side, the loan was granted and the couple started farming in 1992. 
Johannes’s livelihood trajectory as a commercial farmer reads like a fairytale. He repaid 
the bank in full within 13 years of obtaining the loan. He also put all of his children through 
university in either Namibia or South Africa. He farmed mainly with dorper sheep, of which 
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he had about 600 in 2008. In addition he had 150 goats and a few cattle which he kept 
mainly for their milk. He sold livestock at specific times of the year, mostly to the Farmers 
Meat Market in Mariental.
Johannes ascribed his farming success to four key factors: firstly, his passion to become 
a commercial farmer and to succeed as such; secondly, the right environmental conditions 
such as sufficient water and good grazing; thirdly, his tight control over financial matters; 
and fourthly, his willingness to take advice from his neighbours who had assisted him since 
the start of his farming venture in Hardap. On the latter factor, he said, “Our neighbours gave 
us good support especially in the beginning. One can never overemphasise the importance 
of keeping good neighbourly relations … .”
Although Tobias had been farming for only seven years and thus had not yet felt the full 
impact of Agribank’s interest rate, he can also be regarded as an ‘ideal’ AALS farmer. A 
teacher by profession, he had used some of his income to gradually build up a livestock 
herd large enough to stock a commercial farm. He purchased his first small stock in 1984, 
and took them to the Gibeon communal area where his brother-in-law looked after them. 
The latter resided on a farm cattle post. Tobias resigned as a teacher in 1999 and bought his 
farm under the AALS where he settled in November 2000. The farm of 5 439 ha has two 
fully equipped water points (posts) and is divided into 57 camps.
Tobias bought a commercial farm because it had always been his dream to own his own land 
and not to farm for too long on communal land. His expectations in buying the farm were to 
move forward and improve his standard of living beyond that of a teacher. Conditions on 
his farm were much better than those in the communal area. He now had enough grazing, 
water and camps. In the communal area it was an open-access situation which resulted in, 
among other things, much more theft of livestock. Having his own camps facilitated better 
control over and management of his livestock, these being two of his main motivations for 
buying a farm. He had an approximate total of 1 800 small stock, including lambs, which 
he regarded as a major achievement considering that he had nothing 23 years ago. This 
number of livestock meant that his farm was fully stocked.
After seven years on the farm, Tobias had to pay interest on his loan, albeit not yet at the 
full rate. In seasons of good rains, he had no problem with repayments. Only in times of 
drought did he experience difficulty as the condition of the livestock was under par and 
they did not yield sufficient revenues. His annual repayment amount was N$25 700 until 
2007. It increased to N$30 500 in 2008 and this is what he will pay until 2012. Thereafter 
he must pay N$40 000. While the fetching prices for sheep and cattle were low, goat prices 
were always good at around N$450 per goat. Farming was his only income, but his children 
occasionally provided cash, food and clothing to support him and his wife on the farm. 
Despite a big demand for farmland for rent in the area, Tobias had not rented out any of his 
land because it was his most important asset and he needed all of it for his own activities.
His vision was to make his farm a spog plaas (‘boast farm’). He also envisaged turning the 
northern part of the farm into a wildlife area to generate additional income. He had applied 
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to the Ministry of Environment and Tourism for support in this regard, and was confident 
that he would be able to generate income from game, e.g. through commercial hunting. The 
advantage of keeping game was that it survived drought whereas other livestock died.
4.4.2  The ‘cyclical’ trajectory
Livestock owner in a communal area
Buys a farm through the AALS
Finds it difficult to keep up with AALS loan repayments, so decreases the number of livestock
Defaults on repaying the loan, loses the farm and moves back to communal land, or
considers selling the farm and moving back to communal land
The ‘cyclical’ trajectory reflects the history of AALS beneficiaries who started to farm and 
accumulate livestock in the communal areas, bought a commercial farm under the AALS, 
found themselves in financial dire straits and thus sold either the whole farm or parts of it 
to service their debts. Those who sold the whole farm were likely to return to a communal 
area.
Access to communal land enabled communal farmers to accumulate enough livestock to 
buy a commercial farm with an AALS loan. Two broad categories of communal livestock 
accumulators can be identified. The first consists of farmers who were born in communal 
areas, started looking after livestock at an early age and never engaged in any waged labour 
or salaried job. Gifts from family members and a gradual acquisition of livestock enabled 
them to build up a herd of their own. Many of the older AALS farmers in terms of both age 
and farming period are in this category. The second category consists of people who may 
or may not have been born in a communal area, but who followed a career and acquired 
skills which they applied in urban areas. They used part of their income to buy livestock 
which they took to a communal area to be looked after by a trusted person, usually a family 
member. 
Although a number of factors led AALS beneficiaries in both categories to purchase a farm 
of their own, two major factors in virtually every case were conflicts with other communal 
farmers over grazing and natural resources, and a lack of control over their own livestock. 
The latter not only influenced their ability to apply proper herd management, but also led to 
high losses due to stock theft. In Omaheke there was a perception among AALS farmers that 
farmers in communal areas who had more than 200 large-stock units (LSU) had to buy a 
farm. Although one objective of the AALS is to encourage communal livestock owners with 
large herds to move out of the communal areas onto a commercial farm, there has never 
been any formal or informal pressure on them to do so.
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The second stage of the ‘cyclical’ trajectory involves the farmer buying a commercial farm 
with an AALS loan. The most important requirement is sufficient livestock – at least 150 
head of cattle or 800 small stock. The loan repayment period in all cases is 25 years. For 
full-time farmers, the first three years are free of both capital repayment and interest, and 
the capital amount is repaid over the remaining 22 years at an escalating rate of interest. 
Part-time farmers usually start paying interest in the first year. 
During the third stage, many farmers, particularly full-time farmers, start to experience 
financial and cash-flow problems, and find it difficult to keep up with the loan repayment 
and payments in general. This is related to the gradually increasing rate of interest on the 
AALS loan. In 2007 the rates were set at 2% in years 4-6, 4% in years 7-8, 8% in year 9, and 
Agribank’s full commercial rate of 12.68% as from year 10. 
Apart from gradually increasing financial commitments, the financial difficulties of many 
AALS beneficiaries are exacerbated by external threats to their farming activities. The most 
prominent of these is drought, but in Hardap, unseasonal climatic conditions such as frost 
in November have also caused big losses of livestock.
The ‘cyclical’ trajectory is completed when the farmer is unable to honour his/her financial 
commitments and the farm is attached by court order. Having defaulted on repaying the 
AALS loan, the farmer loses the farm and moves back to communal land. 
Abraham, who owned two small businesses in Mariental and a herd of livestock in a Hardap 
communal area, bought a farm under the AALS in 2000, located in the Swartrand area, 
40 km south-east of Maltahöhe. Intending to farm full time, in his first year he farmed 
part time while continuing to run his businesses. He had no problem with paying the AALS 
instalment in the first year. In 2001, having attended a funeral in Maltahöhe District, he 
returned to Mariental to find that the town had been severely flooded and both of his business 
premises had been damaged. Having no business insurance to cover his losses, he applied 
to his local commercial bank for a loan of N$20 000, which was granted.
In the following year he defaulted on the repayment of this latter loan, and hence owed 
the commercial bank a total of N$47 000, which he could not pay. In 2007 the bank issued 
summons, obtained judgement against Abraham, attached his AALS farm and auctioned 
it in execution for the whole outstanding amount of N$47 000. After the sale, Abraham 
was given seven days to vacate the farm with his animals. His only option was to take the 
animals back to the communal area. During the trek he incurred further losses as some 
of the animals died. As a temporary measure he applied at the MLR office in Mariental 
for resettlement. By the time of the survey in early 2008, his application had not been 
successful, but he had not given up hope. He had closed both of his businesses but had 
established a new one in Mariental. Determined to buy another commercial farm within five 
years, Abraham stated that he had learnt his lesson and would not make the same mistakes 
in the future.
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4.4.3  The ‘part-time’ trajectory
Livestock owner in a communal area
Buys a farm through the AALS
Engages in off-farm employment (full time or part time) to support farming activities
Retires/resigns (or aspires to retiring/resigning) to become a full-time AALS farmer
The ‘part-time’ trajectory is identical to both the ‘ideal’ and ‘cyclical’ trajectories in so far 
as the first two stages involve moving from communal farming to commercial farming 
under the AALS.
The third stage of the ‘part-time’ trajectory differs from the previous two in that most of 
the farmers are in full-time employment (in either the government or the private sector) 
and use a portion of their income to support their part-time farming activities. A few are 
full-time farmers who have taken up part-time off-farm employment to supplement their 
farming income. All of the latter interviewed in the survey stated that they would not have 
been able to farm on a permanent basis without earning income “outside” their farming 
activities. 
In the fourth and final stage of the ‘part-time’ trajectory, the farmer has repaid the AALS 
loan in full, and now intends to farm full time. In some instances the repayment in full 
coincides with the farmer either having reached the official retirement age of 60 years or 
having decided to resign or retire from his/her ‘city job’ or ‘city life’. 
Born in 1960, Elizabeth was raised in Aminuis in Omaheke. She left Namibia at 18 years of 
age to pursue a B.Sc. in Chemistry in Brooklyn, New York. After spending seven years in the 
United States, she returned to Namibia to take up employment as a chemist at a mine where 
she worked for five years. She then moved to Windhoek where she worked as a hydrologist 
in a government department for six years. Since 1998 she has worked for a parastatal as a 
senior scientist.
Elizabeth considered herself a “weekend farmer”, returning to her farm every two weeks. A 
widow, she has four children. At the time of the survey the youngest was 19 and the oldest 
28 years of age. During her absence from the farm, her brother managed the farm and lived 
there with his wife and two children.
Elizabeth and her late husband bought some livestock in 1986. From 1992 until 1999 they 
leased land on a government farm. They were told in 1999 that they were no longer allowed 
to stay there because the military used the area for training soldiers. The Ministry of Lands 
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did not offer alternative land, but granted an extension until 2000 to enable them to find 
alternative land themselves. Her husband’s family had a commercial farm in Omaheke and 
helped to accommodate some of their livestock. Her husband died in early 2000.
Elizabeth applied for an AALS farm in April 2000 and her application was approved in 
August that year. In order to receive the loan, she had to give Agribank a payslip, a waiver 
or exemption letter from the Ministry of Lands, and proof of having 150 cattle. She hoped 
to become a self-sustainable farmer with room to expand her farming operations. After 
looking at five farms, she purchased one of 5 000 ha which had been well maintained and 
had good grazing, a good water supply and 27 camps. She estimated that there were 270 
cattle on the farm as well as goats and a few sheep. Out of her own pocket she had to cover 
the difference between the farm’s market value and the Agribank evaluation value, which 
amounted to nearly N$300 000.
Elizabeth said that she was “definitely happy” with her decision to purchase a farm, despite 
some difficult times, particularly in the dry years when she coped by selling cattle to buy the 
required fodder and lick. She had made her loan repayments on time, but to do so she had 
supplemented the income from the farm with her salary from her full-time employment. 
She did not know how she would have managed “to keep the farm going” without her off-
farm income, and did not believe it would be possible to make the repayments from full-
time farming alone, especially with the escalating price of diesel. In addition to the farm 
running costs, she paid her brother a salary for managing the farm – he was unemployed 
when she offered him the job – and she also employed four farm workers on a permanent 
basis. 
Regarding support programmes, Elizabeth had attended several conferences and training 
sessions hosted/run by the NAU and the NNFU, and had found them “very useful”. She also 
said that Agribank had sent extension officers to “our farms” on occasion to examine the 
animals and provide advice, but this outreach had stopped five years before the interview. 
She described her relationship with Agribank at the time as one of “come in and pay”, and 
felt that the interest rates are too high.
Some AALS beneficiaries started off as full-time farmers but took on formal employment to 
support themselves financially. In their assessment, they would not have survived periods 
of drought without off-farm income streams.
Kristof is one example. He was born in 1955 on a large commercial sheep farm where his 
parents worked. The farm workers were allowed to keep 25 small-stock units (SSU). After 
lambing, and when the number reached about 50, they were expected to sell. After a while, 
Kristof’s parents decided not to sell anymore, but rather to use their goats’ offspring as a 
foundation for expanded farming. They encouraged Kristof to obtain a right to farm in the 
communal area. He applied to the Witbooi Tribal Authority in 1979 and given permission to 
farm in the Gibeon area. This enabled his parents to transfer small stock to the communal 
area from time to time. Initially his mother’s sister looked after the goats. Kristof established 
his own kraal in 1981 and stayed permanently in the communal area. 
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In 1992 he applied for and was granted a loan under the AALS to buy a farm in Maltahöhe 
District. His farm of 8 626 ha had a carrying capacity of 1 500 SSU. His purchase of the 
farm coincided with the onset of a drought which lasted until 1995 and resulted in his losing 
almost all of his livestock. From 1996 to 1998 he was able to hire camps on Maltahöhe 
town lands to graze his few surviving animals. He returned to the farm only in 1998 after 
rebuilding his herd.
Rebuilding the herd was possible only because Kristof was able to find employment. From 
1996 to 1998 he was employed as managing director of a local business. His employment 
enabled him to pay his farm workers and the rent for the camps on Maltahöhe town lands 
as well as the instalments on his Agribank loan. He went back to his farm in 1998 but was 
approached by the community to make himself available as a candidate in the regional 
elections, which he did. Since 1998 he has served as a regional official.
Kristof said that without full-time employment since the mid 1990s, he would not have 
been able to continue farming. Although farming conditions improved with the rains after 
the drought, he was still using his salary to covering most of his farming expenses, and the 
revenues from farming covered the rest. His biggest problem as a farmer was the Labour 
Act, which he said required him to spend more on labour than he earned. What kept him 
on the farm was his interest in farming and making a success of it.
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4.4.4  The ‘broekskeur en vasbyt’ trajectory
The ‘broekskeur en vasbyt ’ or ‘neither here nor there’ trajectory is probably reflective of the 
vast majority of especially full-time AALS farmers, not only in Hardap and Omaheke but 
throughout Namibia. In short, farmers in this category find it difficult to make ends meet, 
but manage to repay the AALS loan annually, albeit with “the mercy of the heavens above”. 
Wilfred’s story illustrates this situation. He owns a farm of 11 000 ha which he purchased 
with an AALS loan in 1998, located 60 km south of Mariental off the main road to Keet-
manshoop. He grew up with his Bondelswart parents in the Gibeon area where they farmed 
communally. When he finished school he took a job as a technician in Keetmanshoop. Being 
interested in farming, he started gathering sheep, goats and cattle which he kept in the 
Warmbad communal area. There it became difficult to accommodate more than one person 
on a piece of land. His work as a technician required him to travel often, and he found it 
increasingly difficult to keep control over his livestock, with the result that he suffered 
many losses due to theft and disease. He then rented commercial land for two years close to 
the town of Karasburg, and he duly received a job transfer to be based in that town. When it 
became too expensive to pay for grazing there, he moved back to the Warmbad communal 
area where he bought more livestock. At the beginning of 1996 he was transferred from 
Karasburg to Maltahöhe.
In 1995 he had decided to buy a farm through the AALS. He actively searched for a farm to 
purchase in Hardap, and started negotiating with the owner of the farm that he favoured. His 
AALS loan was approved in October 1997, and in February 1998 the farm was transferred 
into his name. The previous owner set the price for the farm and Wilfred sent the details 
to Agribank in Mariental. The bank agreed to the price and set the amount to be loaned. 
Wilfred resigned from his job as a technician on the grounds that farming is a full-time 
responsibility. He moved onto the farm in May 1998. Agribank did not inspect the farm to 
ascertain that he had 150 head of cattle or 800 SSU as is required before a loan is granted. 
Wilfred could not recall whether the bank inspected the infrastructure on the farm before 
granting him the loan, but on his own close inspection he found most of the infrastructure to be 
dilapidated and in need of replacement. The farm had five boreholes, but the water supply 
had proved problematic in that the supply from the stronger boreholes was salty and not 
suitable for animal and human consumption. While the other boreholes yielded suitable 
water for consumption, they were very weak and often dried up during periods of severe 
drought.
In 2008, Wilfred owned 125 head of cattle, 1 100 sheep and 350 goats in 22 camps, but he 
stated that the land size (11 000 ha) was not sufficing to earn him a living due to the harsh 
environmental conditions along with the high mortgage to be paid on his loan. He did not 
feel too upbeat about his farming prospects.
He argued that the condition in which he received the farm did not justify the price he had 
paid for it. “Nothing worked and nothing was in place when I settled here. I was so eager to 
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start commercial farming that I did not look at these things beforehand,” he lamented. There 
also appeared to be a high risk of stock theft in the area. Forty of his cattle were stolen in 
March 2008, and the police were able to recover only eight. Wilfred ascribes this problem 
to the farm’s location on the main road between Mariental and Keetmanshoop and in close 
proximity to Mariental and the communal area, which makes it easily accessible to thieves.
Employing farm workers on a permanent basis was a constant concern for Wilfred. Thus far 
he had employed mainly Nama-speaking workers, and they “soon get tired of farming and 
then they leave”. For this reason he had decided to recruit Owambo workers instead: 
… they are trustworthy and hardworking. They also save a lot themselves and you can 
see that they are progressing. If they go on leave for a week after every third month, 
they come back if you take care of them and this is what the other groups don’t do.
Would he have followed the same trajectory had he known 10 years ago what he knew now?
No. Physically I had to sacrifice and spend too much money, with little to show for it. 
Yearly I have to pay off my loan with high interest. If things could have stayed the same 
as those times with the white farmers when it was still 4% annual interest, it would have 
been better. It is now market related and you really feel it and we as AALS farmers are 
suffering a lot.
Despite regretting having become an AALS farmer, Wilfred felt that he had no choice but 
to continue on his farm:
I must just pull through as a farmer because it is the choice that I have made ten years 
ago. I have my children to look after – my wife passed away a few years ago. If inflation 
can stay low, I can still make it. Otherwise I will go bankrupt and lose this farm.
One or two suitable photosThe main farmhouse on a resettlement farm in Hardap.
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4.5 Evaluating outcomes 
Evaluating outcomes and discussing the notion of ‘viability’ of the AALS model is difficult 
in the absence of hard-and-fast figures. None of the beneficiaries were prepared to divulge 
personal financial information, and farm data such as budgets were non-existent or not 
accessible.
This study did not find any ‘standard outcome’ of the AALS, therefore it cannot be said on 
the basis of this study that the scheme has been an all-out success or an all-out failure. 
However, the study uncovered a number of issues that pose a challenge to the objectives 
of the scheme. Evidence suggests that the AALS model for land reform is economically 
and financially viable only under certain conditions which relate to the asset base of AALS 
buyers and specifically their access to finance. Beneficiaries with relatively few assets and 
financial resources find it harder to make ends meet. It appears that full-time beneficiaries 
with no access to off-farm income streams have found it more difficult than their part-
time colleagues to accumulate livestock as they have had to sell offspring to service their 
Agribank loan. Repayment requirements together with losses due to drought and predators 
have resulted in some AALS beneficiaries gradually depleting their livestock numbers, or 
in other words, getting poorer. This in turn has meant that many have not had sufficient 
livestock to make full use of their farm, with the result that they have not been able to 
generate enough revenue through livestock sales to make the annual loan repayment and 
also support a family. Thus, some full-time AALS farmers are forced to engage in off-farm 
income-generating activities to survive.
A major benefit of owning a commercial farm as opposed to farming in communal areas 
is that the farmers are able to control their own livestock and farming operations. Most 
AALS farmers in the sample had hoped that buying a commercial farm with infrastructure 
such as internal camps and water points would enable them to improve their livestock 
production and output. Indeed, many have been able to do so. An example is Tobias in 
Hardap who bought his farm specifically for the reasons just outlined. Looking back on 
his eight years of farming on his own land, he said that conditions on his farm were much 
better than they had been in the communal area. His small-stock numbers increased much 
more rapidly on his farm than had been the case in the communal area because he had 
enough grazing, water and camps, which facilitated better management of his livestock. In 
the communal area it was an open-access situation which resulted in, among other things, 
much more theft of livestock.
Apart from the financial considerations, having bought his own farm gave him a sense of 
satisfaction. He was working for himself rather than for others. Moreover, his farm has 
given him the opportunity to leave land to his children, which is something of value that 
they can fall back on if they are ever in need or if they decide to quit urban life.
Acquiring a farm of their own has also enabled AALS beneficiaries to pursue their love of 
farming and live a rural lifestyle, which many vastly prefer to urban life. Many feel that life 
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in town is too fast and one is not secure in one’s own home. While the latter is also true to 
some extent on a farm, farm life is still said to be much better. 
For Bernard and his family who bought their AALS farm in 1992, having their own farm 
is all-important. They started farming in the communal area but decided to buy their own 
farm due to the problems associated with communal farming. Stock losses and maintaining 
communal water points were just two of the many problems which they had continually 
faced. On their own farm, stock loss was massively reduced, and they had not found it too 
difficult to repay the Agribank loan, having only five more years to go at the time of the 
survey. Once their present farm was paid off, they would consider buying another piece of 
land on which to produce oxen. Their present farm would then serve as collateral, which 
they would not have had they continued farming in the communal area where they could 
not own any land.
By no means were all AALS beneficiaries in the sample equally upbeat about commercial 
farming. For some of the full-time farmers, the farm acquired was a major disappointment. 
After more than 10 years of commercial farming, some found themselves worse off, not only 
in comparison to their own situation at the time of buying the farm, but also compared to 
the situation of their peers in the communal areas. As commercial farmers they have had to 
service the Agribank loan as well as generate sufficient revenue to cover the farm running 
costs. These are expenses that their peers in the communal areas do not have. For many, 
the only way to maintain a positive cash flow was to sell livestock, meaning that many 
herds have been reduced rather than maintained or built up.
Kristof ’s livestock numbers had decreased from 1 280 SSU in 1992 to 689 SSU in 2008. A 
major reason for this was that he had to sell 100 to 150 goats annually to make his annual 
loan repayment of N$36 000. This became particularly difficult when the full interest rate 
was applied in year 10. His current livestock numbers did not suffice to generate sufficient 
revenue to service the loan and cover personal expenses such as schooling for the children. 
For most of his farming years he had been in full-time employment, without which, he said, 
he would not have been able to survive as an AALS farmer.
Godfrey regretted having bought his farm. He started to farm in the Epukiro communal 
area, looking after his parents’ livestock. In time their cattle herd grew. He never bought 
any cattle but exchanged young oxen for heifers. Before deciding to buy a commercial farm, 
he had his own small camp and borehole in Epukiro. He kept his pregnant heifers in the 
camp while his other livestock grazed on communal pastures. When he bought his farm of 
4 815 ha with 24 camps and 3 boreholes in 1993, he had 300 cattle.
On paying full interest on his AALS loan as from 2003, his financial difficulties worsened. 
He struggled to keep up with the repayments as he did not produce enough weaners each 
year to generate sufficient revenue to service the loan as well as cover the farm running 
costs. He therefore had to sell full-grown cattle as well, with the result that in 2008 he had 
only 100 head left. In an attempt to cut costs so that he would have enough for the loan 
repayment, he sold a 1 400 ha portion of his farm in 2005 with permission from Agribank 
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and the MAWF. He sold the smaller portion and kept the larger one rather than the other 
way around in the hope that he could still succeed, but said that if his financial struggle 
continued in the years ahead, he would consider selling the portion he still owned. 
He argued that his failure thus far was partly due to there being no additional subsidies 
and government support for AALS farmers. White farmers received large subsidies and 
other support and became successful farmers. According to him, the AALS in its current 
form would not succeed in creating black commercial farmers. As an AALS beneficiary he 
had to repay a hefty loan for the purchase of a farm, land tax and all the costs of repairs 
and maintenance. In addition to his farm-related expenses, he had to cover the costs of his 
children’s education at the Polytechnic (N$20 000 to N$26 000 per annum). Under such 
conditions, he argued, it was impossible for a full-time AALS farmers to succeed. 
To add insult to injury, it seems that the general public erroneously perceives all AALS 
farmers to be wealthy, which for Godfrey has meant that, among other things, his children 
could not benefit from government subsidy programmes for education even though they 
had good marks. Moreover, if his child owed the Polytechnic, he was not allowed to sit for 
exams, so Godfrey had to sell a calf or cow to pay the debt. For all these reasons, he would 
never advise anybody to buy an AALS farm.
Aaron (a farmer not yet mentioned in this report) bought a farm of 5 000 ha in Maltahöhe 
District in 2002. At the time of the interview with him in 2008, he was about to enter his 
seventh year of paying off his loan, and the interest rate was about to increase from 2% to 
4%. He had experienced all sorts of challenges throughout his years on the farm – periodic 
drought, livestock disease and so on – which had much reduced his livestock herd, which 
impacted negatively on his ability to repay the loan. While thus far he had been able to keep 
up with the repayments, he felt unsure that he could continue keeping up at the new rate of 
interest, and was considering the option of selling the farm and moving back to the Gibeon 
communal area. 
While Godfrey had only sold one small portion of his farm, others had to sell their whole 
farm due to having defaulted in repaying Agribank. Exact figures are not easy to come by, 
but based on loan figures captured by Agribank in June 2009 for the total of 604 AALS 
farms spanning a total area of 3 241 353 ha, the PTT estimated that the total area had 
decreased by approximately 255 000 ha during the previous five years.
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5  FARM UNIT 
RESETTLEMENT 
SCHEME (FURS)
5.1 Characteristics of beneficiaries and 
household composition
5.1.1  Social categories of beneficiaries
As with AALS beneficiaries, attempts were made to include the oldest resettlement farms 
in the sample of FURS beneficiaries. All FURS beneficiaries interviewed in Hardap were 
resettled between 1991 and 2004 and in Omaheke between 1992 and 2008.
The average beneficiary household sizes did not correlate closely with the national average 
size of 5.1 determined in 2001. In Omaheke the average size of the households sampled was 
5.6, but most had only 4 members and the largest had 11 members. The 20 respondents in 
Hardap indicated that a total of 88 persons were residing on the farms, averaging at 4.4 
members per household. The largest 5 households in Hardap had 7 members each. The 
relatively small household sizes in Hardap are due to the fact that a substantial number 
of FURS beneficiaries there are pensioners. On the farm Mara, for example, one family 
consisted of two pensioners and occasionally a visiting grown-up child. Their neighbour 
who had also retired lived on the farm with his wife, and another beneficiary there, though 
not retired, lived only with his wife and her child. The household of a 74-year-old pensioner 
on the farm Tulpvlei in Hardap consisted of himself and two of his grandchildren, while 
three relatives lived close to his house in their own shacks. Common to most beneficiary 
households was that they grew in size during school holidays when grandchildren visited. 
The data suggests that the majority of FURS beneficiaries were middle-aged or reaching 
retirement. The average age of FURS beneficiaries sampled in Hardap was 49 years, with 
none being younger than 45, while in Omaheke the average age of those who responded to 
the semi-structured questionnaire was about 55.17 This broadly corresponds to the average 
age of 52 for all FURS beneficiaries in the country as determined in the survey conducted 
by the Permanent Technical Team on Land Reform in 2003/04 (PTT 2005b: 49).18 Table 9 
on the next page shows the age and gender distributions of FURS household heads.
17 Being aware that some respondents did not know their age, broad age categories were provided in the 
Omaheke questionnaire, i.e. 0-5, 6-14, 15-59, 60 and older.
18 The PTT survey did not distinguish between group and farm unit resettlement.
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Table 9: Age and gender distributions of FURS household heads 
Age distribution Omaheke Hardap
20-59 years 5 42% 13 65%
60 years and older 7 58% 7 35%
Total 12 20
Gender distribution 8 males, 4 females 18 males, 2 females
In Hardap, 35% of the FURS farmers were older than the official retirement age of 60, while 
in Omaheke more than 50% were older than 60. The 2003/04 PTT survey (ibid.) found 30% 
of beneficiaries to be older than 60. 
These figures, and those produced by the PTT (2005a and 2005b), indicate that younger 
people are severely underrepresented in land redistribution. The reasons for this are not clear. 
One explanation may be that younger people are not interested in agricultural production 
and hence do not bother to apply for resettlement. A less likely alternative explanation 
could be that younger people have been less successful than older people in applying for 
resettlement.
A closer look at the age profiles of all members of FURS households in Hardap and Omaheke 
reveals that people beyond retirement age were more prominently represented on FURS 
farms than in these regions on the whole. The age profiles are presented in Table 10 below. 
In Hardap, the number of pre-school children on FURS farms was much lower than in the 
region as a whole. In both regions the number of people in the economically active age 
group (15-59 years) was higher than the regional average. One household in Omaheke had 
no member in the economically active age group but only members under 14 and over 60 
years of age.
Table 10: Age distribution of FURS household members by region – Omaheke and Hardap
Age group 
(years) Omaheke*
FURS Omaheke 
(N=68) Hardap*
FURS Hardap
(N=88)
0-5 15% 13% 13% 4%
6-14 26% 16% 23% 14%
15-59 51% 55% 55% 66%
60+ 8% 16% 9% 16%
*Source: Omaheke Regional Poverty Profile, 2006; Hardap Regional Poverty Profile, 2006
It is interesting that in the FURS sample in Hardap, the percentage of very young children 
was comparatively low. As mentioned earlier, it is common for parents in town to send their 
children to reside on farms with family, but in Hardap, with very long distances between 
towns and the FURS farms, this phenomenon is possibly less frequent than elsewhere, 
especially in respect of infants and toddlers.
Most of the household heads interviewed in both regions were male, as Table 11 reflects. 
The PTT study conducted in 2003/04 found a gender distribution of 72% male and 28% 
female (ibid.).
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Table 11: Gender distribution of FURS household heads
Gender Hardap Omaheke Total
Male 18 8 26 (81%)
Female 2 4 6 (19%)
Total 20 12 32 (100%)
The levels of formal education among FURS farmers was very low. In Omaheke, 8 out 
of 12 or two thirds of the sampled farmers had no formal education, and only one had 
completed primary school. The low levels of formal education might have contributed to the 
poor economic performances of FURS farmers in Omaheke. In Hardap, only one farmer had 
completed tertiary education. Table 12 summarises the situation in both regions regarding 
formal education.
Many beneficiaries explained that they were not able to advance their formal education 
because their parents could not afford to keep them in school. Although this was not stated 
explicitly, it is reasonable to assume that one factor contributing to this state of affairs 
was that the parents of most beneficiaries had lived and worked on commercial farms: 
not only were their wages low, but logistical problems such as a lack of proper schooling 
facilities and a lack of transport may well have had a significantly negative impact on their 
children’s schooling. 
No FURS farmer sampled in either region had received formal agricultural training.
Table 12: Education levels of FURS household heads
Omaheke Hardap
No formal education 8 4
Some primary schooling 3 5
Primary school completed 1 5
Some secondary schooling 5
Tertiary education 1
Total 12 20
The education levels of other members of beneficiary households were not much higher. In 
Omaheke only two households had family members who had completed secondary school, 
and five had members with some secondary schooling. In three Omaheke households, 
completion of primary school was the highest level of education attained, and in two 
households the highest level was some primary schooling.
Looking at the levels of education of all 68 household members in the 12 households in 
Omaheke, the picture in Figure 1 on the next page emerged. More than 44% of all household 
members had no formal education, while more than 19% had some secondary schooling 
and less than 3% had completed secondary school.
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Figure 1: Education levels in FURS households in Omaheke
Of the 12 respondents in Omaheke, 5 were retired and receiving a monthly pension, 4 were 
full-time farmers, 1 was employed on a part-time basis, 1 was employed full time and 1 was 
unemployed. In Hardap, 5 farmers were in full-time employment, 14 regarded themselves 
as full-time farmers and 1 was retired. The employment status of the respondents in both 
regions is shown in Table 13.
Table 13: Employment status of FURS respondents
Omaheke Hardap Total # Total %
Full-time employed 1 5 6 18.8
Part-time employed 1 0 1 3.1
Full-time farmer 4 14 18 56.3
Unemployed 1 0 1 3.1
Retired 5 1 6 18.8
Total 12 20 32 100
In the Omaheke sample, just over 4% of all household members were employed full time and 
13% were employed part time, while close to 12% were retired. This indicates that financial 
contributions from sources other than farming (either salaries or pensions) were relatively 
low. Approximately one third (32%) of the people on resettlement farms were too young 
to work and almost the same number of beneficiaries were unemployed. Figure 2 gives a 
schematic overview of the employment status of FURS household members in Omaheke.
Figure 2: Employment status of FURS household members in Omaheke
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Table 14 shows that 28% of the FURS beneficiaries in Omaheke and Hardap had farmed on 
communal land before being resettled. A slightly higher percentage had farmed on freehold 
farms, while 22% were former farm workers. These figures suggests that most beneficiaries 
had gained experience in livestock husbandry and basic farming skills. 
Table 14: Previous work experience of FURS beneficiaries
Omaheke Hardap Total # Total %
Farmer elsewhere in a communal area 4 5 9 28.1
Farmer elsewhere on a commercial farm 1 9 10 31.3
Farm worker 4 3 7 21.9
Businessman 1 1 3.1
Unemployed 1 3 4 12.5
Employed by a company in the formal economy 1 1 3.1
Total 12 20 32 100
The data presented above suggests that many more respondents in Hardap had farmed on 
commercial farms before opting for resettlement. Only one in Omaheke was in this category. 
This must be attributed to the way that the questions in the questionnaire were posed. 
In Omaheke, one third of the beneficiaries had come from communal areas and another 
third had been farm workers. Four respondents stated that they had started farming before 
Independence, five started in the 1990s and two started only after 2007.
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Only two beneficiaries in the whole sample were previous fighters in the People’s Liberation 
Army of Namibia (PLAN). Mathew was 55 years of age. He was born in Caprivi and is of 
Subiya decent. In 1975 he went into exile to become a PLAN fighter. After returning to 
the country in 1989, he spent four years looking for a livelihood. He was not able to find 
any employment and so joined a group farming project on a government farm with a large 
dam close to Mariental. The project came to an end as the dam dried up. Eventually, at the 
age of 41 and having applied for settlement, he secured a place at Mara. He arrived on the 
farm at the end of May 1993 with nothing. Farming with Mathew on Mara was Petrus, born 
in 1949 in then Owamboland. He had worked for the Department of Water Affairs before 
going into exile in Angola in 1976. He served as a PLAN fighter in the liberation struggle, 
and thereafter went to Grootfontein in south-western Namibia, but was involved in a car 
accident. Due to injuries sustained in the accident, he was unable to find a job. Government 
then offered him a place at the same government farm project which Mathew had joined 
near Mariental. After the dam dried up and the project ended, he came to Mara together 
with Mathew. He received a pension of N$375 per month.
5.1.2  Motivation for resettlement
The majority of FURS beneficiaries applied to be resettled in order to farm with livestock. 
Most of them did not want to farm in communal areas as they had previously suffered losses 
there due to stock theft, this being a consequence of farmers not being able to control their 
livestock in communal areas. They hoped that by obtaining their own piece of land, they 
would be able to control their livestock, build up their herds and improve their livelihoods. 
Lazarus spent the first part of his childhood in the Epukiro communal area. He left for 
Windhoek in 1956 to complete Standard 8. Thereafter he was employed, but was fired in 
1977 due to his political activities. He went back to his relatives in Epukiro where he stayed 
until being settled on the farm Skoonheid in Omaheke in 1993. He used part of the money 
he had earned to buy livestock which he entrusted to his relatives in the communal area. 
After Independence he decided to leave the communal area simply because he was not 
able to control his livestock there. His first choice for resettlement was the remote area of 
Gam, which was also on communal land but not populated at the time. His application to be 
settled there failed, but he was offered the alternative of Skoonheid. Despite having lived 
there since 1993, he was conscious of the fact that he was settled there only on a temporary 
basis because the entire farm of Skoonheid was earmarked for San people. Despite his 
location being ‘temporary’, Lazarus expected to become wealthy by farming with cattle on 
Skoonheid. He had a bull and expected that his cows would be properly serviced and he 
would be able to build himself up.
Maria had settled in the Otjinene communal area in Omaheke in 1972. After her husband 
passed away she continued to farm on her own. However, stock theft was rampant in the 
area, and without her husband she found that she was more vulnerable to theft. She therefore 
decided to apply for a place on a resettlement farm. She had owned 200 head of cattle and 
over 300 goats, but stock theft had left her with only 50 and 30 respectively. She suspected 
that the stolen stock had been sold to a white farmer in the region. She expected to be able 
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to improve her standard of living by settling on the farm Danel in Omaheke. She believed 
that she would be able to expand her cattle farming activity to a level that would enable her 
to sell milk to the neighbouring school as well as start a vegetable garden. But none of her 
plans materialised. The grazing on the farm was plentiful but of poor quality. Her livestock 
were dying from unknown causes and the soil for vegetable gardening was poor.
A few beneficiaries applied for resettlement because they were no longer able to keep their 
livestock on the commercial farm where they worked, but they did not want to farm on 
communal land. Some commercial farmers allowed their farm workers to keep a limited 
number of animals on the farm as part of their remuneration. When the number of animals 
exceeded the maximum allowed, the worker either had to sell or transfer the animals to a 
communal area. Some commercial farmers charged grazing fees.
For Herman, a former farm worker, paying grazing fees was not an option as he still had 
children in school and could not afford to pay both school and grazing fees. To do so, he 
would have had to sell his livestock. Although he had been working for the same employer 
for 12 years, he decided to leave instead of paying grazing fees, and applied for resettlement 
at Skoonheid.
Like Maria, some other FURS beneficiaries regarded resettlement as a means to build up 
their live stock farming operations, albeit not necessarily to a large-scale commercial 
level. Jakob, a 32-year-old man who worked as a labourer for a FURS beneficiary indicated 
that he wanted to apply for resettlement on his own piece of land. He was working on the 
resettlement farm Rosenhof but had some cattle on a cattle post which his brother in law 
rented from a beneficiary on the resettlement farm Danel. Jakob wanted his own piece of 
land because it was impossible to farm in the village from which he hailed in the Epukiro 
communal area. In the event of being resettled, he would put his livestock and that of other 
family members on the farm, hire somebody to look after it and continue to earn cash 
through farm labour. This was necessary to preclude his having to sell his livestock to 
obtain cash to buy farm inputs such as medicines. His aim was to have around 100 cattle. 
All he needed to improve his livelihood was his own piece of land, even if it was only one 
camp. He did not think that he would ever use his cash to buy a car because a donkey-cart 
sufficed to fulfil his transport needs. 
For several beneficiaries, resettlement meant obtaining a piece of land on which to retire. 
Many former farm workers regarded this as a more attractive option for retirement than a 
communal area. Daniel and his wife Rosa were 73 and 70 years old respectively. They did 
not apply to be resettled at Mara but the Hardap Regional Governor allocated them a place 
there in 2000. Daniel was born on a commercial farm in the region where he became a 
farm labourer. He and Rosa married on that farm. He then worked on several other farms 
in the region. In 1990 they moved to a commercial farm in Rehoboth District. In 2000 the 
community there were told that they had to move out. The Regional Governor and the 
Regional Resettlement Committee of the Hardap Regional Council decided in October 2000 
that the community would be resettled at Mara. Although Daniel and Rosa had cultivated a 
small piece of land at Mara, they primarily wanted some land to retire on “in peace”.
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5.1.3  Settlers’ relationship with pre-settlement homes
Most of the FURS beneficiaries maintained relationships with relatives and acquaintances 
in communal areas or elsewhere. However, all respondents stated that they no longer had 
any livestock on communal land because the risks of losing stock on communal land were 
too high. 
Lazarus who farmed at Skoonheid still had close ties with his relatives in the Epukiro 
communal area from where he had come. One reason for this was that his son, a Windhoek-
based lawyer, was keeping a few livestock there. But Lazarus himself did not have any 
livestock there, and he said that he would not consider taking his livestock there even in a 
drought. In his view, communal areas were no longer favourable grazing areas, not least 
due to stock theft which was rife in these areas. He said that “as soon as cattle leave your 
kraal [in a communal area], they are not your cattle anymore”.
5.1.4  Settlers’ social relations and networks
On many resettlement farms, social relations among beneficiaries were problematic. This is 
partly due to the way that beneficiaries were selected. FURS beneficiaries did not have the 
benefit of choosing their neighbours. Social issues were not considered in the land allocation 
process, therefore fate alone determined who settled next to who. Most beneficiaries on a 
particular farm were not related, but rather were complete strangers at first. In addition, most 
had opted for resettlement to be able to take management decisions themselves. For them, 
resettlement represented the only option for leaving communal farming and communal 
decision-making behind.
The upshot of the above was that there was no real sense of community on most resettlement 
farms. Ethnic heterogeneity did not help the process either. In and of itself this might not 
have represented a problem, but it often became a problem when FURS beneficiaries had 
to co-operate on crucial farming issues by force of circumstance. The most important issue 
requiring co-operation was water. 
As resettlement farms are subdivisions of large-scale commercial farms, not all allocated 
portions of land had their own borehole. It was therefore very common for beneficiaries to 
have to share a borehole. In many cases this situation led to disputes. Issues of paying for 
maintenance, for example, gave rise to disputes because some beneficiaries watered more 
livestock than others. This was the case on the farm Panorama in Hardap which had only 
one water point. It was controlled by the labourer of a part-time beneficiary with a large 
number of livestock. A recurring issue was who was responsible for repairs and maintenance. 
Because his neighbour had fewer animals, he wanted to pay less.
One way to settle disputes over paying for the pumping of water was to require that each 
beneficiary provided his/her own diesel. On at least one farm, this solution was a departure 
from the earlier system of sharing the fuel costs. Farm Uitsicht in Hardap was allocated to 
three beneficiaries but had only one borehole. Two beneficiaries had to pump water from 
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this borehole over a distance of 8 km. Until 2005 they managed to buy diesel together, 
but this system did not prevail as the parties claimed to have no money when the supply 
ran out. Now each farmer bought his/her own fuel. If any of them did not have diesel, their 
livestock did not have water. In practice this meant that each farmer filled the tank of the 
engine with his/her own diesel, pumped enough water for his/her own consumption, and 
then emptied the tank of any remaining diesel which they took home.
In worst-case scenarios, the pipelines supplying beneficiaries without their own boreholes 
were cut as a result of disputes. It happened to Maria, a widow farming on Danel. She did not 
have her own borehole, and pipelines linked the water points in her camps to the borehole 
on her neighbour’s farm. The neighbour, who claimed ownership of the pipelines, cut some 
of her lines on the grounds that he could not get enough water if she also used the supply. 
She bought her own diesel to pump water, but when the engine broke down, she had no 
money to repair it, which exacerbated the tensions with the neighbour and the situation 
became even more difficult. On occasion the engine had been out of order for up to a month, 
so she had no water and had to take her livestock to the neighbouring resettlement farm. 
At times she had even transported water by truck from a nearby farm. She compared her 
situation with that of dogs: dogs normally walked together peacefully until they reached 
food, whereupon they started to fight, sometimes over nothing more than a bone.
However, sharing of water did not always lead to disputes. In some instances beneficiaries 
co-operated well in managing water points. On Rosenhof in Omaheke, for example, three 
beneficiaries shared one water point, and although there were minor tensions from time 
to time, they worked together to maintain the infrastructure and diesel supply. One of them 
said that if all their cattle had to drink water from that one water point only, they could not 
afford to quarrel. 
Ethnic differences sometimes impacted negatively on social relations on FURS farms. 
There was a strong perception among the beneficiaries sampled in both regions that Hardap 
traditionally ‘belongs’ to the Nama-speaking communities while Omaheke was associated 
with Otjiherero-speaking people. In view of this, and for some other political reasons, the 
MLR strove to implement a regional balance in allocating land. Ideally, a resettlement farm 
in Omaheke, for example, would be allocated to one Herero person, one Nama person, one 
person from Kavango and one from a north-central region – if indeed such a mix of people 
had applied for resettlement in a given area.
This approach did not go down well with all beneficiaries, however. At Mara in Hardap, 
Petrus, an Oshiwambo-speaking official beneficiary, said that Nama people had moved onto 
the farm without authorisation, claiming that it was their land and therefore he and his 
neighbour Mathew should go back to Owamboland and Caprivi respectively.
These ethnic tensions perhaps assumed more importance than was warranted in view of the 
fact that the Nama speakers on the farm were settled there by the Regional Governor while 
the non-Nama speakers were settled by the MLR. The official beneficiaries interpreted the 
Governor’s actions as interference with their rights, while the Nama people placed there by 
the Governor accused the MLR of supporting only the non-Nama beneficiaries.
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5.2 Production systems and output types /
‘productivity’
The agricultural histories of FURS beneficiaries are similar in many respects to those of 
AALS farmers. To a large extent, their production systems in Omaheke and Hardap reflect 
the different agro-ecological conditions of the two regions. Like their AALS counterparts, 
FURS beneficiaries in Hardap primarily practised extensive small-stock farming, while 
extensive cattle farming predominated in Omaheke, but all of them kept small or large 
stock in addition to their primary livestock herds.
The path of FURS farmers in accumulating livestock was similar to that of AALS farmers. 
Some accumulated small numbers of livestock while working on a commercial farm. They 
kept as much as the farmer allowed them to keep on the farm and either sold off the excess 
animals or sent them to communal areas to be looked after by a trusted person. Other 
beneficiaries were employees in urban areas who used some of their earnings to purchase 
livestock which they kept in a communal area. It was noted in section 5.1.1 of this report 
that compared to those in Omaheke, a higher proportion of beneficiaries in Hardap had 
farmed in one way or another on commercial farms. 
5.2.1  Farm sizes and tenure
Many beneficiaries did not know the exact size of the land allocated to them. This was partly 
due to none of the beneficiaries having any official documents specifying the size of their 
allocation and their rights regarding that land.
As readers will recall, the Land Reform Advisory Commission (LRAC) recommended that the 
minimum sizes of land allocations should be 1 000 ha in the central, eastern and northern 
regions, and 3 000 ha in the southern half of the country. Regardless of their farm size, most 
beneficiaries in the sample in both regions had 2 to 6 camps. Maria on the farm Danel in 
Omaheke, for example, received 6 camps which amounted to approximately 800 ha. All of 
the camps were fenced, but she did not have her own borehole and therefore obtained water 
for own consumption and for her livestock from a borehole on her neighbour’s portion of 
land. Lazarus in Omaheke ended up with 3 camps amounting to approximately 800 ha, 
on which he grazed 50 cattle and 50-55 goats. In Hardap, 95% of the beneficiaries sampled 
were allocated more than one camp, but the poor condition of the fences meant that they 
had little control over grazing. Many FURS farms were thus very similar to communal areas 
in terms of access to and control over grazing.
Although none of the FURS beneficiaries sampled had any formal lease agreement with the 
government, tenure insecurity was not a major issue for most and did not appear to impact 
negatively on production systems and agricultural outputs. Eight respondents (two thirds) 
in Omaheke stated that they felt secure on their land, while five stated that they had official 
lease agreements with the government. Only three (25%) stated that they had enough land 
on which to farm, while the remaining nine said that they did not have enough land. Eight 
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stated that they would be able to farm more effectively on more land. These findings suggest 
that many beneficiaries in Omaheke did not regard the allocated land units as big enough. 
5.2.2  Livestock farming
FURS beneficiaries commonly owned both cattle and small stock. In Omaheke, most owned 
cattle and/or goats in varying numbers. In Hardap, 7 of the 20 FURS farmers owned cattle, 
10 owned sheep and 13 owned goats. In both regions there were beneficiaries who did not 
own any livestock, i.e. 25% of the sample in Omaheke, but only one in Hardap. The latter 
said that all his livestock had been stolen, therefore he was working in town again. As the 
requirements for resettlement included that beneficiaries had to own some livestock, it can 
be assumed that all of them did have livestock before settling, but some had lost it due to 
stock theft or drought, or they had sold it.
Only one livestock owner in Omaheke and one in Hardap did not sell any livestock. Table 15 
reflects the livestock ownership situation in both regions. The survey respondents were 
asked to provide data on their livestock for the 365 days preceding the day of the interview. 
For Hardap this meant the period March 2007 to February 2008, and for Omaheke it was 
March 2008 to February 2009.
Table 15: Livestock ownership on FURS farms in Omaheke and Hardap, 2007/08
Omaheke Hardap
Number of beneficiaries in the sample 12 20
Owned cattle 7 7
Owned sheep 2 10
Owned goats 9 13
Number of beneficiaries owning no livestock 3 1
Livestock owners who did not sell any livestock by choice 1 1
Beneficiaries with 1 000 ha in Omaheke could stock the farm with about 66 LSU or 200 SSU 
or a combination of large and small stock. Beneficiaries in Hardap could stock a 3 000 ha 
farm with 120 LSU or 600 SSU or a combination. The differing agro-ecological conditions 
influenced the carrying capacities in each region. Table 16 reflects the types and numbers 
of livestock owned by the 9 livestock owners in Omaheke. Only 7 owned cattle, of whom 4 
had a viable herd (42 to 78 animals), while 3 had fewer than 10 cows and some calves.
Table 16: Livestock ownership on FURS farms in Omaheke, 2008
Calves Bulls Heifers Cows Goats Sheep
Farmer 1 1 4 2 6
Farmer 2 3 6 4 25
Farmer 3 4 1 8 12
Farmer 4 9 1 2 30 20
Farmer 5 11 1 3 37 25
Farmer 6 15 1 6 39 28
Farmer 7 20 2 9 47 42
Farmer 8 47
Farmer 9 68
Total 63 6 20 171 248 31
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The 9 goat owners had herd sizes of 2 to 68 goats. Table 16 suggests that 6 goat owners had 
sustainable herds, if small ones, of 20 to 68 goats. Only 2 beneficiaries kept sheep, and both 
herds were small. Sheep were not considered to be suitable for Omaheke. 
Table 16 also throws some light on the composition of livestock herds, which in turn gives 
some indication of future production potential, and also suggests what happened to the 
offspring of the previous year. Cows are the nucleus of any livestock production system. 
At least one bull is required for every 40 cows. Without any bull, the production potential 
is seriously limited. The number of calves reflects the herd productivity in the previous 
season. If the number of calves is under 60% of the number of cows, it can be assumed that 
there were problems with fertility or husbandry practices, or otherwise stock was lost or 
calves were sold once they were weaned. Not all female calves should be sold; some should 
be kept for future breeding. Heifers are female calves which should start producing calves of 
their own within the next breeding season. For goats and sheep, only the totals are provided 
in Table 16, and these clearly show the huge variance in small-stock numbers. 
All cattle owners had some cows for breeding. Four owners had herds of 30 cows and more, 
while 3 owners had fewer than 8 cows. The 7 cow owners jointly owned 171 cows and 63 
calves, indicating a calving rate of 37% to 50%. Ideally, 171 cows should have produced 103 
or more calves per year according to the national calving rate of 60%. Assuming that half 
of the 63 calves were female, it would have been possible to introduce 32 heifers into the 
productive herds each year. In addition to the natural increase in productive capacity, 4 
cattle owners brought 20 young heifers into their productive herds to expand production. 
Two owners purchased 12 new heifers from outside. It was common that young heifers were 
sold at weaning age to generate income, and this dramatically reduced the prospects of 
natural heifer production. The three smallest herds had no positive prospects for increased 
productivity in the near future, and the female herd was not growing.
One farmer had 12 oxen which he was preparing for slaughter at an abattoir.
Seven of the 9 goat owners in Omaheke had 12 to 68 goats, and the other 2 owners had 2 and 
4 goats respectively. The total herd number was increased with the purchase of 2 goats and 
the birth of 12 lambs. This slight increase was offset as 16 lambs, 1 ram and 2 wethers either 
died or were stolen. Only 2 goats were slaughtered for the 9 owners’ own consumption, but 
this might be an underestimation. Of the total goat population of 248, only 2 had been sold 
by one owner during the past year. This suggests that goats are not produced primarily for 
commercial purposes, but rather are kept for own consumption and occasional sale.
Most beneficiaries were aware of the advantages of bringing in new breeding stock (i.e. 
rams and bulls) in order to increase production and raise overall fertility. However, due 
to financial constraints this was a rare practice on the farms sampled in both regions. 
A good ram could cost up to half of the value of the increase in lamb production in the 
next lambing season, and it had to be paid immediately. In at least one case in Omaheke, 
three beneficiaries farming on adjacent units managed their cows and calves together. They 
placed all their cows together in the biggest camp and the calves in a smaller camp. The 
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cows of all three farmers were serviced by the two bulls belonging to one of them. Only one 
of the three had a labourer who assisted the other two from time to time.
In Hardap, due to the area’s aridity, there were fewer cattle owners who owned fewer cattle 
than in the Omaheke sample. As in Omaheke, there were herds in Hardap with potential 
for breeding and regular offtake. The prospects of other herds were limited by their small 
size. Table 17 suggests that five of the seven cattle owners in Hardap possessed a bull for 
breeding. The other two either made use of someone else’s bull for breeding or did not have 
access to bulls.
Table 17: Cattle ownership on FURS farms in Hardap, 2008
Calves Bulls Heifers Cows Oxen
Farmer 1 3
Farmer 2 4
Farmer 3 1 8
Farmer 4 4 1 3 11 1
Farmer 5 6 1 5 15
Farmer 6 8 1 8 17 3
Farmer 7 12 2 15 32 4
Total 30 6 31 90 7
In the Hardap sample, 4 beneficiaries owned 10 or more cattle. The largest cattle owner 
with 32 cows had a good offspring in the previous year. The number of calves in his herd 
suggested a calving rate of 38%. The calving rate of the other cattle owners varied between 
36% and 50%. Two beneficiaries owned 3 and 4 cows respectively with no bulls. There were 
A fenced internal camp on a resettlement farm in Omaheke.
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no calves at the time of the fieldwork, which could have been due to failure to conceive, 
current pregnancy, loss or sale. There were also no new productive cows, possibly because 
they had been sold. In general, fertility and reproduction could be increased but further 
details are needed to ascertain the cause of the low fertility rates. The year preceding the 
survey was considered to have been a drought period in which farmers had to reduce their 
livestock numbers. 
Cattle farming on the plains (“die vloere”) west of Maltahöhe was not possible as the lack 
of grazing makes the land unsuitable for large livestock. Cattle ownership was therefore 
very low. Information provided by some FURS beneficiaries suggests that cattle take a long 
time to recover from drought to become productive again. In a drought, cows are unlikely 
to conceive due to weakness. If a drought is followed by seasons of good rain, they might 
conceive again and nine months later give birth to a calf, but it can take one to two years 
after the first good rains for a cow to become productive again.
Table 18 reflects the numbers of small stock owned by the beneficiaries in the Hardap sample. 
The highly unequal distribution of small stock is striking: some farmers owned fairly large 
herds, while others had very small herds with limited production prospects.
The production of female herds was generally low. An increase in animal husbandry was 
possible but was challenging and limited during a drought when fertility decreased. Goat 
nannies/does (i.e. females) and sheep ewes are able to produce three lambs within two years 
with optimal husbandry. It was difficult to assess the natural reproduction of small-stock 
herds in the Hardap sample because the owners suffered devastating losses in the year 
preceding the fieldwork. Lamb deaths in the sheep and goat herds were very frequent due 
to cold weather. This reduction influenced the small-stock numbers dramatically.
Table 18: Small-stock ownership on FURS farms in Hardap, 2008
Sheep ram
s
Sheep heifers
Sheep ew
es
Sheep lam
bs
Sheep w
ethers
G
oat ram
s
G
oat  nannies
G
oat kids
G
oat w
ethers
Farmer 1 2 11 3 1 2 9
Farmer 2 2 18 1 6 12
Farmer 3 3 30 4 1 31 14
Farmer 4 3 35 5 1 35 15 4
Farmer 5 3 45 10 2 50 17
Farmer 6 3 87 12 5 2 50 20
Farmer 7 3 110 18 2 75 21
Farmer 8 4 46 150 30 2 105 32 20
Farmer 9 5 54 160 31 15 2 118 48 22
Farmer 10 8 60 250 100 38 2 122 50
Farmer 11 8 3 130 60 28
Farmer 12 4 264 68 31
Farmer 13 5 300 72 40
Total 44 160 896 201 53 28 1 288 438 99
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5.2.3  Production costs and gross incomes
Livestock farming costs varied greatly between livestock owners. Indications were that 
those who owned larger herds purchased inputs and invested in their livestock to increase 
herd productivity, whereas those with smaller herds minimised their production costs and 
purchased the minimal amount of inputs.
The seven cattle owners in the Omaheke sample incurred total livestock-related costs 
ranging from N$100 to N$11 500 per annum. Two did not have any livestock-related costs. 
Four incurred veterinary costs ranging from N$70 to N$2 000.
Production costs incurred by goat farmers in the Omaheke sample were much lower, at N$20 
to N$3 000 per annum. These costs included veterinary, labour, supplementary feed and 
transport costs. Four of the five goat farmers incurred goat-related costs of under N$900 
per annum. Annual compulsory vaccines were not administered by all of the farmers.
The direct allocable goat-related costs in Hardap totalled N$23 793 in the year preceding 
the fieldwork, incurred by 7 of the 13 goat owners. Individual costs ranged from N$120 to 
N$7 500. The 4 who owned the largest numbers of goats incurred 95% of the total. 
The same applied to the sheep owners, with the 4 owners of the largest numbers incurring 
97% of the total sheep-related costs. Two other sheep owners only purchased dosing 
medicines and vaccinations at a total cost of N$200 per owner. The four owners with the 
smallest numbers of sheep did not incur any costs.
The mandatory annual vaccine for sheep and goats and vaccination against the most 
prevalent diseases would have cost approximately N$5 per dose. Vaccination bottles are 
usually available in doses for 20 animals. Regular vaccination helps to reduce the incidence 
of disease and death among small stock, particularly where the poor condition of internal 
fences allows for livestock to roam around freely and therefore to come into contact with 
the livestock of other beneficiaries. However, veterinary officials stated that while normal 
vaccinations were being administered, this was often done incorrectly or at lesser doses. It 
was not uncommon that a beneficiary bought vaccines but administered only half a dose 
per animal. In some cases, one vaccine bottle was bought and kept at room temperature 
only to be used when the first clinical signs of disease became rampant.
Production costs might have been higher than usual in Hardap due to the drought that 
preceded the fieldwork. Farmers in Hardap incurred higher costs than their counterparts 
in Omaheke for supplementary feeding and fodder for cattle, sheep and goats. During dry 
periods of the year, many Hardap beneficiaries invested in additional assistance for their 
livestock. 
Table 19 on the next page gives an indication of the gross incomes realised on all of the 
FURS farms sampled in Omaheke and Hardap.
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Table 19: Gross incomes of FURS livestock farmers in Omaheke and Hardap, 2008
Omaheke Hardap
Total area covered in sample (ha) 9 718 44 760
Total number of cattle 272 181
Number of cattle sold 39 14 
Cattle sales value (N$) 52 000 38 900
Direct allocable cattle costs (N$) 31 320 13 837
Gross income (N$) 20 680 25 063
Total number of goats 248 2 124
Number of goats sold 9 1 124 
Goat sales value (N$) 6 800 108 442
Direct allocable goat costs (N$) 4 646 23 793
Gross income (N$) 2 154 84 649
Total number of sheep 31 1192
Number of sheep sold 5 775 
Sheep sales value (N$) 1 600 78 975
Direct allocable sheep costs (N$) 3 716 32 472
Gross income (N$) -2 116 46 503
These aggregate figures allow for certain deductions to be made regarding stocking rates 
and intensity of land use. The total land area allocated to farmers in the Omaheke sample 
was approximately 9 718 ha. With a carrying capacity of 15 ha per LSU and 6 ha per SSU, 
this area could carry a total of 648 LSU or 1 620 SSU. Given the total combined numbers of 
livestock in the sample, cattle utilised 4 080 ha, small stock 1 395 ha, and horses and donkeys 
an additional 1 065 ha. The combined utilisation thus amounts to 6 540 ha which is 67% of 
the total carrying capacity. Therefore, almost one third of the grazing land was not utilised 
for livestock production. Livestock lost to and consumed by households during the year 
preceding the fieldwork accounted for an estimated 235 ha in addition, which brings the 
total area utilised to 6 775 ha, amounting to almost 70% of the overall carrying capacity of 
land in the sample. 
The total cattle, goat and sheep costs include the direct allocable costs borne directly by 
the owner for each livestock type. These costs included veterinary, fodder, supplementary 
feeding, hired labour and transport costs. Lazarus at Skoonheid, for example, was buying 
salt and supplementary feed as well as medicines and vaccines for his cattle. Matthias, 
another cattle farmer in Omaheke, also regularly bought lick for his cattle. He stated that 
provision of lick is essential in Omaheke: “Without lick, you would be without cattle.”
Administrative costs and costs relating to maintenance of farming infrastructure, vehicles 
and water supply are not included in direct allocable costs. The questionnaire included the 
question of whether any animals had been transferred to another place or given away as 
gifts. One respondent had transferred seven goats to his family as a gift. No respondent had 
transferred or given away any cattle or sheep.
The combined gross income from cattle and goat farming in Omaheke in the year preceding 
the fieldwork was N$22 834 for the 9 718 ha. The gross income of the two sheep farmers was 
negative (they made a loss) and was not included in the total. This amounts to a gross income 
of N$2,35 per hectare. By comparison, commercial large-stock ranching on larger farming 
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units can have a net farm income of over N$20 per hectare (personal communication with 
study group leaders in Omaheke). Net farm income includes costs that are excluded from 
direct allocable costs, i.e. it includes costs of maintaining farm infrastructure, water supply, 
vehicles, etc., but excludes the costs of purchasing the farm or renting land.
The FURS respondents in Hardap farmed on an approximate total area of 44 760 ha. The 
cattle, goats and sheep jointly utilised 21 105 ha, taking into consideration that the carrying 
capacity was much lower in this arid region; it was thought to be 25 ha per LSU. Horses 
and donkeys utilised an additional 1 500 ha. The total number of livestock in the Hardap 
sample thus utilised 22 605 ha or 50% of the total possible carrying capacity. Including 
livestock lost and livestock slaughtered for own consumption in Hardap brings the total 
area utilised to 3 510 ha or 58% of the carrying capacity. Gross income on the respondents’ 
farmland was N$156 215 or N$3,50 per hectare.
These figures suggest that resettlement land in Hardap was more intensely utilised than the 
land in Omaheke if measured by income generated per hectare. This is surprising in view of 
the fact that Hardap poses more challenges due to its aridity and high levels of stock loss. 
The data and analysis suggests that there were two broad categories of FURS beneficiaries 
in both regions. They were distinguished mainly by their asset base and seemingly different 
production objectives. For beneficiaries with large herds of livestock, agricultural output 
was important. In both regions this group included part-time farmers who had access to 
off-farm income streams through employment. For the second group, being those owning 
only small numbers of livestock, agricultural productivity was not necessarily the main 
reason for applying for resettlement. This group’s investment in infrastructure was kept to 
a minimum and most income was spent on consumables.
Several households in both regions had access to off-farm income. In Omaheke, apart from 
11 households with pensioners, there were 5 households with individuals earning a salary 
from formal employment. Their incomes were modest, ranging from less than N$1 000 per 
month in three cases to N$2 200 earned by a tailor. Another earned N$2 000 per month for 
woodwork. Respondents said that the money earned from off-farm activities was used in 
their respective orders of priority to pay for food, household goods, travel, fuel, school fees, 
farming implements, more livestock, medical services, seed, building materials and repairs, 
and to help relatives and repay loans. A few respondents managed to use some income to 
boost their savings. 
5.2.4  Constraints on productivity
Many beneficiaries identified stock theft and loss to predators as major factors that reduced 
farm productivity and output. Matthias in Omaheke stated that if his herd produced 40 
lambs in a year, 15 to 25 would be lost to either thieves or predators (mainly jackals). In 
Mariental District in Hardap, Jeremiah suffered big losses due to stock theft, his camp being 
situated next to a district road that connects some of the major towns in the region. The 
beneficiaries in the district did not have much confidence in the police’s ability to investigate 
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stock theft there. The closest police station was at Gibeon, approximately 100 km west of 
the farm Jakkalsdraai. Often the police did not have staff and/or vehicles to investigate 
crime in the area, and if they did come out to the crime scene, there was never any follow-up 
investigation. Maria in Omaheke was adamant that most of the stock theft on her farm was 
committed by people from the neighbouring group resettlement scheme at Skoonheid. In 
her view, government had not done people in the surrounding areas a favour by settling 
people at Skoonheid. This view may be imbued with some ethnic bias in that the settlers 
on Skoonheid are predominantly of San decent.
Livestock diseases were another cause of losses, particularly of goat and sheep lambs which 
are highly susceptible to diseases and which made up the highest percentage of small-stock 
losses. In Omaheke, more cattle were lost than small stock. The survey did not classify 
stock losses in terms of natural death, theft and lost (i.e. wandering away). Table 20 reflects 
all stock losses as well as the numbers of animals that beneficiaries consumed themselves.
Table 20: Livestock losses and livestock utilised for own consumption on FURS farms, 2008
Omaheke Hardap
Died, lost, stolen Own consumption Died, lost, stolen Own consumption
Cattle
Calves 8 1
Heifers 5 3
Cows 5 4
Oxen 3 1 1
Goats
Lambs 14 138 31
Rams 1
Nannies 69 10
Wethers 3 16 3 21
Sheep
Lambs 12 154 37
Ewes 2 151 15
Wethers 1 28
Attaching a market value to the high livestock losses in Hardap would decrease the gross 
income per hectare by N$1,50 to give a gross income of only N$1,50 per hectare. 
Respondents in Hardap did not explicitly mention the reasons for their cattle losses. The 
small stock lost were mainly lambs and ewes/nannies. Lambs are highly susceptible to 
diseases and require good husbandry practices. The high losses of adult females could be 
attributed to veterinary causes and poor condition, especially during the early lactation 
period. A few farmers in Hardap mentioned that in October 2007 (i.e. three months before 
the applicable interviews), a devastating cold front which lasted for a few days resulted in 
substantial losses. These losses were included in the data to be analysed. Four beneficiaries 
mentioned that they had slaughtered some small stock (goats and sheep) on a regular basis 
for their household’s consumption. It was common for farmers to slaughter one or two goats 
or sheep per month for consumption by themselves and their workers.
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Dilapidated and/or non-existent farm infrastructure also impacted negatively on agricultural 
production. Close to half of the respondents in both regions singled out water as their main 
problem and stated emphatically that every beneficiary should have his/her own water 
point. None of them considered shared water points with shared costs and responsibility to 
be a preferred system for water supply. Specific issues raised with regard to water included 
decrepit infrastructure and a lack of capital to repair or replace it, and not having enough 
water points. Two respondents expressed their need for support to obtain diesel which they 
regarded as too expensive. 
The general picture on FURS farms was that the majority of beneficiaries lacked financial 
means to repair water infrastructure. In situations where water sources were shared, this 
exacerbated conflict, as in the case of Maria in Omaheke whose story was related in section 
5.1.4 of this report (p. 93).
In some instances, beneficiaries had invested their own money to get basic infrastructure 
operational again. Matthias, for example, not only maintained his camp fences but also 
demolished the old decrepit kraal and built a new one. In addition he built a permanent 
house as well as a corrugated-iron house, despite having no documented proof of security 
and his allocation being to small.
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Dilapidated water infrastructure at Mara resettlement farm, Hardap.
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5.2.5  Marketing 
Table 21 summarises livestock sales in both regions in the year preceding the fieldwork. 
Beneficiaries in Hardap recorded higher sales of livestock units than those in Omaheke. 
This is not significant only in terms of absolute units sold, but also in terms of what this 
says about livestock production in the two regions. The data suggests that beneficiaries 
in Hardap did not sell any breeding stock with the exception of two cows. This was in 
stark contrast to the findings in Omaheke where the sale of cows and heifers appeared to be 
a very common practice. Selling breeding stock reduces a livestock farmer’s breeding nucleus 
with potentially negative results for the medium term. The sale of 26 cows in Omaheke 
suggests that the urgency of generating cash income was greater than the need to invest in 
order to increase cattle production. Old cows have to be sold once their productive years 
have ended, but they should be replaced with heifers to maintain or expand a herd.
Table 21: FURS livestock sales in Omaheke and Hardap, 2007/08
Omaheke Hardap
Cattle Weaners 2 4
Heifers 5 0
Oxen 6 8
Cows 26 2
Sheep Lambs/weaners 0 65
Ewes 2 618
Young males 2 92
Goats Kids/weaners 0 105
Nannies 0 927
Young males 2 92
Although the survey data does not bear this out, qualitative interviews suggested strongly 
that many beneficiaries were selling weaners rather than oxen. Matthias marketed weaners 
once a year. One of his reasons for selling weaners was that his two camps were too small. 
By selling weaners after six months or so, he relieved pressure on grazing to some extent. 
The other reason was that weaners gave him a more regular revenue stream in the short 
term. Selling 30 or 40 weaners per annum gave him enough income to live on. He sold small 
stock only on an ad hoc basis. He said that these animals were basically just running on his 
land, providing meat for his family and the jackals. He was also milking his cows to make 
omaere (sour milk) for his family’s own consumption. He did not sell any milk or omaere.
Goat sales in Hardap reflected the skewed distribution of small stock. Four farmers in the 
sample sold a total of 927 nannies. One farmer sold only 9 nannies, one sold 18, and two 
sold 150 and 750 respectively. Thus there was a very uneven spread among beneficiaries 
with regard to small-stock sales, and only the four biggest owners sold stock. The pattern 
among sheep farmers was similar, with only the biggest owners selling stock.
Livestock were sold to cover a wide spectrum of needs. In Omaheke, calves were sold to 
help relatives financially, heifers were sold to buy implements and food and to repay loans, 
cows were sold to buy goods and repay loans and cover travel costs, oxen were sold to buy 
goods, and goats were sold to cover travel costs. As herds in Omaheke consisted mostly of 
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female animals, beneficiaries were forced to sell these reproductive assets to improve their 
cash flow, but selling breeding stock to cover day-to-day expenses has seriously limited their 
prospects for further expansion and reproduction over the medium term.
Beneficiaries in the Hardap sample stated that they sold calves and cows to buy food for 
own consumption. This suggests that by selling cows and calves, cattle owners with small 
herds were decreasing their breeding stock. Goat nannies and sheep ewes were sold to buy 
food and help relatives. The annual offspring of male lambs and other marketable animals 
were sold to buy goods, food and more livestock, and pay for repairs, education and medical 
needs. Indications were that the smaller farmers were gradually decreasing their female 
herds due to their need for immediate cash to cover urgent needs. Beneficiaries with larger 
herds were selling primarily for commercial reasons.
Availability of markets for livestock in both regions did not constitute a problem for the 
beneficiaries. Accessing those markets, however, was difficult for many due to their having 
no access to transport. Livestock farmers were aware that auctions represented the best 
marketing prospects. While transport could be hired, this was only economically feasible if 
farmers combined their livestock into one large consignment that fills the trucks to capacity. 
Farmers with smaller herds and hence smaller numbers for marketing found it difficult to 
take their livestock to auctions on their own steam. But sharing consignments also posed 
challenges as not all beneficiaries necessarily wanted to market at the same time.
Another option available to and often used by beneficiaries was selling directly to individual 
buyers and neighbouring farmers, who usually came with their own small pick-up trucks 
which allowed for buying and transporting up to 10 small-stock units. This not only gave 
beneficiaries the freedom to sell livestock whenever they needed to, but also removed the 
problem of transport. Those located closer to auction venues tended to take their livestock 
to auction themselves. It was estimated that if beneficiaries lived more than 40 km away 
from an auction venue, it became difficult to pay for transport, whereas distances shorter 
than 40 km were manageable.
The auction facilities most commonly used by beneficiaries in the Omaheke sample were at 
Plessisplaas. In many cases they had access to information on prices, and accordingly took 
prior decisions on whether or not to sell. Matthias, for example, received price information 
from a buying agent via his cell phone, but prices were also advertised on shop doors. 
When the prices were right, he sold quite a few cattle. In July 2008 he sold 30 weaners. He 
used his own pick-up to transport his livestock to Plessisplaas and was able to transport up 
to 5 weaners at a time. Maria at Danel sold 8 to 10 head of cattle per year, and sometimes 
12. She also took her livestock to the neighbouring farm, Plessisplaas, where private and 
auction sales took place regularly. She used to obtain price information from the Afrikaans 
radio service as other community radio stations did not broadcast prices. However, in most 
instances when she sold her stock, price was less important than her need to obtain cash. 
There is a tendency to market a lot of livestock around the start of the school year when 
school fees have to be paid, even though prices may not be at their peak at that time. During 
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the remainder of the year, goats are sold on an informal basis when money is needed. In 
Hardap especially, small stock are very lean at the beginning of the year when there is little 
foliage and hardly any grazing. Prices for small stock are thus generally lower at that time.
Lazarus, a full-time FURS farmer at Skoonheid, started to work in Windhoek after completing 
Standard 6 (Grade 8) in 1956. While working he bought livestock which he placed in the 
care of his family in the Epukiro communal area. All the animals he owned he bought 
himself; his family did not give him any animals. He ended up with 3 camps of about 
800 ha in total. He grazed 50 head of cattle and 50 to 55 goats on that land. At one stage 
these numbers were much higher at 70 cattle and 80 goats, but they declined due to disease, 
drought, death and sales. When he arrived at Skoonheid in 1993 he had 35 cattle. He did not 
own chickens as he regarded them as a waste of time: “If you eat white meat, you will still 
want to have red meat.” He sold his cattle and small stock both at auctions and to private 
buyers, but the latter were his preference as they paid better prices than buyers at auctions. 
In both cases, his livestock had to be taken to Plessisplaas. A number of beneficiaries at 
Skoonheid combined their livestock and hired a truck to take their livestock to Plessisplaas. 
The costs for this were N$200 per LSU. Lazarus normally sold cattle every three months 
or so, sometimes four head at a time or only one head, depending on the circumstances. 
He never slaughtered cattle for own consumption, but only goats. Cattle were only eaten 
when they died. At the time of the field visit, he had sold his two bulls as he feared that they 
might have succumbed to the poor condition of the veld. Once the veld improved, he wanted 
to raise two more bulls from his own herd. In a drought he usually sold some livestock to 
buy feed for the remaining animals. In addition he would try to find grazing in the vicinity. 
Taking his animals to the communal area was not an option. 
5.2.6  Diversification
Options for land-based livelihood diversification were limited for beneficiaries in both 
regions for reasons relating mainly to rainfall. In Omaheke some farmers engaged in small-
scale rainfed cultivation, primarily of maize and beans. Lazarus is one example. His wife 
was in charge of planting maize and beans on a piece of land smaller than a football pitch. 
The whole family provided labour inputs. As they did not have a tractor, they cultivated by 
hand. The maize was for own consumption and for feeding the goats. Because they did not 
have a mill for producing maize meal (aka mielie-meal), they produced stampmielies (samp). 
If he had more land, they would have enlarged the piece used for cultivation.
Stephanus settled at Grootrooibult in 1997. Although he had a garden in which he grew 
vegetables, it was only in 2008 that he considered starting to plough. His main reason for 
not having ploughed earlier was that he lacked appropriate implements to do so. As he and 
his wife were retired and of advanced age, they were no longer able to plough with donkeys. 
He approached the Skoonheid project manager with a request to plough his land with the 
project tractor against payment, but this was not possible. He was hoping to gather three 
or four beneficiaries interested in ploughing to approach government to provide a tractor 
and implements for them. In the meantime he had hired beneficiaries from the Skoonheid 
group resettlement project to clear his field.
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Herman who farmed on a portion of Skoonheid also had a small piece of land on which 
he cultivated maize and beans. Its size was probably smaller than a football pitch. He took 
his maize to a farmer in the vicinity to be milled into flour. His field did not yield enough 
for own consumption and feeding his chickens, but it helped. A shortage of labour power 
prevented him from enlarging the field, but people from the Skoonheid group resettlement 
project helped him.
In addition to cultivating a small piece of land, Herman made tombstones. He referred to 
this as a hobby that started before he was resettled. After resettlement, the MLR gave him 
financial support for buying shovels, a wheelbarrow, troughs, cement and steel. There was a 
good market for his tombstones. When people placed orders, he demanded a deposit before 
starting the job, and delivered only when the full outstanding amount had been paid. 
In Hardap, diversification was limited to very few farms with enough water to irrigate. One 
such farm was Mara, which was settled on the assumption that beneficiaries would focus 
on irrigated crop production. This was still happening on a very limited scale, but the main 
source of income for beneficiaries there was the sale of small stock. The full potential of 
irrigable land on FURS farms in Hardap has not been exploited in most cases. On Mara, 
for example, only 2.5 ha are being cultivated by three beneficiaries, and crop production is 
generally low. A factor that impacted negatively on the marketing of crops was the absence 
of timely and organised transport arrangements. Quite often when crops were ready for 
marketing, transport was lacking to get them to the markets.
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5.2.7  Skills 
Although many FURS beneficiaries were satisfied with their ‘fate’ on resettlement farms, their 
agricultural productivity was constrained by several factors. Inadequacy of appropriate 
skills was a factor mentioned by many beneficiaries. Only a few had basic skills in general farm 
maintenance, animal husbandry and business management, and many lacked knowledge of 
appropriate farming practices/methods. Maria, a retired widow, was allocated a portion of 
the farm Danel. She felt that she did not have sufficient skills to farm, and that government 
should train people like her before settling them. Due to her lack of skills, she was likely to 
stay where she was rather than develop as a farmer. She arrived with 60 cattle and 14 goats 
in 2000, and had only a few more at the time of the survey. 
Apart from some support provided recently by the Emerging Farmers Support Programme 
initiated in 2007 to support AALS and FURS beneficiaries, FURS beneficiaries did not receive 
any post-settlement support from government or any other agency. In Hardap, 75% of the 
FURS respondents indicated that they had never received any services in support of their 
agricultural activities. While some knew where to obtain specific agricultural information, 
many did not. Only three were able to access farming information whenever they needed it. 
The other eight did not know where to access information. The Ministry of Agriculture and 
Agra were the most important sources of agricultural information in Omaheke and Hardap.
The issue of post-settlement support will be addressed in the near future in terms of the MLR’s 
Strategic Plan 2006-2010, which treats provision of basic infrastructure and empowerment 
of communities as a separate strategic theme. The plan states that the MLR will provide 
tailor-made pre- and post-settlement support packages which include technical advice, 
training and support in appropriate farming methods and agricultural practices (MLR 
2007: 11). At the time of writing this report, the MLR was considering proposals to provide 
infrastructure development grants to FURS beneficiaries. 
5.2.8  Finances 
Two thirds of the farmers experienced farming-related financial and managerial problems. 
Most required financial assistance from various quarters (i.e. government and bank loans) 
to finance their farming activities, but often this assistance was not granted. To Jeremiah it 
seemed impossible to obtain loans to pay for infrastructural improvements. Banks required 
security such as a house or an investment policy, and since the leasehold agreements with 
resettlement farmers were not yet in place, they could not use their land as collateral. In 
fact it appeared that the absence of a leasehold agreement with the MLR was the biggest 
obstacle facing resettlement beneficiaries. Jeremiah, who did not have a lease, was acutely 
aware of the importance of a proper lease agreement: 
It is only when you have the papers that you have the right to get the other people off 
the farm. The Ministry only talked about the 99 years agreement, but they have not 
given me any papers yet. I wanted to keep the place neat and I wanted my children also 
to farm here one day. We wanted government to give the land to us. If the land was 
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our own property, we could at least take proper care of it and put in much more. Even 
if they resettled us correctly, it would have helped a lot. The units must be together in 
order for us not to move from the one camp across someone else’s land to get to your 
other camp. This is causing conflict and the Ministry knows this, because we have told 
them so several times in the past.
5.3 Typology of livelihood strategies in relation 
to land reform 
A number of livelihood strategies of FURS beneficiaries are discussed in this section in 
relation to land reform.
5.3.1  Land-based livelihood strategies
Extensive livestock farming was the single most important land-based livelihood strategy 
of FURS beneficiaries. Where rainfall permitted, livestock farming was combined with small-
scale crop cultivation for own use as well as limited sale. 
5.3.1.1 Accessing land for residence and retirement
It has been noted in this report that for older beneficiaries in particular, the priority in 
applying for resettlement was to find a secure home. Pensioners interviewed appreciated 
the fact that they could live in peace on their plot, receiving a small pension and keeping a 
few livestock. For Daniel and Rosa, an elderly couple at Mara in Hardap, the main advantage 
of being resettled on a government farm was to have a place where they could “rustig sit” (sit 
peacefully). They wanted their own secure place because wherever they had gone before, 
they had to leave again as it was not their own place. However, they would have liked to be 
given an official document to secure their rights to the land on which they had now settled.
Stephanus on the farm Grootrooibult in Omaheke did not really want to farm, but his wife 
persuaded him to apply for land in view of their impending retirement and because she 
found life in Windhoek too fast. They moved to the farm in 1997 and were very happy there 
10 years later. They were still farming, not to ‘get rich’ but only to sustain themselves. Life 
in town had been too expensive and too noisy, but on their farm it was quiet and peaceful, 
and they were very grateful for the allocation of this portion of land. Although Stephanus 
might have qualified for an AALS loan as the owner of the required 150 head of cattle, he 
preferred to be resettled as he did not have the required deposit for an AALS farm and did 
know how he would have serviced the loan as a pensioner.
5.3.1.2 Small-scale crop cultivation to supplement food supply and income
Crop cultivation (or ‘cropping’) in both Hardap and Omaheke is very risky due to the high 
variability in rainfall and low annual rainfall. However, some beneficiaries in Omaheke 
were ploughing small pieces of land ranging in size from smaller than a soccer pitch to 7 ha. 
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The most common crops grown were maize and beans. Beneficiaries consumed much of 
their harvests themselves, and used much of the maize to feed livestock. Depending on the 
size of land cultivated, surplus was sold at nearby markets, e.g. in the communal areas. A 
few beneficiaries had gardens in which they grew vegetables such as cabbage, carrots and 
beans for household use.
5.3.1.3 Crop cultivation to obtain livestock assets
Not a single FURS beneficiary regarded cropping as his/her main livelihood strategy, not 
even where water was abundant and free of charge as is the case at Mara. The main reason 
for this is that most resettlement farms did not have enough water to irrigate crops on a 
large scale. Where there was enough water, the cost of pumping was too high to irrigate.
However, at least two beneficiaries with access to artesian water used cropping to obtain 
assets including small stock. Mathew and Petrus arrived at Mara with no livestock. They 
cultivated small portions of land with artesian water which is cost free. They invested part of 
the proceeds in small stock. However, intensive gardening was difficult, mainly due to the 
distance to markets and a lack of appropriate storage facilities. The risk of vegetables rotting 
was high. In time, small stock became their main agricultural activity. Petrus summed this 
up succinctly in saying, “Die tuin het nie geld nie. Goed vrot net.” (The garden does not have 
money. The stuff only rots.) Although both Petrus and Mathew continued to cultivate crops, 
goat farming formed the backbone of their livelihood as it brought in more money than the 
garden produce. 
5.3.1.4  Harvesting of natural resources
With two exceptions, utilisation of natural resources did not play a major role in livelihood 
strategies. The exceptions were collection of firewood for cooking and droppers for fencing. 
Firewood appeared to be plentiful on most resettlement farms. In Omaheke, beneficiaries 
used branches of the yellow wood tree to make fence droppers. This wood is durable and 
thus an appropriate substitute for the droppers sold commercially. This implied major 
savings in fence maintenance.
5.3.1.5 Employment of non-beneficiaries
Many FURS beneficiaries employed farm labourers. Part-time beneficiaries who worked in 
town needed to have someone on the farm to look after livestock while they were away. 
The definition of a ‘labourer’ and remuneration for labourers differed from beneficiary to 
beneficiary. Lazarus at Skoonheid, for example, said that he had a San man staying with 
him. He did not really work for him but only assisted. He did not get a monthly wage as he 
was part of the family and ate with them. If he needed something, he was given N$100.
Beneficiaries on the farms around the Skoonheid group resettlement scheme hired piece 
workers from the scheme when they needed labour, e.g. for fencing jobs. These labourers 
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were predominantly San people. When the need arose, the beneficiaries would go to the 
scheme and recruit people at a wage agreed between them. Apart from money, the labourers 
received basic rations, depending on the duration of the employment. Maria, for example, 
a retired and widowed farmer on a farm adjacent to Skoonheid, had recruited temporary 
labour there on several occasions, especially for the task of mending the fences of her camps.
Remuneration of farm labourers was generally low. Matthias employed one permanent 
labourer, on a full-time basis, to whom he referred as “my Bushman who I raised”. He was 
paid N$300 per month and received rations in addition. He was also allowed to keep his 
four or five cattle in the camps.
Thirty-two year old Jakob was a farm worker on a FURS farm. He had worked on several 
commercial farms prior to being employed by a beneficiary on the farm Grootrooibult. After 
four years there he left on the grounds that his remuneration was too low. The beneficiary 
had paid him N$200 per month and also gave him mealie-meal, sugar, fat and a little tea, 
but these did not suffice as rations for a whole month. He stayed there for a long time only 
because it was difficult to find alternative employment and he had a 10-year-old daughter to 
look after. Having left Grootrooibult, he went to live with his uncle on the nearby resettlement 
farm Rosenhof. He helped his uncle because the latter’s eyesight was failing. In return, rather 
than a monthly wage, he received food and a little money when his uncle sold cattle. Thereafter 
he worked for a female beneficiary who was a pensioner living in Windhoek. She farmed on a 
unit next to his uncle’s unit, but could not farm full-time for health reasons. Jakob effectively 
ran the entire farming operation for her, in return for which he received N$150 per month 
and 20 kg of mealie-meal as well as sugar, tea, coffee, rice, macaroni and soup. In addition, 
as he milked every day, he made sour milk (omaere) for his own consumption. He ate meat 
only when his employer came to the farm from Windhoek. This was enough food for him. 
Although he worked as a labourer for other beneficiaries, Jakob owned 14 cattle which he 
kept on a portion of the farm Danel which his brother-in-law and father hired from another 
beneficiary. The family members (his brother-in-law, his parents and himself) kept a total 
of 80-90 cattle on that portion. They employed someone else to look after the cattle. Asked 
why he did not do this, Jakob said that if he looked after them and needed cash, he would 
sell a calf and hence not make progress. The person looking after the cattle was paid N$450 
per month plus rations. Jakob only sold an animal if he needed money for his child. 
5.4 Combinations of land-based and other 
livelihood strategies
Beneficiaries were combining land-based and other livelihood strategies to survive. 
Overall, monthly old-age pensions were the most important source of additional cash for 
FURS households. These were received on all FURS farms by farmers or their spouses or other 
family members living in the household (e.g. mother, father or another relative). The pension 
of N$370 (2008) assisted in covering the monthly household expenses. 
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Part-time FURS beneficiaries were able to supplement their farming income with income 
from their off-farm employment, whereas farming was the main source of income for full-
time farmers. None of the full-time farmers sampled performed any piece work to generate 
additional income.
An example of a part-time farmer combining two sources of income was Matthias in 
Omaheke who supplemented his farming income with income from his long-distance taxi 
business and vice versa. He made money out of farming, but when a mini-bus broke and 
he had cash from a livestock sale, he would use it to get the mini-bus back on the road. 
Conversely, if he needed money for his farming operation, during a dry year for example, he 
made use of income generated by his taxi business. He said that there was no other way to 
survive. He would not have been able to continue farming cattle without the taxi business 
and vice versa. His income from farming was simply not enough.
During very dry years, government distributed drought aid to certain target groups. This 
was also the case in December 2008 when some beneficiaries in Omaheke received drought 
aid. Maria received 25 kg of mielie-meal and two bottles of cooking oil. She never applied 
for this support. Her understanding was that this aid was for people “what nie lewe het nie” 
(who have no life), i.e. pensioners and people without income. 
Interview with FURS beneficiaries in Hardap.
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5.5 Livelihood trajectories
Based on its findings and observations, the research team has formulated a number of 
livelihood trajectories (pathways) pertaining to FURS farmers. Again, as was stated in the 
section on AALS trajectories, while the ‘ideal’ FURS trajectory corresponds closely with 
policy objectives, it is hardly ever achieved in reality.
5.5.1   The ‘ideal’ trajectory
Landless, previously disadvantaged person with no assets or employment
Becomes a full-time FURS farmer
Invests in farming
Buys a farm through the AALS
Expands his/her farming enterprise
The ‘ideal’ trajectory reflects what amounts to successful poverty alleviation through land 
reform. It begins with previously disadvantaged Namibians who have no assets, land or 
employment. They are officially resettled on a group gardening project, which makes it 
possible for them to cultivate portions of land on their own. With the money earned from 
cultivation, they are able to purchase livestock and other assets. Those who have followed 
this trajectory were greatly assisted by their access to artesian water which is abundant 
and cost free.
This trajectory is best illustrated with reference to 55-year-old Mathew who was born in 
Caprivi and is of Subiya decent. As an ex-combatant, he settled on the farm Mara in Hardap 
in 1993. In 1975 he went into exile to become a PLAN fighter. After returning to the country 
in 1989, he spent four years looking for a livelihood. Unable to find any employment, he 
joined a group farming project on a government farm with a large dam close to Mariental. 
The project came to an end as the dam dried up. Eventually, at the age of 41 and having 
applied for settlement, he secured a place at Mara, arriving on the farm at the end of May 
1993 with nothing. 
Mathew completed Standard 4 (Grade 6) in Katima Mulilo. Apart from military training, he 
had no further education. Before he was resettled, he attended a few workshops offered by 
the MLRR on agronomy and livestock farming.
He started gardening on arriving at Mara. He first lived there with a woman who passed away. 
They were the only two people working in the garden. He grew pumpkins, tomatoes, onions, 
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maize and spanspek, and received support from the MLRR in the form of seed and fertiliser. 
In 1994 the Ministry gave him a Chinese push tractor which he had used ever since. An 
agronomist hired by the Ministry provided technical advice until the mid 1990s. He had 
not received any further support from the Ministry. In 1998 he was able to move into the 
main farmhouse, which was the home of the former owner. In 2004 he remarried, and was 
living with his wife and her 2-year-old child at the time of the survey.
Until 1997, Mathew received drought food aid. This enabled him to keep all the cash he earned 
from selling garden produce to buy goats. In 1995/96 he bought 63 goats in one go with the 
proceeds from the garden. When the drought aid stopped, it became more difficult to cover 
costs. Despite this, his goat herd grew steadily. In 2007 he had about 400 goats and made 
most of his money from goat farming. He sold his goats mostly to commercial farmers, who 
sometimes came to him, or otherwise he went to them. To keep the goats in good condition, 
he bought supplementary feed such as lucerne and yellow maize in Mariental or Maltahöhe.
Markets for garden produce remained a problem. He sold his produce mainly on the streets 
of Mariental and in the township there. He mentioned that the competition was tough. In 
the early years the MLRR provided a lorry to take produce to markets in Windhoek and 
Mariental. When that service came to an end, he used his bicycle to go to Maltahöhe from 
time to time. He was able to buy his first used car in 2001, and in 2005 he bought another 
used car.
The fact that water at Mara was plentiful and cost free undoubtedly helped Mathew to build a 
successful small-scale farming enterprise. Although the yield of the artesian well varies with 
rainfall, he experienced water problems only once in 1996/97. No pumps were needed to 
obtain water from the well which ran for 24 hours a day. The well had sufficient pressure to 
push the water to other households up to 3 km away.
5.5.2   The ‘reversing’ trajectory
Farm worker
Becomes a full-time FURS farmer
Struggles to survive, so takes on temporary employment
Does not use the FURS plot
The ‘reversing’ trajectory starts with a farm worker applying for full-time resettlement. 
The second stage involves the beneficiary struggling to survive as a resettlement farmer, 
often because he/she has too few livestock to make a living from, or he/she receives too 
little technical and financial support. As a result, the beneficiary has to find other means 
to survive, such as temporary construction work in town, or piece work on a neighbouring 
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farm. Consequently, the land allocated to the beneficiary is underutilised or lies idle. There 
is always the wish to return to the land again one day if enough money is generated through 
temporary employment in order to buy livestock, but this is really a ‘distant dream’ as the 
beneficiary is unable to generate enough money to return. 
The case of Frederick exemplifies the ‘reversing’ trajectory. Aged 53 at the time of the 
survey, Frederick had settled on the farm Jakkalsdraai in Hardap in 1994. Before that he was 
a farm worker on a commercial farm in the region. The farm owner died and his son took 
over, but he and Frederick did not get along, so Frederick decided to look for another place. 
He heard about Jakkalsdraai when he went to the MLR office in Mariental, and was advised 
to apply for resettlement there as it was the only farm available for resettlement in Hardap 
at that time. Three to four months later the Ministry informed him that his application for 
resettlement was successful and he moved to the farm immediately with his 54 goats. 
When he arrived at Jakkalsdraai, the Ministry showed him the two camps it had allocated 
to him, amounting to 445 ha. Thirteen years later, Frederick did not have a single goat left. 
Many of them died due to drought. In 2002 his wife took ill and he had to look after her 
in Mariental. On returning to the farm, he found that the rest of his goats had been stolen. 
Since then he had lived in Mariental where he worked as a casual builder and gardener. On 
occasion he went back to Jakkalsdraai to see how things were going there. He still wished 
to return to the farm permanently, but first needed to earn enough money to buy goats. His 
two camps were unoccupied and no one was using them. He did not tell the Ministry that 
he was not living on the farm, fearing that the camps would be taken away from him. 
5.5.3   The ‘pensioner’ trajectory
Employed part-time farmer or farmer worker in a communal area retires
Applies for resettlement and farms part time as a pensioner on a FURS farm
Engages minimally in farming activities
The ‘pensioner’ trajectory starts with an employed part-time farmer or a farm worker on 
communal land nearing retirement age. The second and third stages involve the person 
applying to become a resettlement farmer, and then farming part time as a pensioner, but 
with minimal engagement in farming activities due to not having sufficient capital to expand 
these activities. 
The case of Jeremiah exemplifies the ‘pensioner’ trajectory. Aged 64 at the time of the 
survey, Jeremiah was born in Aroab in today’s Karas Region where he worked for most of 
his life for the postal service. In 2007 he lived in Mariental as a pensioner, and had been 
farming at Jakkalsdraai on a part-time basis since 1996. He had waited three months for 
the MLR in Mariental to approve his application.
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Previously a part-time farmer in a communal area 25 km from Jakkalsdraai, Jeremiah felt 
frustrated with the conditions there: “It is difficult to make progress as a communal farmer 
where your animals are mixed with others. They get lost or stolen if you don’t keep them 
fenced in.” He felt positive about resettlement: “I have waited a long time for this to happen. 
I am an old man now and I am glad to have place for myself.” The Ministry allocated to him a 
piece of land of 1 000 ha where he kept his 145 goats and sheep and 25 cattle. He used part 
of his monthly pension to support his farming activities. He sold livestock only when the 
need arose, for example to assist his child who was training to become a builder. While he 
lived in Mariental, members of his family stayed at Jakkalsdraai to look after his livestock.
5.5.4   The ‘changing pathways’ trajectory
Full-time employee and part-time farmer in a communal area
Becomes a full-time FURS farmer
Struggles to make ends meet
Takes up other full-time employment to support farming activities
The ‘changing pathways’ trajectory starts with a person in full-time employment who also 
farms part time in a communal area. The person applies for land on a resettlement farm, 
is granted land and quits full-time employment to become a full-time resettlement farmer. 
Due to a lack of farming support and financial security, the person finds it difficult to farm 
profitably and thus takes up other full-time employment to support the farming activities. 
Angelina’s case exemplifies the ‘changing pathways’ trajectory. She was born in Windhoek 
in 1966. After completing high school in Windhoek in 1986, she worked as a junior teacher 
in a town in today’s Otjozondjupa Region. She then returned to Windhoek to study nursing 
and received her diploma in Nursing Science in 1991. For five years thereafter she worked 
in Windhoek and Okahandja at three hospitals, state and private. She then obtained a 
degree in Psychology at the University of Namibia. In 1999, working for various public health 
organisations, she enrolled for part-time study in Industrial Psychology. After graduating 
in 2005, she worked as a nurse in the UK for several years and then returned to Windhoek.
Angelina grew up with her grandmother’s sister, a family of “Herero farmers who had that dual 
life of farming and living in town”. While working, she put aside some money to purchase 
cattle, usually from her own family, which she kept on communal land in the Rietfontein 
area in Omaheke. She had found it difficult to acquire communal land on which to keep 
her cattle. In 1999, a few months before her grandmother passed away, Angelina read 
that the MLRR was granting land to people through the process of resettlement, and this 
triggered her interest because “you can do nothing without land”. For her, as for virtually 
every other resettlement beneficiary, land is associated with hope. To apply, she needed 
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a letter of motivation and a stock book, which she had. She also supplied a letter from 
her mother’s sister’s husband stating that the water shortage at Rietfontein rendered the 
supply insufficient for watering the 85 cattle that Angelina was grazing there at the time. 
She applied in late 1999 for resettlement at Grootrooibult, and in May 2000 the Ministry 
phoned to notify her that her application had been approved. 
Angelina was allocated a land unit of 1 400 ha, of which 30% was bush-encroached. The 
infrastructure was in poor condition when she arrived; the borehole and drinking trough 
were broken and the water tank was leaking. Workers who had worked on her grandmother’s 
farm assisted her with repairs. On her first visits to the farm, Angelina slept in her car 
as there was no house on her premises. After receiving what she called “a 99-year lease 
agreement” from the government, she decided to build her own house. Financially, she 
struggled to make ends meet. The problems started while she was in the UK. Her son, who 
was asked to look after the farm during her absence, allegedly stole nearly 120 cattle and sold 
the heifers and young bulls. In addition he spent N$24 000 on personal items rather than 
on buying cattle, for which purpose Angelina had sent the money. As if that were not enough, 
after returning to the farm she injured her hand and was forced her to use most of her savings 
to cover the medical costs as she did not have insurance. After recovering from this injury, 
she had to look for a job in town again. Although keen to debush her land to provide more 
grazing for her cattle, the process was expensive and she feared that the cost may derail 
her plans to save money for purchasing a bigger farm through the AALS. Her hopes for the 
future were to farm commercially and perhaps one day to have registered stud animals. 
She planned to keep working in town for at least another five years until she had enough 
money to either debush her present farm or purchase a bigger one. Until then, she did not 
see herself being able to live on farming alone.
5.5.5   The ‘blocked accumulation’ trajectory
Grows up in an urban area, acquires education and then employment
Keeps livestock in a communal area
Becomes a part-time FURS beneficiary with the aim of becoming a full-time AALS farmer
Unsuccessful in efforts to accumulate livestock, therefore unable to buy an AALS farm
The ‘blocked accumulation’ trajectory applies to beneficiaries who grew up in urban areas, 
completed their education at whatever level, and then found employment or established 
their own business. With their income they bought livestock which relatives in a communal 
area looked after. Some also hired land for their livestock in a commercial farming area. 
They then applied for resettlement or were settled on government land bought for drought 
relief in the early 1990s. Some of them hired people to run their urban business so that they 
could farm full time. Before long, their livestock numbers exceeded the carrying capacity 
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of the allocated unit, but the numbers did not suffice for buying a farm under the AALS. At 
the same time, they did not make enough money from farming and had to supplement their 
farming income with income from other employment or their business. In effect, therefore, 
resettlement land posed a barrier to expansion with no viable exit strategy.
The case of Matthias exemplifies the ‘blocked accumulation’ trajectory. He was born in 
Windhoek in 1956 and went to school there. Having completed his schooling, he worked for 
10 years for the predecessor of Agra. He then joined another employer, but soon thereafter, 
in 1985, he decided to invest in a vehicle to work full time as a taxi driver in Windhoek. He 
expanded his business in 1995 when he bought a mini-bus to travel between Gobabis and 
Windhoek. Later he bought another mini-bus, and drove both of them himself until retiring 
from driving in 2003. He still owned the business but had recruited drivers to drive for him.
In 1975, at the age of 19, he started buying cattle, one at a time. He took them to Epukiro where 
his mother and brother looked after them. In 1989 he had 38 cattle which he transferred from 
Epukiro to land hired from a white commercial farmer in the Witvlei area. His applications 
for resettlement in 1990 and 1991 were unsuccessful. Then, this being a time of drought, 
the Ministry of Agriculture, Water and Rural Development bought some farms in Omaheke 
for drought relief purposes, Rosenhof being one. Matthias applied for permission to take 
his cattle to Rosenhof, and was permitted to use two camps there for three years. He went 
there in 1992 and was still farming in the same camps in 2008. He arrived there with 46 
cattle. In 2008, though down to only 6 cattle, he had 90 head of small stock. These numbers 
exceeded the land’s carrying capacity, with the result that some of the animals were grazing 
in the road reserve. He had applied at least 10 times for proper resettlement but thus far 
had not been successful. All this forced him to reduce his livestock numbers.
5.6 Evaluating outcomes 
It has been stated in this report that the current model for resettlement is one of small-scale 
commercial farming. However, the planning criteria for implementation are not entirely 
clear. One guideline has been the minimum annual income required to remain above the 
poverty datum line. Allocated units were expected to yield incomes as high as but preferably 
higher than the poverty datum. As rough gross margin calculations have demonstrated, 
under optimal conditions, beneficiaries should be able to generate higher revenues than 
the poverty datum from recommended minimum farm sizes. However, as reliable income 
data was difficult to obtain in this survey, it was not possible to assess the extent to which 
beneficiaries in the Hardap and Omaheke samples were able to produce at optimum levels.
The gross margin calculations have also revealed that the recommended minimum farm 
sizes for northern and southern regions were inherently unequal. Beneficiaries in the south 
should be able to generate much higher incomes from their 3 000 ha allocations than 
beneficiaries in the north with 1 000 ha allocations. The findings of this study bear this out: 
those in Hardap do indeed appear to have generated higher incomes from farming than 
their counterparts in Omaheke.
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It is impossible to provide a simple answer to the question of whether or not the current 
resettlement model is succeeding in improving livelihoods. Resettlement has impacted in 
different ways on the material aspects of livelihood, i.e. the economic and social aspects. 
Beneficiaries were differentiated not only in terms of their assets, but also in terms of their 
expectations. As discussed above, this survey found several categories of beneficiaries 
on resettlement land. On the one hand, there were part-time and full-time farmers, who 
had very different opportunities for financing agricultural production and infrastructure 
development on their land. On the other hand, there were beneficiaries who had opted 
for resettlement primarily because they needed a secure place to stay, i.e. a permanent 
home of their own, and not because they wanted to become successful farmers. Among the 
latter were retired people and people who were no longer able to work. The beneficiary age 
profile as presented in this report suggests that most beneficiaries were middle-aged or had 
reached retirement age. The absence of young beneficiaries raises the question of whether 
younger generations were actually applying for resettlement or whether their applications 
were simply unsuccessful.
Their differing motivations for and expectations of resettlement imply that beneficiaries 
assessed their resettlement experiences on several levels, reflecting the multi-layered nature 
of livelihoods. This has produced a much more differentiated and nuanced picture of the 
successes and failures of land redistribution than has public opinion with its focus exclusively 
on economic considerations. Against this background, it is perfectly understandable that the 
majority of beneficiaries were generally very happy to have been resettled, notwithstanding 
the severe problems that many experienced with regard to farming. A more differentiated 
assessment is more helpful in advancing the objectives of land reform in so far as it enables 
decision-makers to acquire a better understanding of what is working for beneficiaries and 
what is not working. It broadens a narrow economic and financial assessment to include 
non-economic issues that matter to the beneficiaries.
Maria’s assessment of her resettlement experience illustrates this point very well. Her 
expectation of being able to develop her livestock farming operation did not materialise. 
She had hoped to sell milk to the neighbouring school and to grow vegetables. Contrary 
to her expectations, the grazing was plentiful but of poor quality, her livestock were dying 
from unknown causes and the soil for vegetable gardening was poor. In her own words, “We 
are not living in luxury; we live from hand to mouth.” But, despite these disappointments 
and stock losses, she had never regretted being resettled. In the communal area where she 
lived before, people stole her livestock as it sometimes wandered up to 10 km away from 
her home, whereas on her own land she had fenced camps for her livestock.
Close to two thirds or 63% of all respondents in the study expressed satisfaction with having 
been resettled. This number corresponded to roughly two thirds who said that their standard 
of living had improved since being resettled. A common explanation for this satisfaction 
was that they had their own land and could take their own decisions. For many, access to 
their own piece of land represented empowerment and freedom to do as they pleased, as one 
beneficiary put it. There was a widespread perception that owning land enabled people to 
work for themselves instead of making someone else rich. 
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Their own land enabled some to improve their standard of living by means of accumulating 
livestock. To some extent this was possible because they were able to reduce stock loss by 
exercising better control over their livestock, which was not possible on communal land. As 
one respondent put it, “With the current farm, I know which livestock is mine. Livestock is 
also better protected against theft than on communal land.”
However, over one third of the respondents were not satisfied with their current situation. 
This number corresponded to the roughly one third who claimed that their standard of 
living had not improved at all. The main cause of their dissatisfaction was infrastructural 
deficiencies which impacted negatively on their farming activities. The sharing of water 
points and the lack of internal camps were major causes of dissatisfaction. With regard to 
water, the issue was not so much availability but rather proper management of water points 
and ways to minimise the costs of supply.
Some respondents also identified a shortage of land as a factor holding them back. This 
was a major issue for those who had opted for resettlement primarily to get out of the 
communal areas in order to advance their agricultural productivity. Land size was not an 
issue for those whose primary motivation was not agricultural production.
Land size is a multifaceted issue, and how best to address it depends on the objectives 
of land redistribution. In discussing whether the sizes of the allocated units sufficed, the 
first question arising is whether the recommended minimum farm sizes for the small-scale 
commercial farming model were viable, i.e. whether the allocated land was large enough to 
enable the farmers to become independent small-scale commercial producers. The answer 
appears to be that the sizes were not viable. The rough gross margin calculations presented 
in section 2.6 of this report suggest that revenues generated on these farm units under the 
best possible conditions are not large enough to sustain a family and leave surplus cash for 
infrastructure maintenance, replacement and investment.
Apart from land size, many respondents stated that the grazing on their land was of poor 
quality. This problem appears to have been more widespread in Omaheke than in Hardap. 
An example of a farmer facing this problem was Lazarus whose expectations of building 
himself up at Skoonheid in Omaheke did not materialise. His allocation was too small and 
the grazing was of poor quality. If he did not provide lick all year round, the condition of his 
livestock deteriorated. His cows did not produce enough milk to support their calves and 
also provide milk for the household. While grass was plentiful, its nutritional value was low. 
Lazarus did not see himself being able to move forward on this piece of land.
The second question that arises with regard to land size and the current resettlement model 
is whether the sizes allocated allow for the beneficiaries to become full-scale commercial 
farmers if they so wish. This question is important in that an increasing number of people 
view the resettlement model as a means to progress from small-scale communal farming 
through small-scale commercial farming (on a resettlement farm) to large-scale commercial 
farming. Formally speaking, the threshold between small-scale commercial farming and 
large-scale commercial farming is 150 LSU: people with more livestock than that cannot 
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be accommodated by the National Resettlement Programme and rather have to apply for 
an AALS loan to buy a farm. For the linear progression model to work, resettlement should 
enable farmers to accumulate livestock to a level exceeding the 150 LSU threshold so that 
they can qualify for an AALS loan for buying a large commercial farm.
In reality, this cannot happen. In the first place, the recommended minimum farm size in 
Omaheke, i.e. 1 000 ha, makes it impossible to keep more than 70 LSU given a carrying 
capacity of 15 ha per LSU. This is less than half of the 150 LSU required for an AALS loan. 
Livestock owners with herd sizes ranging from 70 to 150 LSU are thus not catered for in the 
National Resettlement Programme. 
Moreover, the model’s rigidity holds back resettlement beneficiaries who have succeeded in 
accumulating livestock. Some resettlement farmers, including some part-time farmers, have 
managed to gradually but steadily increase their herd sizes due to successful investment 
in their farming operations, but the relatively small land allocations prevent any further 
accumulation and thus effectively place a ceiling on their progress as farmers. 
An example of a farmer in this position was Matthias at Rosenhof in Omaheke, who combined 
farming with a transport business. His land allocation was too small to accommodate his 
growing livestock numbers, and in effect, resettlement prevented any further accumulation 
and even forced him to downsize. Although his livestock numbers far exceeded his camps’ 
carrying capacity, they amounted to only about two thirds of the 150 LSU required for an 
AALS loan. He thought that a farm of 3 km2 would be appropriate for him; it would enable 
him to keep rather than sell his cattle continuously (“kort kort”). His current allocation made 
further accumulation impossible and thus would keep him at the same level as a farmer.
Regardless of size limitations, Solomon, a part-time resettlement farmer in Hardap, viewed 
his resettlement as his first step towards large-scale commercial farming. Born in 1966, he 
grew up in a farming environment. He obtained technical diplomas in electrical engineering, 
and worked for a large mine for several years and since 1995 for the Ministry of Works. 
His love of farming motivated him to invest a lot of money in his resettlement farm. His 
ambition was to become the owner of a large-scale commercial farm, and he was confident 
that by 2011/12 he would be able to buy a large farm. He aimed to have at least 1 000 
small stock and 100 large stock by that time. Although this amount was far too high for his 
allocated portion of 1 200 ha, he intended to negotiate with his neighbour to graze some 
of his livestock on the latter’s portion against a small payment. Solomon was aware that 
this would be against the law, but he believed it was unjust that he wanted to expand while 
his neighbour, who was alone on his portion with only 80 goats on 4 camps, had spare 
grazing capacity.
At the other end of the spectrum were beneficiaries with less livestock than they had when 
they started farming on resettlement land. Much of the land occupied by this category of 
beneficiary was underutilised. Apart from drought, cash-flow problems contributed to a 
situation where they had to sell livestock, and even breeding stock, to generate income. 
This suggests that they did not have cash reserves to cover day-to-day living expenses and 
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operational costs on the farm. This implies that any new costs incurred, such as repairs to 
water installations, were covered by the sale of their only means of production. Unless they 
receive cash injections in the form of grants or cheap credit, beneficiaries in this category 
are likely to grow poorer and their farm infrastructure will gradually decay. 
Despite the various constraints on the more enterprising beneficiary, productivity on most 
resettlement farms could be enhanced if beneficiaries are given appropriate support. The 
almost complete absence of post-settlement support gave rise to dissatisfaction. Most of the 
respondents said that they needed training in several areas of production, such as financial 
management, general farm management and herd management. In addition they needed 
agricultural extension services. No such support measures were in place. While advice could 
be obtained from agricultural input retailers in urban centres, access to them depended on 
access to transport. Many beneficiaries who faced continual cash-flow problems expressed 
the view that if government gave them access to loans and other assistance, they would be 
better placed to improve their livelihood. In the absence of any meaningful farming and 
financial support, they found it extremely difficult to farm sustainably.
A number of beneficiaries who were generally satisfied with their situation commented 
critically on the ongoing absence of proper leasehold agreements. In some cases this had 
reduced their control over the land on which they farmed, particularly against outsiders 
and government.
These factors contributed to what this study has found to be a low level of productivity 
per hectare. From this finding it can be concluded that household incomes on average are 
far lower than what was possible on the allocated lands. By no means does this imply that 
most beneficiaries lacked knowledge of livestock farming. This study has confirmed that 
most had previous farming experience on communal land and/or commercial farms, as 
farmers or farm workers. However, resettlement farms pose their own challenges, at least in 
the short term. These being located on freehold land, the expectation is that beneficiaries 
will farm commercially, but this is not necessarily achievable. Unlike AALS farms which 
broadly replicate and reproduce existing commercial farming operations and practices, 
resettlement farms are a ‘hybrid’ farm model straddling the commercial and communal 
models. This model has communal features where water points are shared and where 
communal grazing results from the absence of internal fences separating allocations. Where 
there are internal fences, resettlement farmers can exercise much better control over their 
livestock, which increases their chances of breeding livestock for sale and succeeding as 
commercial farmers.
Against this background, it appears necessary, firstly, to review the minimum sizes of farm 
units allocated under the National Resettlement Programme, and secondly, to provide 
post-settlement support urgently to help ensure that beneficiaries utilise their land fully. It 
appears that cash-flow problems constitute the single biggest constraint on their ability not 
only to maintain existing infrastructure, but also to invest in the acquisition of productive 
assets such as livestock. A proper leasehold agreement, registered in the Deeds Office, should 
be the foundation on which these support measures are implemented.
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6  GROUP 
RESETTLEMENT 
SCHEMES
Officially, the MLR runs 14 group resettlement schemes across the country. Half of them 
are located in communal areas and the other half in the commercial or freehold sector. 
Three, namely Drimiopsis, Skoonheid and Donkerbos/Sonneblom, are in Omaheke Region 
and two, Westfalen and Bernafey, are in Hardap Region (Meliczek 2008: 11). As opposed to 
other farms where large groups of people have been settled, group resettlement projects 
of the MLR are defined in terms of specific official membership and by the fact that some 
have project co-ordinators appointed by the MLR. At the time of field visit, Drimiopsis and 
Skoonheid had project co-ordinators while Bernafey and Westfalen did not. (Donkerbos/
Sonneblom is outside the study area.) Where co-ordinators have been appointed, their 
responsibilities are limited to the resettlement projects; they have little knowledge and no 
mandates with regard to individual beneficiaries who may have been settled in the camps 
of a farm accommodating an official group resettlement project. An example of such a farm 
is Skoonheid where nine individual beneficiaries are farming independently of the group 
resettlement project on land allocated to individuals.
6.1 Characteristics of beneficiaries 
6.1.1  Social categories of beneficiaries
A marked difference between the group resettlement schemes in Omaheke and Hardap 
is their ethnic composition. Beneficiaries on the Drimiopsis and Skoonheid schemes in 
Omaheke are almost exclusively of San origin, while the ethnic origins of those on Westfalen 
and Bernafey are diverse, i.e. Nama, Damara, Owambo, Kavango and Caprivian. This is due 
mainly to the fact that Omaheke has a relatively large San population.
The 1 200 ha Westfalen resettlement scheme was started in 1997. Most of its beneficiaries 
hail from the north-central regions of Namibia. Seven of the official beneficiaries indicated 
that they were settled there after their applications for resettlement proved successful. One 
person stated that he lived on the farm without the MLR’s permission but then applied to 
be resettled and was permitted to stay there.
The 3 730 ha Bernafey scheme was also started in 1997. When the MLR bought the farm, 
the farm workers there were allowed to stay and continue cultivating the existing gardens. 
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In 2002, however, when the Ministry invited applications for resettlement, some of these 
farm workers were not aware of the advertisements and didn’t apply, with the result that 
they became unofficial or illegal occupants of the farm. By the end of the advertising and 
selection process, a total of 11 beneficiaries were officially resettled on Bernafey. 
For the Drimiopsis and Skoonheid schemes, there was no official selection of settlers. The 
first beneficiaries ended up on one or the other scheme because they were located closest 
to the settlers’ former places of work and residence. An assessment of group resettlement 
schemes in 2000 found the following:
[Beneficiaries] simply found themselves in so-called “co-operative” projects, and were 
instructed by government officials to work collectively on certain activities. Rather than 
moving towards self-reliance and independence, nearly all beneficiaries exhibit[ed] 
attitudes of dependency towards the projects (Werner and Vigne 2000: 30).
These schemes were “mainly social welfare projects providing free accommodation, food 
and other transfers, which show(ed) few signs of being resettlement projects as commonly 
understood” (Werner and Vigne 2000: 32).
Group resettlement in Omaheke started as a result of an increasing number of farm workers, 
primarily San, losing their jobs on commercial farms around the time of Independence. 
Without employment or a home, they squatted in road reserves. Karolina described the 
initial stages of the Drimiopsis scheme. According to her, at Independence there were many 
San people squatting in the road reserve close to Drimiopsis. It was decided that they could 
not carry on living like that and the resettlement scheme was established. Government 
gathered people and gave them food. When the rains came, government provided tents. 
When the soldiers who were stationed at Drimiopsis left after Independence, the small San 
community was told to go there and start working in the garden to obtain something to 
live on.
Ongoing government support to group resettlement schemes, particularly Drimiopsis and 
Skoonheid, has probably contributed to the fact that none of these schemes has recorded a 
significant dropout rate. On the contrary, many have attracted outsiders, i.e. illegal settlers, 
who live in informal settlements on the schemes (Meliczek, 2008: 10).
The number of official beneficiary households at Drimiopsis and Skoonheid in 2008 was 
63 and 73 respectively. At Bernafey and Westfalen in Hardap there were 11 and 7 official 
households. The numbers of male and female household heads were more or less equal in 
both regions.
The average age of the beneficiaries in Hardap differed markedly to the average in Omaheke. 
Close to 90% of the beneficiaries at both Bernafey and Westfalen were 20-59 years of age, 
whereas at Drimiopsis and Skoonheid, only 34% and 57% were in this age group. This 
regional disparity is partially attributable to the fact that the Omaheke schemes offered 
older and/or retired farm workers the only option for permanent settlement after they 
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lost their employment. The fact that Drimiopsis was established at Independence may 
explain why it had the highest number of pensioners: a larger proportion of beneficiaries 
who settled there in 1990 had reached retirement age by 2008. Table 22 summarises the 
age situation on the schemes sampled.
Table 22: Age distribution of group resettlement scheme beneficiaries
 Age Drimiopsis Skoonheid Hardap
20-59 years 34% 57% 90%
60 years and older 65% 43% 9%
The vast majority of the settlers at Drimiopsis and Skoonheid are the descendants of San 
generational workers on commercial and communal farms. Many of these settlers either lost 
or gave up their employment in the early 1990s and had nowhere to go. Being the children 
of generational farm workers, they had no communal area to return to, but they were 
fundamentally rural people who wanted to remain so. Others on these two farms decided to 
retire there. Table 23 shows that only 11% of the beneficiaries at Drimiopsis and Skoonheid 
were not involved in agricultural work prior to resettlement. 
Table 23: Work experience of group scheme beneficiaries prior to resettlement in Omaheke
  Drimiopsis Skoonheid Total
Farming or other work related to farming 46% 81% 62%
Work not related to farming 17% 5% 11%
Unemployed or retired 38% 14% 27%
Total 100% 100% 100%
Table 24 reflects the beneficiaries’ employment status prior to resettlement, and shows some 
significant differences between the schemes. At the time of settling at Drimiopsis in the 
early 1990s, 69% of the settlers were either unemployed or retired. At the Skoonheid scheme, 
which was established a little later than Drimiopsis, the corresponding figure was 40%. In 
Hardap, by contrast, over 90% of those sampled were in full-time or part-time employment 
at the time of settling. This difference may be ascribed to the fact that most beneficiaries of 
group resettlement schemes in Hardap had to apply for resettlement.
Table 24: Primary occupation of group scheme beneficiaries at the time of resettlement
  Drimiopsis Skoonheid Hardap
Full-time employed 4% 25% 25%
Part-time employed 13% 10% -
Full-time farmer 13% 25% 67%
Unemployed 39% 30% 8%
Retired 30% 10% -
Total 99.8% 100% 100%
The high percentage of beneficiaries who were either retired, unemployed or in temporary 
employment at the time of resettlement suggests that Drimiopsis and Skoonheid provided 
an opportunity for settlement and sustenance. Indeed, most of them had no other place to 
settle after leaving their employment on commercial farms in Omaheke.
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Low levels of education further limited the options of beneficiaries in Omaheke, who attained 
markedly lower levels than those in Hardap. As Table 25 indicates, 61% and 71% of the 
beneficiaries at Drimiopsis and Skoonheid had no formal education, compared to only 14% 
in Hardap. The numbers of beneficiaries at Drimiopsis and Skoonheid who had completed 
primary school were more or less the same at 5%, but lower than the 14% in Hardap.
Table 25: Education levels of group resettlement scheme beneficiaries
  Drimiopsis Skoonheid Hardap
No formal education 61% 71% 14%
Some primary schooling 26% 19% 36%
Primary school completed 4% 5% 14%
Some secondary schooling 4% 0% 29%
Secondary school completed 4% 0% 7%
Tertiary education completed 0% 5% -
Total 100 % 100% 100%
Even though one fifth to one quarter of the beneficiaries in Omaheke had acquired some 
primary education, for many this was too little and too long ago to have retained literacy and 
numeracy skills. Many respondents were unable to state their age, partly due to an inability to 
count. An example is Karolina, who was born on a farm close to Skoonheid and Drimiopsis, 
and schooled for only one year. She knew the first two letters of the English alphabet, and was 
able to count to 30. She could not write anything but her name, and did not know her age.
The low levels of education are undoubtedly connected to the fact that the majority of these 
beneficiaries were born and bred on commercial farms, which limited their access to schools. 
Moreover, until the Gquina Primary School was established in Omaheke in the 1990s, mother-
tongue education for speakers of San languages was unavailable. Where beneficiaries did 
have access to schools, their parents were too poor to pay school fees and therefore had to 
withdraw their children.
The life histories of many beneficiaries illustrate these difficulties, an example being the 
history of John. Born on a commercial farm in 1957, he had never been to school and could 
not read or write. He started to work on the farm, looking after cattle, at a very young age. 
He spent his entire working life on the same farm and left with his wife when the owner died 
in 2004. The latter’s son took over, and asked John to stay on, but John wanted to rest for 
a while as he had worked continuously for many years. After leaving the farm, the couple 
heard that government was helping people like them. They decided to go to Drimiopsis, 
where they had stayed on a few occasions in the past, to find out what they could do there, 
and settled there permanently.
William was born in Kalkfeld in 1930. He started his working life as a worker on a bridge 
construction site in Omaheke. Thereafter he worked on four different commercial farms 
and finally on a government research farm in Omaheke. He did general farm work such 
as repairing fences, making cut lines, tending to livestock and pumping water. Although he 
did not have a driver’s license, his tasks on the research farm included driving workers 
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out to their workplaces on the farm and driving to Gobabis. After 21 years of service, he 
retired. As he was not allowed to continue living on the research farm, he went to look for a 
place to stay, ended up at Drimiopsis in 1992 and applied to be settled there permanently. 
The response was that there was no space for him, but he was advised to stay there until 
he could be accommodated at Skoonheid. Then he was told that Skoonheid was also full, 
but  that the MLR would find a place for him.
He stayed on at Drimiopsis but settled on the eastern side of the main road, away from the 
group land. He established a small garden to sustain himself and kept livestock. When 
he needed other food, he used his donkey-cart to buy it at nearby commercial farms. He 
also used the cart to visit his daughter who worked at a research station in the area. In 
2005, the Deputy Director of Resettlement instructed him to move his home and garden 
to the western side of the project. No reasons were given, and William suspected that a 
witvoet19 had talked to the Deputy Director about the move. He and 11 other families who 
were moved with him were not allowed to work in the communal garden as this was only 
for project members, therefore William established a new small garden near his house.
19 According to Suzman (1995: 17f), witvoet is a common term in farm worker discourse, and it refers to a 
worker who seeks to win the favour of a farm owner through ‘betraying’ fellow workers. Winning the 
baas’s favour usually had tangible benefits for workers.
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William did not really want to farm at Drimiopsis; he just wanted a place to stay and rest. 
He cultivated his small garden mainly for the purpose of keeping himself busy. All the 
livestock that he brought to Drimiopsis was stolen. Despite this loss, he hoped for support 
in the form of 5-10 head of cattle or goats to see where this would take him. He received a 
combined monthly pension (government and general) of N$800 which he said was too little.
Alfred was born in 1949 on a commercial farm in Gobabis District where his parents, both 
of Nama origin, were employed as farm workers. He attended school for about two years in 
Gobabis, but left because his parents moved to another farm which made going to school 
impossible. For most of his life he worked in the construction business in and around 
Gobabis, making bricks. In the 1960s he helped the “Basters” to build Gobabis’ “Coloured” 
township, Nossobville. But then, work opportunities became scarce and the costs of living 
too high in the town, so he and his wife decided to offer their services to farmers in the 
district, whereafter Alfred mainly maintained fences and built kraals.
Alfred quickly learnt from white farmers how to work with livestock. This notwithstanding, 
permanent farm work was difficult to find, therefore Alfred and his family moved from farm 
to farm in search of work. He had worked on “too many farms to recall”. He worked on one 
farm in Gobabis District for about five years until 1991 when he lost his leg in a confrontation 
with a warthog. This forced him to leave his work and home on the farm. The only place 
where he could stay free of charge was Drimiopsis. After a short stay there, he was settled 
at Skoonheid in 1993, more or less the time when the resettlement project there was started. 
He and has lived there ever since. Alfred recalled that the then Prime Minister of Namibia, 
Dr Hage Geingob, had visited Drimiopsis to inform the resettlement community that the 
government had bought a farm at Skoonheid for anyone interested in settling there. Those 
interested were asked to put their names on a list, and the government would send a truck 
to move them together with their belongings to their new home. Alfred opted to be resettled 
at Skoonheid because Drimiopsis was overcrowded and the crime rate was high there. 
Kxao, a Ju|’hoansi San man, was born on a commercial farm approximately 20 km west 
of Skoonheid. He never learnt to read and write. His Namibian identity document states 
that he was born in 1959, which means that he was not yet eligible for an old-age pension. 
Unlike many other farm workers in the region, Kxao had never moved around a lot. He had 
worked for most of his life on a commercial farm approximately 15 km north of Skoonheid. 
After the owner passed away and his son-in-law inherited the farm, Kxao and his wife left 
in search of another place to stay. 
He heard that government had purchased Skoonheid for the purpose of resettling mainly 
San. On arriving there, he asked the previous project co-ordinator whether they could stay. 
The answer was affirmative and they were given a house. Kxao had two sons. One of them 
lived and worked on the farm where Kxao had worked. He visited Kxao quite regularly at 
Skoonheid, but Kxao has not seen him for a long time. His other son worked for Herero 
farmers in the communal area near Otjinene in Omaheke. Kxao’s daughter had passed 
away several years earlier on another farm in the region after drinking a lethal brew of 
brandy apparently mixed with poison.
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Determining beneficiaries’ marital status proved difficult as many of those interviewed 
defined marriage in a formal way, i.e. as formally sanctioned by a church, but it is very 
common in the applicable communities for men and women to live and have children 
together without religious or legal sanction. Also it is fairly common for women to bear 
children from several fathers and raise them on their own.
6.1.2  Motivation for resettlement
It was noted above that most of the official beneficiaries at Drimiopsis and Skoonheid found 
themselves on these two schemes because there was no alternative for settlement. They did 
not apply to be resettled. Many hoped that resettlement would give them a secure place to 
stay and an opportunity to produce a little food to sustain themselves. As Table 26 shows, 
only one third of the beneficiaries at Drimiopsis and Skoonheid cited farming as their main 
motivation for joining these schemes. Most of the others joined because they needed a place 
to stay after retiring or had nowhere else to go after losing their agricultural job on a 
commercial or communal farm. The latter category included people who had felt that they 
were too sick to continue working in the agricultural sector. 
Table 26: Group scheme beneficiaries’ reasons for resettling
  Drimiopsis Skoonheid Hardap
Reasons related to farming 27% 38% 58%
Reasons related to socio-economic hardship 73% 62% 42%
Total 100% 100% 100%
In Omaheke, the majority of the sample stated that they opted for resettlement due to their 
socio-economic circumstances rather than a desire to farm. These circumstances were 
primarily related to their vulnerability as farm workers. The right of farm workers to stay 
on a farm is usually tied to their employment status. Once they lose their employment, they 
lose not only a source of income but also their residential rights. 
In Hardap, several people opted for resettlement due to socio-economic circumstances, 
including unemployment, the loss of parents, and having been born on the farm that 
became a group resettlement scheme. However, a much larger percentage of people in the 
sample opted for resettlement for reasons related to agricultural production and their own 
place to stay.
It is reasonable to state on the basis of the interviews that for almost all beneficiaries, a secure 
place to live and work was the primary reason for opting for resettlement. San beneficiaries 
in particular did not have a communal area that they could call their own, to which they 
might have retreated after losing their employment. Their homes were the commercial farms. 
However, residential rights on those farms were conditional on employment. As soon 
as a worker stopped working on account of ill health or having reached retirement age, 
for example, he was asked to leave the farm and faced an uncertain future. In some cases, 
retirement or near-retirement coincided with physical and health problems resulting from 
farm labour, and in invariably these workers were asked to leave the farm. 
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Typical of this category of beneficiaries was Lukas who settled at Drimiopsis in 1996 when 
he was 62 years old. He was born in 1934 in Omabalantu in what is now Omusati Region in 
the north, and never went to school. He said that his parents had not treated their children 
well. His ‘education’ was to look after goats and cattle. He was recruited as a contract worker 
at a young age and spent his entire working life working on commercial farms. His main 
tasks as a farm worker were looking after livestock, which included fencing and animal 
health tasks. One of his tasks was to collect cattle in the veld on horseback. After injuring 
his back, he found it increasingly difficult to perform his duties, and his employer suggested 
that he should leave the farm if was no longer able to do farm work. He had heard that 
government was accommodating people at Drimiopsis. He talked to the then headmaster 
of the school on the farm, Kilus Nguvauva (who later became the Regional Councillor for 
the constituency in which Drimiopsis falls and thereafter Deputy Minister of Fisheries), 
about settling there. Mr Nguvauva gave him permission to look for a place for himself on 
the farm, and Lukas stayed on there, but he settled on the eastern side of the main road, 
away from the group project, hoping that he would be resettled elsewhere sometime, which 
he believed would enable him to “go forward”. 
Benjamin’s life journey was very similar to that of Lukas. He was born in 1932, never went 
to school, and spent his working life moving from one commercial farm to another, the 
last being in the district of Maltahöhe in the south. The owner first sold his livestock and 
then the whole farm to move to South Africa, leaving Benjamin without employment. Due 
to illness, Benjamin was no longer able to do hard physical work. His arms, legs and whole 
body ached. When he heard that government had obtained Drimiopsis and that people he 
knew were going to settle there, he decided to do the same. In 1991, at the age of 59, he stopped 
work and went to Drimiopsis where he stayed for two years and then took up the offer of 
resettlement at Skoonheid. He anticipated that their lives would improve at Skoonheid, and 
that government would help them to achieve this improvement so that they wouldn’t have 
to struggle to achieve it. But he was also aware that he would have to do some work and not 
just rely on government support. All went well initially when he and the other beneficiaries 
received food from the communal garden as well as government food rations under the Food 
for Work Programme, but when the latter was terminated in 1998, the struggle to survive 
began again.
Group resettlement in Omaheke gave some people an opportunity to retire to resettlement 
farms before reaching official retirement age. Some stated that they opted for resettlement 
because they had worked long and hard enough for somebody else and needed to slow 
down. They sought a place on a group resettlement scheme in order to obtain a secure and 
permanent place of residence. Many expected government to assist them to improve their 
lives considering that they had worked so hard on commercial farms.
The case of Karolina and her family exemplifies this point. She was born on a commercial 
farm close to Drimiopsis, but does not remember when. On that farm she met her husband 
who was a farm worker. She accompanied him when he worked on various commercial 
farms in the area. The last job he had before settling at Drimiopsis was piece work on a farm 
neighbouring the one where they had met. Although he had not yet reached pensionable 
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age, they decided that he had worked enough, and moved to Drimiopsis, then still a military 
camp, where Karolina worked for the farm owner. They settled there permanently because 
they had stopped working for a wage and saw that government was helping people to stay 
in one place so that they could start working for themselves. Having worked very hard for 
other people, she and her husband wanted to settle at Drimiopsis where they could work 
for themselves instead. Apart from a donkey-cart and two horses, they had nothing when 
they arrived there. Her husband earned a little money from piece work which helped them 
to buy food. They expected to progress, but this expectation did not materialise; they still 
had nothing in 2008.
Philip was born in 1937 on a commercial farm. He had never been to school and could not 
read or write. He started to work at age 15, and stayed with one employer for 36 years (1952-
1989). He did general farm work such as working with livestock, erecting and mending fences, 
repairing windmills and watering trees in the garden. He left the farm because he was single 
and wanted to be with his cousins at Drimiopsis, but also because the farm owner’s offensive 
manner made him and the other workers feel vulnerable. He stated that if the workers did not 
work according to the owner’s expectations, he chased them away, frequently without paying 
them for the work done to date. On hearing that government was taking over Drimiopsis, he 
decided to leave his job and go there. He said it was a good decision as government provided 
monthly food rations to the people there and they did not have to struggle at all, at least in 
the beginning. In 1997 this support stopped and Drimiopsis saw a decline, particularly in 
the yields of the communal garden.
For the former farm workers who were able to accumulate some livestock while working on 
commercial farms, losing their employment meant, apart from anything else, having no 
grazing for their livestock. They needed some land, albeit a very small piece, and the only 
option was to try to find it on one of the group resettlement schemes.
The group resettlement schemes also assisted a small group of non-San people in similar 
situations. Lukas went from former Owamboland to Omaheke as a contract worker and 
married a local woman with whom he established a family. Omaheke gradually became 
his home. He had accumulated livestock while working on farms, which made it difficult 
to move back to the north. Due to the Veterinary Cordon Fence, he would have had to sell 
his animals before moving back and he did not want to struggle to acquire livestock again, 
therefore he settled at Drimiopsis.
6.1.3  Settlers’ relationships with pre-settlement homes
Due to the vast majority of the Drimiopsis and Skoonheid beneficiaries being generational 
workers, they had no ties to communal areas. Their homes had always been the commercial 
farms where their parents and even grandparents were born and in some cases buried. 
Many beneficiaries at Drimiopsis and Skoonheid still had relatives working on commercial 
farms. The older people, some of whom were pensioners, had children working on farms. 
Many younger people who settled at Drimiopsis or Skoonheid as children no longer had 
any known relatives on farms.
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Albertina settled with her parents at Skoonheid when she was about eight years old. She 
no longer had any contact with the farm where she was born as she had lived at Skoonheid 
too long. She did not know whether she still had relatives in the Hochfeld area. She never 
visited her relatives in other areas because they were too far away, but occasionally they 
visited her. When they came, they stayed for what she considered a long time – two weeks.
Where they still existed, links between resettlement schemes and commercial farms served 
as a safety net for farm workers. When they lost their jobs, family or friends at Drimiopsis 
and Skoonheid gave them a place to stay. The Skoonheid project manager could not control 
the inflow of settlers as the official settlers would not refuse family members a place to stay. 
Likewise, relatives working on commercial and communal farms were a source of support 
for group resettlement beneficiaries in times of hardship. Working family members provided 
financial and other support, albeit limited, from time to time, especially when it was needed. 
Maintaining relationships with the commercial farms where beneficiaries were born and 
where they had worked was not always easy, particularly, it seems, where a younger member 
of the owner’s family had inherited the farm. They restricted visits to relatives on the farm 
out of fear that the visitors would stay. Farmers tended to be even more harsh with visitors 
whom they knew came from a group resettlement scheme; they often chased them back.
Karolina’s experience illustrates this point. Her father and sister were still working on the 
farm of her birth not far from Drimiopsis, and when she “longed for them”, she went there. 
However, after the owner died and his son took over, visiting became a problem. The son, 
a part-time farmer living in Gobabis, did not like her to visit her father and sister. Not only 
was she born on his farm, but her grandfather, mother and cousin were buried there, as 
he well knew. She had helped to raise him, and he knew her entire background, yet she had 
to obtain his permission to visit his farm. If he was on the farm, she had to contact him to 
tell him that she wanted to visit, and only went if allowed. “This is very discouraging,” she 
said. “He knows me and I am a woman. I am not doing anything; I am only visiting my 
father and he knows it well. I have raised him. Then he asks me what I am looking for when 
he is there. This is not nice.”
Usiel visited family members on commercial farms from time to time, but not for long. He 
confirmed that farm owners had problems with people visiting their relatives. The owner of 
the farm where his son worked did not permit him to visit his son, and even prevented his 
son from visiting him at Drimiopsis. On the few occasions when Usiel had visited the farm, 
his son had been reprimanded and threatened with dismissal.
Gabriel, a 23-year-old settler at Skoonheid, confirmed that it was not easy to visit relatives 
on a commercial farm. He said that farmers gave permission to visit for no more than two 
weeks. If he wanted to stay longer, the farmer required him to work on the farm.
Elfrieda at Skoonheid only visited her daughter on the neighbouring farm. She had lost contact 
with her sisters, aunts, uncles and grandmother who all lived on another farm in Omaheke, 
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which was too far away to visit as she did not have transport. She could hitchhike, but feared 
getting lost as she no longer remembered the farm’s exact location. She visited her sister in 
Gobabis whenever she had money to hitchhike.
Alfons, born in Kavango Region, had been employed as a contract worker on a commercial 
farm in Omaheke. After being resettled at Skoonheid in 2000, he lost touch with most of 
his relatives and acquaintances. Only his sister visited him occasionally. His children visited 
relatives in Kavango, but he and his wife did not have enough money even to hitch a ride to 
Kavango. Maintaining contact with his relatives was more difficult from Skoonheid than 
from the farm where he had worked. As a contract worker, he had money as well as regular 
holidays which made it possible to travel to the north every December. 
While some beneficiaries visited their relatives on commercial farms, others preferred their 
relatives to visit them. Clemens felt strongly that his wife’s relatives who lived in town had 
to visit them at Skoonheid so that they could see how they were living there. If they liked 
Skoonheid, they might decide to stay as they were struggling in town. 
6.1.4  Settlers’ social relations and networks
The most important social relationships at Drimiopsis and Skoonheid are those between 
family members. Family ties have played an important role in facilitating access to the group 
resettlement schemes without formally applying for a place. The project co-ordinator at 
Skoonheid stated that he could not chase newcomers away as official beneficiaries saw it 
as their right to accommodate family members. This view was supported by the perception 
that the entire Skoonheid farm was for San people only. Family members have been an 
important source of assistance in times of need, such as when there is a shortage of food or 
of labour for cultivating gardens.
Elfrieda, an unmarried woman with five children, settled at Skoonheid because she lost 
her employment on a commercial farm. She had two years of schooling, and did not know 
her age. She had spent her whole life with her father working on commercial farms. Circa 
2000, the farm owner wrongly accused her father of stealing small stock, which in fact 
had been eaten by lynxes, so her father left the farm with her and went to the neighbouring 
communal area of Epukiro. Having no work in Epukiro, she decided to join her family at 
Skoonheid. Her sister, grandfather and his daughter and son-in-law were the first members 
of her family to settle at Skoonheid, soon after the farm was bought for resettlement. Later 
her father also settled there. 
Elfrieda arrived at Skoonheid with two children and bore another three there. Although 
she and the father of the latter three no longer lived together and he had married another 
woman at the farm where he was working, he still provided support for the three children. 
After they separated, Elfrieda moved to her father’s house at Skoonheid. Then, when her 
grandfather fell ill (one month prior to the field visit), she moved to his house to be his 
caretaker. Believing that he may die, he informed her that he had bequeathed his house to 
his son who was working in the communal area, and asked her to stay in the house in the 
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son’s absence. She felt certain that she would be able to share the house with the son, should 
he return, as she did not have a house of her own. Still, her tenure in the house was tenuous. 
She had never applied officially for resettlement, but her family ties had made it possible for 
her to stay at Skoonheid. She legitimised her presence there by working in the communal 
garden.
She stated that after eight years at Skoonheid, she still had no friends but only family, and 
it was the latter to whom she would turn for help with any major problem or need. If they 
were unable to help, she would turn to the father of her three youngest children.
Family members helped each other with agricultural activities and provided food for each 
other if possible. Without access to family labour, cultivation became difficult. 
Gabriel at Skoonheid stated that people who are not related do not help each other with 
their dryland cultivation. His harvest in the 2007/08 season was very low because his 
father-in-law was away working on a commercial farm and his wife was visiting him there 
at the time when Gabriel needed their labour in the garden.
6.2 Production systems and output types /
   ‘productivity’
The production systems on group resettlement schemes in Namibia have generally consisted 
of communal cultivation and limited livestock farming, and in some cases small backyard 
gardens. However, there was a regional difference in the origins of these systems at the 
schemes studies: Westfalen and Bernafey in Hardap were established around the existing 
irrigated cultivation of citrus, maize and vegetables, whereas the communal gardens at 
Drimiopsis and Skoonheid in Omaheke were established by the MLR after the farms had 
been purchased for resettlement.
Due to the haste with which group resettlement schemes were established after Independence, 
little planning went into the process. In terms of policy, the basic concept underlying the 
group resettlement approach was that beneficiaries would engage in dryland crop farming 
for own consumption, in combination with other small income-generating activities to 
“make them self-sufficient in the long term” (MLR 1996: 19). Skoonheid was the only farm 
with a group resettlement scheme for which a proper in-depth assessment of the “broad 
agricultural potential” was carried out by the MLRR, in 1994. The two neighbouring farms, 
Rosenhof and Rusplaas, were included in that assessment (Huesken et al 1994).
The assessment consisted of a soil and vegetation survey, compilation of data on rainfall 
and evaporation, and an inventory of boreholes and internal and external fences. Water 
availability was also assessed by measuring the yields of most of the boreholes. On the 
basis of the information obtained, a land evaluation was carried out, which found that 
rainfed maize production could not provide a secure basis for a production scheme. The 
major constraint was rainfall, with crop failures predicted in “at least 2-3 years out of 4” 
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(ibid.: 11). Pearl millet production (mahangu) was considered a better option, but even 
millet “[could] only perform moderately under the given circumstances … [providing] the 
household with grains on a subsistence level” (ibid.). Rainfed crop production was therefore 
“not recommended as the major land use for the farms” (ibid.).
Limited irrigation was said to be possible under proper management on the loamy soils of 
the lower-lying areas and in the depressions, provided that the water supply was adequate. 
Consequently, the assessment recommended that “the resettlement process on the farms 
will have to be based on extensive grazing with irrigated crop production as an additional 
land use on subsistence level” (ibid.: 13-14). The economic carrying capacity of the three 
farms was set at 1 LSU per 10 ha, but the assessment recommended keeping stocking rates 
to the ecological carrying capacity of 1:15 (ibid.: 10). 
The assessment made no recommendations on the use of these resources, nor on how many 
beneficiaries the farms could sustain. It did not develop detailed enterprise gross margins 
or farm budgets, nor did it set target incomes for beneficiaries (Werner and Vigne 2000: 36), 
thus the numbers of settlers on group resettlement schemes have not been determined on 
the basis of income needs or the income-generating potential of scheme activities (ibid.: 40).
6.2.1  Cultivation
The Skoonheid group resettlement scheme has a 2 ha irrigated communal garden in which 
beneficiaries are able to produce vegetables throughout the year. At the time of the study, 
80% of the garden produce was used for own consumption, and the other 20% was sold, 
with the proceeds deposited in the scheme’s account. The MLR was responsible for the 
garden’s operational and maintenance costs, e.g. the costs of fencing, supplying diesel, and 
repairing machines and boreholes.
Only about 30 beneficiaries were working in the communal garden. It was said that no 
young people worked in the garden, but only the elderly.
Contrary to the recommendations of the assessment carried out by the MLR in 1994, rainfed 
cultivation was practised on a small scale. The project had approximately 20 ha for rainfed 
cultivation, and each official beneficiary household had access to a small portion of this land 
for producing vegetables for own use. The size of the field allocated to each household was 
determined by the household’s ability to cultivate it, i.e. by the amount of labour available 
to the household. The MLR was responsible for providing seed, a tractor to plough the field, 
and tractor maintenance services. Beneficiaries wanting to make use of the tractor had to 
pay for the fuel. This was regarded as one way to steer beneficiaries away from dependency 
on the Ministry for “handouts”.
In Hardap, the Bernafey and Westfalen schemes had established irrigated citrus plantations 
and infrastructure to produce horticultural products. Water was pumped with electric 
pumps and the MLR financed the power. Access to artesian water on the Bernafey irrigation 
scheme made horticulture possible there.
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Expenses for the group scheme farmers in Hardap varied significantly. Bernafey’s greatest 
expense was the transportation and marketing of the citrus and other crops. The farmers 
at Westfalen made use of a government vehicle to transport their produce to Windhoek’s 
informal market. Westfalen received seed, fertiliser and herbicide from government-appointed 
consultants who visited the project regularly. Bernafey received only some vegetable seed 
and fewer visits from the government-appointed consultants. The types of seed provided to 
Bernafey varied with no consideration of planting dates and the needs of the market.
On both schemes in Hardap, labour was the main (perpetual) expense, with family labour 
used for horticultural production. Additional family labour was used at harvesting times 
and remunerated in cash or in kind. Wages were paid from the group bank account until the 
account was exhausted. Monthly wages ranged from N$300 to N$500, depending on the 
beneficiary’s labour input. This did not compare favourably with the minimum agricultural 
wage of N$429 per month paid to farm workers. Water and electricity were mostly free of 
charge as electricity was paid by government. 
There were no records and thus no data on the amounts of crops sold by the projects as a 
whole and/or individual families in both Hardap and Omaheke.
Backyard garden, Drimiopsis. Individual gardens, Drimiopsis.
Communal gardening, Bernafey. Garden produce, Bernafey.
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At Drimiopsis in Omaheke, two communal gardens of about 3 ha each were irrigated with 
borehole water. In addition, about 3 km from the centre of the scheme, 55 ha were cleared 
in 2001 for dryland maize cultivation. However, this land had not been ploughed in recent 
years. The reason for this was said to be waning interest due to the long distance between 
the field and the beneficiaries’ homes: it was too far a distance to walk every day, and also 
it facilitated theft from both the field and their homes. Beneficiaries also complained that 
they did not have any food while out cultivating the field. When they started cultivating it, 
they were still receiving food under the Food for Work Programme. When the programme 
ended, they stopped cultivating the field, but continued cultivating the two communal 
gardens closer to home. Many households also had a small backyard garden at home.
Until 2002, Cuban agricultural advisers supported communal gardening on the group 
resettlement schemes in Omaheke and Hardap, and elsewhere in Namibia. From 2002 
until 2007 when the Livelihoods Support Programme (LISUP) started, group resettlement 
beneficiaries did not receive any agricultural advice. The MLR provided seed and fertiliser 
during that period, and made a tractor available, but did not provide diesel or tractor parts 
such as tyres. 
In 2007, the two communal gardens at Drimiopsis were subdivided into individual plots. 
These were very small, measuring 45 m x 12 m or about 540 m2. This initiative originated in 
the LISUP which was implemented at Drimiopsis and Skoonheid by the Desert Research 
Foundation of Namibia (DRFN) in association with a Spanish NGO. The LISUP supported 
beneficiaries with agricultural inputs, technical advice and transport to market produce in 
Gobabis. The produce was for sale, but what was not sold was consumed. 
Beneficiaries were encouraged to produce for the market and not only for own consumption. 
To facilitate good sales, they were encouraged to be aware of what types of crops were in 
demand. Certain crops were always in demand, but some, such as potatoes and tomatoes, 
were costly to produce whereas others, such as onions, carrots and beetroot, were not. Due 
to their high costs, no fertilisers and insecticides were used, which sometimes resulted in 
produce of lesser quality. In Omaheke, maize and beans were produced mainly for own 
consumption.
Occasionally, the Skoonheid project was able to sell some of its produce at a farmers’ 
market in Windhoek. Attempts were made to enter into contracts with shops and vegetable 
outlets to supply produce on a regular basis, but the beneficiaries found it difficult to 
deliver. Problems experienced with the irregular water supply, for example, meant that an 
agreement concluded in 2006 with a catering enterprise in Gobabis to buy fresh produce 
from the Skoonheid garden came to nothing, and deliveries remained irregular. Sometimes 
the beneficiaries sold their produce next to the road between Gobabis and Otjinene.
Needles to say, transport was essential to market produce whenever it became available. 
This was mostly provided by government, and the Spanish Co-operation also assisted. In 
2008 a government car shuttled between Gobabis and Skoonheid several times a week. 
Whenever transport was needed for getting produce to the market, the project co-ordinator 
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phoned the MLR in Gobabis to send a car. The Ministry also sent someone out to the project 
every weekend to deal with emergencies, mostly of a medical nature. It was alleged that the 
driver of the MLR vehicle was transporting shop supplies from Gobabis to Skoonheid for 
the small cuca shop which his girlfriend ran on the project.
In addition to providing Skoonheid and Drimiopsis with seed, the Spanish Co-operation 
assisted beneficiaries with transporting crops to Windhoek where they could be sold at 
higher prices. The idea behind this was to concentrate not only on the local market, but also 
on the Windhoek and other markets as demand and prices might be higher there. Whether 
this strategy is sustainable in the long run remains to be seen. Unless beneficiaries can utilise 
the support provided by the Spanish Co-operation to accumulate enough capital to obtain 
their own transport, they will be not be able to continue supplying distant markets after the 
Spanish project has come to an end due to a lack of transport opportunities.
The model of communal gardens on group resettlement schemes originated in the MLR. For 
a few years these communal gardens were referred to as “co-operative farming” in the annual 
reports and other documents of the MLR, but a review of these co-operative projects in 
2000 revealed that they bore no resemblance to co-operatives as defined by the Namibian 
Co-operatives Act (Werner and Vigne 2000).
In terms of this cultivation model, the entire community was expected to work in the 
communal garden. For as long as beneficiaries received regular food rations from the 
Food for Work Programme, most participated in communal gardening. Food rations were 
introduced at the inception of these gardens to support those involved in developing them. 
They needed food rations to sustain themselves until the first harvests came in. However, 
the food aid was stopped in 1998, and interest in communal gardening waned at that point, 
thus it appears that the waning of interest was a direct result of the food aid stoppage. At 
the time of the field visit, the Skoonheid project co-ordinator estimated that no more than 
30 beneficiaries, mostly elderly people, were working in the garden. The youth were said to 
be disinterested in the garden as they had no incentive to cultivate.
Communal gardening was controversial in all group resettlement schemes and gave rise to 
a lot of dissatisfaction among beneficiaries. Disputes over the distribution of proceeds from 
cultivation were very common. Such disputes arose when people who refused to work in 
the communal garden claimed a share of the harvest. Many people stopped to work in the 
communal gardens as a result.
Elfrieda, for example, stopped working in mid 2008 because of the constant quarrels and 
disputes. This decision meant that she received no more food from the communal garden. 
She sustained herself and her three children from her own small piece of land where she 
grew maize, beans and watermelon during the rainy season. If the rains were good, she 
harvested enough for her family for several months. She was able to conserve her harvest 
as her children’s father was employed and provided food for the family every week. When 
those provisions were depleted, she turned to her own harvest. This system yielded two 
meals per day for each child and herself.
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Bernadine at Drimiopsis stated that people there did not co-operate in the garden. Some 
were lazy and did not work. Others went only when they saw that she was going, and stayed 
home when she did. Yet, everybody received food from the garden, which she did not think 
was a good thing. General dissatisfaction with communal gardens had given rise to the 
idea that each beneficiary household should have its own small garden, and Bernadine was 
confident that this approach would improve the situation.
An issue related to disputes over the distribution of produce from the communal garden was 
that those who worked in the garden did not know what happened to the money generated 
from the sale of the produce. All group resettlement schemes were expected to divide their 
harvests into a portion for own consumption and another for sale. The money generated 
through the sales would then be deposited in a bank account to be used for the purchase of 
diesel fuel or other items needed by the scheme.
At Skoonheid the intention was to distribute 40% of the harvest to those who worked in the 
garden for their own consumption, and to sell the remainder. Part of the revenue received 
from sales, i.e. 40%, was meant to be used for the maintenance of project infrastructure, and 
the remaining 60% paid into a bank account held by the community. In reality, however, 
80% of the harvest was consumed by the project households. A Resettlement Development 
Committee sub-committee on health, education, water and agriculture decided how much 
of the harvest to sell. The MLR provided transport to get produce to the market in Gobabis. 
The project bank account was kept in Gobabis and was managed by four project members. 
At the time of the research, the amount in the account was N$5 519. The project co-ordinator 
kept the savings book, but was not authorised to withdraw from the account. The banked 
money was used to repair garden infrastructure, e.g. engines and pumps, and to buy diesel 
when government supplies ran out. Individual beneficiaries did not receive any cash payouts, 
which posed problems. The first was that many people could not understand why they did 
not receive any payment for their hard work. Secondly, because they received no payment, 
the beneficiaries were chronically short of money, and were unable to accumulate capital 
from their gardening work to use for increasing output or investing in livestock. The result 
was that many beneficiaries stopped working in the communal garden.
Against this background, the option of food for work must be evaluated. The ups and downs 
of communal gardening in Omaheke were directly linked to the provision of food for work. 
Initially, the prospect of receiving food rations from government every three months was 
the major incentive to work in the communal garden, and food rations were conditional on 
people working in the communal garden. When food rations stopped in 1998, willingness 
to work in the communal garden dwindled. Many beneficiaries at Drimiopsis were said to 
have left the project to find work on commercial farms instead.
Alfons, a non-San beneficiary at Skoonheid, put the link between the lack of cash and the 
necessity of food aid into perspective. He said that food aid is necessary to get people to 
work well, the reason being that while their crops are growing, they have nothing to eat. 
Also he said that people at Skoonheid still needed food aid after so many years because 
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they never learnt to save. They should have saved some of their income right from the start 
when government still provided food aid. Instead, they had wasted their income. Since his 
arrival in 2000, the older people who started the project had not had any cash, and he had 
also not managed to save any. He said that the communal garden was a good idea in the 
beginning, but now people needed to be trained to save.
The evidence from Skoonheid and Drimiopsis suggests that the communal gardening 
model does not enable beneficiaries to accumulate sufficient capital to sustain themselves 
and become independent producers. All the money circulated in these communities came 
from pension and itinerant work, and this did not suffice to break the dependency on 
government for basic inputs.
The beneficiaries’ troubles with communal gardening coalesced around a desire to have their 
own plots. For Alfons, the way to break dependency on government was to give beneficiaries 
their own plot. He was convinced that had he been given a plot of his own, he would have 
been fine. He would have had to buy his own inputs and not wait for government.
As mentioned above, the LISUP took the initiative of giving beneficiaries their own small 
gardens, thereby clearly addressing a major issue in these projects. The extent of MLR 
support for this idea is unclear, but there is no doubt that it proved very popular among the 
beneficiaries. Karolina at Drimiopsis said that when people received their own small plot, 
they started to cultivate again, and this new approach was a good one. She sold beetroot 
from her garden, and at the time of the field visit was awaiting the cash from her sales. A 
government car had transported the produce to Gobabis. Apart from beetroot, she grew 
carrots, pumpkin, watermelon and spanspek.
Rudolf at Drimiopsis also received his own small garden plot in 2008. He considered this 
a very good solution to the garden-related problems, and observed that many more people 
cultivated land when they knew that it was their own land. This new approach would also 
put a stop to complaints about not knowing what happened to the money generated from 
the communal garden. As the owner of his garden, he would be able to keep all the money 
that he could earn from cultivation and do with it what he considered necessary, such as 
buying goats again.
However, a possible downside of the individualisation of garden plots was identified by 
Alfons. Individualisation and the end of the communal garden could impact negatively on 
the provision of some basic services to the community, such as water. Individuals who did 
not have cash to contribute to the purchase of diesel would suffer the most. The community 
garden at least provided some money for purchasing diesel to pump water for the benefit 
of the entire community.
The individualisation of garden plots (re)introduced co-operation among the beneficiaries 
at Skoonheid and Drimiopsis. One form of co-operation is mobilisation of family labour 
to tend the plots. Karolina co-operated with five family members, being the daughters of 
her mother’s aunt and her father’s uncle’s son. Each of these family members had their own 
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garden and planted for themselves, but they pooled labour to help each other. When the 
time came for weeding, they weeded all their plots. If one of them was away from the farm 
at weeding time, the others weeded and watered the absent person’s garden. After selling 
produce, each member of the team gave the other members a small share of the proceeds. 
Contrary to their experience with the communal garden, there were no quarrels among them. 
The same principles were applied for dryland cropping. Elfrieda had her own piece of land 
for cultivation and obtained seed from the government. When short of seed, she obtained 
some from the father of her children. She was able to carry out all the tasks associated with 
cultivation by means of pooled family labour, her team consisting of her sister, her grown-
up children and the father of her younger children. The team composition was always the 
same. They used the government tractor to plough their land if they were able to pay for the 
diesel; the MLR only provided fuel for ploughing the communal garden.
Not all beneficiaries were blessed with enough labour to cultivate their small rain-fed plots, 
as the story of 23-year-old Gabriel illustrates. In 2005 he obtained a small parcel of land of 
about 0.5 ha for dryland cultivation. It was allocated to him by the Skoonheid Resettlement 
Development Committee rather than the MLR because he was unemployed. He hoped that 
this land would improve his livelihood, but instead found himself in a ‘poverty trap’: he 
lacked money to buy seed, and the only solution was to do piece work and use his earnings 
to buy seed, but this meant neglecting his garden which reduced his output.
In 2007/08 he had one of the lowest yields of all the dryland farmers on the project. He 
harvested only one 50 kg bag of maize and two bags of beans which did not suffice even to 
feed himself and his child, let alone sell. His explanation for this sorry state of affairs was 
that he did not have enough seed and his land was too small, but he also faced two other 
major constraints: a shortage of household and family labour; and the need to go out and 
work to obtain cash to buy basic foodstuffs and other items while his crops were growing. 
During the early part of 2008 when labour was required to weed his maize, Gabriel left 
Skoonheid to do piece work on a commercial farm. He knew that his absence would impact 
negatively on his harvest, but he had no choice as there was no food left in his house. He 
returned to find that most of his maize had been burnt by weeds and his beans had dried 
up. In addition, goats and cattle had eaten some of his crops. His mother had helped a bit, 
but could not devote all her time to his land as she also helped his father. His wife had left 
to visit her father on a commercial farm. The latter fed his wife while she visited him and 
also gave her some food to take back to Skoonheid. Apart from his close family members, 
nobody on the project was prepared to help him: “People do not help each other on the farm.”
For some beneficiaries, a lack of water limited vegetable production. John, for example, had 
a small garden at a cattle post at Drimiopsis. He planted maize, pumpkin, spanspek and 
carrots, using borehole water pumped with a diesel engine. But he struggled to contribute 
cash for buying the diesel. He could water his crops only if the farmers using the borehole 
had diesel and the reservoir was full. At the time of the field visit, his carrots had dried up 
and he had to replant. He had to buy all his seed which he considered to be expensive. His 
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idea was to grow crops and sell them for a living, but was not progressing at all towards that 
goal due to the water supply problems. In fact, life on a commercial farm was better for him. 
Through the MAWF, government provided draught animals and ploughing training for the 
beneficiaries at Skoonheid. The animals were intended to serve the entire community, but 
instead were allocated to only some members. This was not because they were any more 
powerful or well connected than others, but rather, the animals went to those who did not 
have the cash needed to buy diesel for running the government tractor. LISUP provided 
seed but no fertiliser.
The MLR continues to provide regular budgetary support to official group resettlement 
schemes. This is meant to be spent on clearing land, preparing land for crop production, 
irrigating crops, drilling boreholes, purchasing fencing materials and building houses. The 
Ministry has not set a cutoff date for providing this support (Meliczek 2008: 11). Individual 
resettlement beneficiaries and settlers on unofficial group farms do not receive this post-
settlement support.
6.2.2  Livestock 
Generally, individual ownership of livestock on group resettlement schemes in both regions 
was low. Normally, beneficiaries accumulated small numbers of livestock while working on 
commercial farms. Many had to sell these after losing their employment and had no means 
to sustain themselves. Others were able to build on their accumulated livestock, albeit very 
modestly.
At Drimiopsis and Skoonheid, 5 of the 24 and 11 of the 21 respondents owned livestock. 
At Drimiopsis, 2 of the 5 livestock owners owned 90% of all the livestock, and the other 3 
each had 10 or fewer head. At Skoonheid, 1 livestock owner owned nearly 60% of all the 
livestock, and the other 10 had 10 or fewer head of each species, i.e. goats, sheep and cattle. 
At both schemes, those with the highest numbers of livestock had all three of these types, 
cattle being the main type. Omaheke is generally not suitable for sheep and goats, whereas 
cattle fare better and even thrive there.
At Skoonheid, Benjamin bought 3 goats with his pension money. These increased to 6 but 
then decreased to 2 in 2008. One reason for this loss was the presence of a poisonous plant 
at Skoonheid referred to as slangkop (snake head). Benjamin said that most people there 
had lost their few head of small stock to this plant. Skoonheid was said to be suitable for 
cattle and sheep, but not for goats.
Alfons had virtually the same experience as Benjamin at Skoonheid. He started to work 
on a commercial farm in the mid 1980s at the age of 23. When the owner sold the farm to 
government in December 1998, he gave Alfons 2 goats. In his capacity as government’s 
caretaker of the farm, Alfons worked in the established garden for his own benefit. With the 
revenues generated from selling his produce, he bought another 8 goats. When he settled at 
Skoonheid in 2000, he had 36 goats, including a few donated by the MAWF. At the time of 
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the field visit, he had 28. He ascribed the decrease to Skoonheid not being suitable for goat 
farming; goats simply died there. In 2007 he sold goats only once, and slaughtered 3 for 
own consumption. In the following year, he had not sold any goats by September, but had 
slaughtered 2 for own consumption.
Four livestock owners at Drimiopsis and five at Skoonheid sold livestock, thus 56% of the 
livestock owners in the sample sold from their herds. They sold most of their livestock (75%) 
to private buyers, and three made use of auctions as well. Livestock was sold for various 
reasons, in the following order of priority: to buy food, to help relatives, to cover medical 
costs, to buy more livestock, to buy household goods, to cover education costs, to make a 
profit, to buy fuel and farm implements, and to cover travel costs.
As Table 27 shows, on the group schemes in Omaheke in 2008/09, cattle numbers increased 
whereas goat and sheep numbers decreased.
Table 27: Total livestock numbers at Drimiopsis and Skoonheid, 2008/09
  Cattle Goats Sheep
February 2008 255 133 71
February 2009 272 117 62
Livestock sales in the same period fetched an approximate total of N$31 000, and the 
estimated total value of the livestock slaughtered for own consumption is N$14 500. Only 
owners of bigger herds slaughtered for own consumption, i.e. two owners of cattle and sheep, 
and three goat owners. All livestock owners suffered stock losses, and the effects of these 
were most severe for those with smaller numbers. Livestock expenses were not covered in 
the survey of group schemes because the beneficiaries were not able to provide information 
on direct allocable costs per livestock type.
The purchase of livestock indicates that the beneficiaries had managed to save funds and 
were keen either to start farming with livestock or to enlarge their existing herd/s. Many 
found it extremely difficult to save funds, Alfons being one. He had managed to save some 
money in a commercial bank savings account. When he arrived at Skoonheid he had 
N$3 400 in the account, earned from his produce sales and waged labour on the farm where 
he previously lived. At the time of the field visit, though he still had money in the account, 
the amount was only N$1 800. He was no longer able to save as he was unemployed, and 
could generate cash only from the sale of produce from his own plot after a very good rainy 
season. The communal garden provided no cash; people worked there only to ensure that 
government continued to supply the diesel needed for pumping water and using the tractor. 
Should government stop supplying diesel, the beneficiaries would either go without water 
and a tractor, or pay for diesel themselves.
In Hardap, 20 group scheme beneficiaries were surveyed. The highest number of livestock 
owned by a single beneficiary was 12 head of cattle. Her previous employer, a farm owner, 
had given her 13 head, and she had sold 1 male unit at a price of N$2 000 which covered her 
personal expenses.
Section B ● 6. Group Resettlement Schemes
144 ● Livelihoods after land reform: Namibia country report (2010)
At Bernafey, 7 beneficiaries involved in the group scheme owned goats, as did 1 person who 
resided at a cattle post on the farm but was not part of the scheme. Only 1 goat nanny was 
purchased during the preceding year, and the purchase was financed by a loan/gift from 
relatives. More stock was lost than was utilised for animal production. Own consumption 
accounted for only a small proportion of the losses.
Two beneficiaries owned sheep. In 2008 they incurred a total cost of N$820 for the sheep, 
and fetched a total of N$640 for the sale of 5 lambs. No sheep were slaughtered for own 
consumption, but disease killed 11 lambs. Eight beneficiaries owned small herds of goats, 
i.e. 5-20 per herd. In 2008, 18 goats were sold for a total of N$5 630, 23 died or were lost, 11 
being kids, and 1 nanny and 1 kid were slaughtered for own consumption. The beneficiaries 
also owned horses and donkeys, and 1 horse was sold.
Livestock sales in 2008 fetched a total of N$8 270, and the costs incurred by the livestock 
owners totalled N$3 441. The latter included direct allocable costs, i.e. for vaccination, 
dosing, veterinary treatment, fodder, supplementary feed, castration, labour and transport. 
Supplementary feed was purchased on occasion, even though it can be grown and produced 
on the farm if the water pumps are functioning. It is not clear why it was purchased instead.
Nine of 14 the livestock owners in the Bernafey scheme had access to more than one camp, 
but none of them practised rotational grazing, nor did they employ a fixed breeding system. 
Only 22% of them used a weaning system, 50% applied parasite control measures, 71% gave 
supplementary feed (salt licks) and 50% castrated their livestock. Herd production cannot 
be improved if young males are not castrated to enhance genetics and promote weight gain. 
This is particularly important where the goats of multiple farmers graze together. Parasite 
control is ineffective if some farmers dose their livestock regularly and others do not. 
Five Bernafey beneficiaries received daily benefits from their livestock and poultry in the 
form of eggs and milk in varying quantities. The quantity of milk obtained was 0.5 litres to 
2 litres per day, and 1 to 3 eggs were obtained per day.
The stocking rates on the Hardap group schemes can be regarded as low. Localised over-
grazing was evident around the households where water points were situated. In the group 
schemes sampled in both regions, the beneficiaries lived together at or very close to the 
old farmstead or main dwelling. The outlying areas on these farms had adequate grazing, but 
the water infrastructure in those areas was often out of order. Beneficiaries wanted to utilise 
this grazing, but not before the broken fences were repaired because the risk of livestock 
wandering off and being stolen was too high.
Theft of both crops and livestock on group schemes was a major impediment to sustained 
accumulation of livestock and other produce and assets. Many beneficiaries had suffered 
high stock losses due to theft. William at Drimiopsis, for example, arrived there with 22 goats 
in 1992. All of his goats and both of his horses were stolen, leaving him with no livestock, so 
he no longer engaged in livestock farming. He had also stopped producing crops, allegedly 
due to too much theft. Respondents said that young people on the scheme, including small 
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children, stole from the gardens at night. According to William, the old people cultivated 
their gardens, and as soon as they yielded crops, the young people stole them. “We cannot 
work for small children; they must work with us,” he said. To prevent theft, the community 
mobilised some members to undertake regular night patrols in the gardens. Some of the 
perpetrators were caught and handed over to the police. At the time of the field visit, the 
community was considering giving the youth gardens of their own as one strategy to reduce 
theft. Despite having lost all his goats and theft remaining a major problem, William still 
wanted to be given goats. He said that next time around, he would look after them carefully, 
whereas in the beginning he was “a bit stupid” because he had “just let them go out”. 
The Drimiopsis scheme had struggled with theft from the start. Respondents attributed 
this to overcrowdedness in the first years. After Skoonheid was established as a group 
resettlement scheme, many beneficiaries at Drimiopsis opted for resettlement there in the 
belief that there would be less conflict and violence there because it was not overcrowded. 
But, according to Festus at Skoonheid, “Today things at Skoonheid are the same as they are 
at Drimiopsis.” People were stealing from each other, especially livestock. Festus said that 
the perpetrators were not only the youth at Skoonheid, but also the youth on surrounding 
resettlement farms. He said they stole because they “have no work and nothing to live for”. 
Apart from the livestock brought by the few beneficiaries who had accumulated livestock on 
commercial farms, the Omaheke schemes received donations of livestock. 
At Drimiopsis, the Roman Catholic Church initiated a livestock loan scheme in 2001, with 7 
households receiving 9 head of cattle each to start livestock production. After the calving 
stage, the initial beneficiaries were meant to distribute the calves among those who had 
no cattle. The scheme failed because beneficiaries sold the cattle without permission before 
every household benefited. According to Philip, this closed the doors for many households.
At Skoonheid, 14 households received a total of 20 cattle and 10 donkeys from the MAWF. 
By the time of the field visit, these numbers had risen to total 60 animals. In 2005, the NGO 
Komeho gave 12 households 10 goats each and 8 rams to share. This donation was to have 
operated as a revolving livestock fund, with each recipient expected to give 2 nannies to a 
household without goats. The outcome of the Komeho project could not be determined by 
the time of sending this report to print.
Helena and her husband had 10 goats when they settled at Skoonheid in 2000. This 
number rose to 20, but by the time of the field visit it had dropped to 3. Helena explained 
that this was because they sold and slaughtered quite a few goats in 2007. They had also 
received 2 cows through government’s Draught Animal Power Acceleration Programme 
(DAPAP), which incorporated a loan scheme, in terms of which they had to return the two 
cows after they had calved. At the time of the field visit, they had 6 cows. They did not know 
what to do with the loaned cows as nobody had come to claim them back, and they were 
not allowed to sell or slaughter any of the animals. 
All told, it appears that the donations did not have the desired impact of enabling individual 
house holds to build up herds, due mainly to a lack of supervision, guidance and support.
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6.3 Typology of livelihood strategies
6.3.1  Land-based livelihoods
Limited small-scale crop cultivation and livestock husbandry formed the basis of the 
liveli hood strategies pursued in the four group resettlement schemes sampled, all of 
which are located in semi-arid agro-ecological regions. Although Bernafey in Hardap had 
an abundance of water on account of its location in an area with artesian sources, land-
based livelihood strategies there were constrained by other environmental factors. 
Crop production on group resettlement schemes was further constrained by the particular 
form of production prescribed by the MLR, being communal production. Although initially 
referred to as “co-operative farming”, none of the group schemes sampled were organised 
as per the formal definition of a “co-operative” set down in the Namibian Co-operatives 
Act, and none were registered as a “co-operative”. Rather, “co-operative farming” in the case 
of these schemes meant nothing more than beneficiaries contributing labour for cultivating 
a communal garden.
The beneficiaries on group schemes in both regions pursued several land-based livelihood 
strategies, the most important of which are discussed in this section.
6.3.1.1 Accessing land for residence
Most beneficiaries on these group schemes were formerly farm workers with weak or no 
ties to communal areas. This was particularly true for beneficiaries on the Drimiopsis and 
Skoonheid schemes. Some of the Westfalen and Bernafey beneficiaries came from northern 
communal areas. As farm workers in general do not have a permanent and secure place of 
residence, access to a piece of land to call their own was of paramount importance for the 
vast majority of the respondents. The group resettlement schemes provided not only access 
to land, but also a small brick house and basic services such as water. 
Access to land on a group scheme provided a sense of security which replaced the sense 
of vulnerability that most farm workers experience. In Omaheke particularly, the group 
schemes have served as secure places from which beneficiaries can go out to look for work 
and withdraw back to in the event of a dispute with a commercial farmer or unemployment.
Group resettlement schemes have also provided access to residential land for people who 
are not official beneficiaries. Many people utilised family ties with official beneficiaries to 
settle permanently or temporarily on a group resettlement scheme. This gave them, among 
other things, a base from which to go out and look for work, and place to return to if their 
search was unsuccessful. Due to the ethnic homogeneity of Drimiopsis and Skoonheid, 
family ties among beneficiaries there were strong, and have played an important role 
in facilitating access to resettlement without the need to apply formally. The Skoonheid 
project co-ordinator stated that he could not chase newcomers away as official beneficiaries 
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saw it as their right to accommodate family members. This belief was supported by the 
perception that the entire Skoonheid farm was meant for San people only. The testimonies 
of several respondents confirmed the importance of family ties for accessing land on a group 
resettlement scheme.
John, born on a commercial farm in 1957, had been a farm worker all his life. Between 
2004 and 2007 he worked on a commercial farm in the Khomas Hochland, and thereafter 
in the Herero communal area of Aminuis. Whenever he lost his employment, he returned 
to Drimiopsis to stay with his sister until he found new work. In 2007 he decided to stay 
permanently at Drimiopsis because he was not treated well on the farms where he worked, 
and also was suffering from rheumatism and struggling to work. He asked to be resettled 
officially in the belief that government “sal my optel” (lift me up). Initially he struggled with 
accommodation, but then built his own shack next to his sister’s house and was taken up 
in the register. 
Elias, 41 years old, is an example of a person who was able to stay at Drimiopsis after losing 
his employment due to work-related injuries. He had been there for nearly 10 years. Born 
in Kavango Region, he went to Omaheke at an early age to search for work on commercial 
farms. He met his wife on a farm where he worked, and they had three daughters who lived 
with them at Drimiopsis. A few months before his move to the scheme, Elias injured his back 
while offloading equipment from a truck and was unable to work. After a few months, his 
employer retrenched him with no compensation. His only option was to go with his wife to 
Drimiopsis where her father was an official beneficiary. They built a shack for themselves 
in the backyard of her father’s house and stayed there permanently.
Although none of the group scheme beneficiaries had received a long-term lease as provided 
for in the legislation, the majority felt reasonably secure on the schemes. Official beneficiaries 
at Skoonheid and Drimiopsis felt secure because their names had been entered in the project 
register. The San beneficiaries’ sense of security was enhanced by the belief that Skoonheid 
and Drimiopsis were acquired exclusively for them. Still, many beneficiaries including San 
feared that they might be chased off the schemes one day. The fact that two San families at 
Drimiopsis had to vacate their houses in favour of two Oshiwambo-speaking families kept 
those fears alive. The main fear expressed by people in the sample was that they did not 
know where to go if they were chased off.
6.3.1.2 Small-scale crop cultivation to supplement food supply and income
Some people at Drimiopsis and Skoonheid had their own small backyard vegetable garden. 
The harvests were usually very modest and used mainly for own consumption.
6.3.1.3 Harvesting of natural resources
Due to aridity in Omaheke and particularly Hardap, natural resources were harvested only 
on a very limited scale. At Westfalen and Bernafey, no harvesting of natural resources was 
taking place, with the exception of firewood collection.
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Diversification at Skoonheid – leather production.
Water provision at Drimiopsis.
Firewood – an abundant natural resource at Westfalen.
Housing at DrimiopsisHousing at Bernafey
Water infrastructure in need of repair at Westfalen.
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At Drimiopsis and Skoonheid, harvesting of natural resources complemented agricultural 
production to a very limited extent. The natural resources were used primarily for own 
consumption and a very limited amount could be sold locally.
Beneficiaries gathered veldkos (field food) seasonally to supplement their diet. However, the 
resettlement lands were said to be too small to supply adequate amounts of veldkos for all 
community members, so families sometimes had to search for it beyond the borders of the 
resettlement land. Veldkos was most abundant during the rainy season, but was harvested 
only after the rains, from around July, and it lasted only until August. 
The foods gathered included marimba nuts, boesman komkommer (‘bushman cucumber’), 
wild potatoes and berries. Even if abundant, not all of these natural products could be sold. 
Traditionally, the sale of wild potatoes and boesman komkommer was prohibited, whereas 
marimba nuts and berries could be sold, the main market being at the Roman Catholic 
Mission at Epukiro. 
Karolina explained that marimba nuts in particular were very much sought after. The old 
people would crush the nuts, boil the mulch and scoop off the fat, the taste of which is said 
to be as good as beef fat. Herero people tend to buy this fat whenever it is available. However, 
at the time of the field visit, the practice of producing fat from marimba nuts had largely 
stopped in the Drimiopsis area due to declining availability there.
Kamagu or devil’s claw was also harvested at Drimiopsis, mostly for own medicinal use. 
Beneficiaries were promised that somebody would go to the project to providing training on 
harvesting devil’s claw sustainably for commercial purposes. This was already happening 
in other parts of Omaheke.
In the absence of electricity at both Skoonheid and Drimiopsis, beneficiaries depended 
on firewood for cooking, lighting and heating purposes. The task of collecting firewood 
was usually assigned to women. At Drimiopsis it was mentioned that the search for firewood 
required walking longer distances today than in the early 1990s when the scheme started.
Some beneficiaries at Skoonheid who owned dogs used them to hunt rabbits and small 
antelope such as steenbok and warthogs, in spite of their fear of being caught by the police. A 
few beneficiaries hunted snakes or tortoises to eat.
6.3.1.4 Grazing land for multi-purpose livestock production
Access to group resettlement land gave beneficiaries grazing for their livestock. However, 
because few beneficiaries owned livestock, pastures were underutilised at Drimiopsis and 
Bernafey. At Skoonheid the situation was different because the group resettlement scheme 
occupies only a portion of the farm. Grazing on the scheme portion was underutilised 
at the time of the field visit only because the beneficiaries did not own sufficient livestock. 
The remainder of Skoonheid had been allocated to 11 individual livestock farmers on a 
temporary basis. They utilised 3-4 camps each for grazing and some rainfed cultivation.
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6.3.2  Other livelihood strategies
Beneficiaries were combining land-based livelihood strategies with other strategies to 
survive. These consisted mostly of off-farm income streams, the most important sources of 
which were pensions and money earned through piece work on commercial farms.
6.3.2.1 Pensions and remittances
For most households at Drimiopsis and Skoonheid, pensions were the only reliable source 
of cash income. These were being used to pay school fees of children and grandchildren as 
well as to buy food. Given the strong family ties at Drimiopsis and Skoonheid, the benefits 
of pensions were distributed far beyond individual pensioners and their spouses, as the 
following testimonials confirm.
Elfrieda was a single mother of five children, two of whom still lived with her. She had access 
to at least five sources of food, her father’s pension probably being the most important. He 
handed his entire pension to her to buy food which she kept in her house. She prepared 
meals for the family, including her father, every day. When this food ran out, she made use of 
the food offered by the father of her three youngest children. This meant taking the children 
to their father’s new wife to eat, but this did not cause any problems. There she received two 
meals a day for her children, herself and her father. Once this food supply was depleted, 
she would start to use her own reserves of maize and beans. In 2008 she estimated that 
her own food reserves would last until the new planting season. In addition, her sister who 
was employed in Gobabis supported her with a little money from time to time or sent some 
food. One of her daughters worked in Windhoek, and sent about N$200 to Elfrieda every 
month or bought clothes for her younger sisters at Skoonheid.
The limited amounts of cash that flowed into these group resettlement schemes through 
pensions provided opportunities for some people to earn small amounts of money or food 
by providing basic services. Elfrieda’s income included small rewards for itinerant work 
on the project and remittances from her husband. She earned a little mealie-meal, soap or 
cash from assisting sick people at Drimiopsis. If they were pensioners, they gave her either 
mealie-meal or N$20. Many were unable to give anything. She also earned some cash from 
selling garden produce. Her husband, who was working on a commercial farm at the time 
of the field visit, occasionally sent her N$200 or N$300, or an average of N$200 per month. 
She had a dispute with him over the small amounts he sent. His response was that food at 
his farm was also expensive and he wanted to save money for Christmas food. When he 
sent money, she collected it in Gobabis. She had to hitchhike to Gobabis which cost her 
N$20 one way. If she had no cash to pay, she had to wait for a free ride.
The community at Skoonheid used to receive food aid from the government until the late 
1990s when, according to Alfred, it was stopped without any explanation. Approximately 
every third month, each household had received a food package consisting of mealie-meal, 
beans, cooking oil and tinned fish. Alfred said that since the stoppage of this food aid, more 
and more people, especially the youth, loitered around the farm and engaged in criminal 
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activities. He did not know how he and his wife would have survived without their monthly 
pensions. For Usiel, the years when they received food rations and worked in the garden 
were the best years at Drimiopsis. When the rations stopped, everything “went backwards”; 
they struggled even to get the garden going properly.
It was very common for pensioners at Drimiopsis and Skoonheid to look after their grand-
children and pay for their schooling. Some of the fathers employed on commercial farms sent 
money and/or food to sustain their children and the grandparents. Apart from his wife’s 
income of N$300 per month, the only other support that John and his wife received was 
the food or cash sent from time to time by their son who worked on a nearby farm. When 
they ran out of food, they bought food on credit at a local shop.
William, formerly a government employee, received a government pension as well as the 
general pension, totalling N$800 per month. Since arriving at Drimiopsis, the only other 
cash he had earned was from sales of small amounts of his garden produce. He had used 
some of this money to buy two bicycles, but had sold one. 
Some churches provided support to beneficiaries at Skoonheid from time to time. Katrina 
Helena had received clothing, cooking oil, stampmielies (samp), sugar and meat from the 
Roman Catholic Church once a month. This church provided support only to people who 
claimed to be Catholic.
6.3.2.2 Crafts and cultural displays
Craft production and needlework provided modest but important complementary income 
streams for households at Skoonheid and Drimiopsis. However, due to a general lack of 
cash for buying the necessary inputs, many women were almost entirely dependent on 
external sources for inputs and marketing. If an outsider provided beads and string for 
making various items, or cloth for making clothes, women engaged in these activities. As 
soon as the supply of raw materials stopped, production also stopped. Only occasionally 
did some women buy beads and other inputs in Gobabis or Windhoek if they had spare 
cash as well as transport opportunities. 
A medical doctor who ran regular clinics at Skoonheid initiated a craft project involving 
women. She supplied beads and other inputs, and even bought the finished products. Anna 
Albertina was one of the women who benefited from this. She used the time she did not 
spend in her garden to make beaded items and clothes. The latter she sewed by hand as she 
did not have a sewing machine. For inputs she depended on outside agencies such as the 
doctor and the pastor. They supplied inputs and bought the crafts from her. She usually 
lack cash for buying inputs, but whenever she had spare cash, she bought beads in Gobabis. 
Making crafts was her only source of cash income, enabling her to earn N$10 to N$40 per 
week. This sufficed to buy mealie-meal and sugar, but was too little to buy soap as well.
Bernadine sewed dresses which she sold for N$120 each. If she could not sell them at 
Drimiopsis, she took them to neighbouring farms. When she had material, she made up to 
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three dresses per month. She depended on foreign donors to provide material. At the time 
of the visit she did not have any. 
A number of income-generating activities were set up as community-based projects on 
both schemes in Omaheke. A community-based approach to income generation may have 
been sensible from a logistical point of view, but, as with communal gardening on these 
schemes, this approach introduced social problems which led to disputes and some people 
withdrawing or being excluded. It was stated that jealousy and interpersonal problems are 
enhanced by this approach. 
Karolina, for example, engaged in making crafts from beads and cloth. Although a project 
had been set up, she did not take part in it because she had observed that the project leader 
was jealous and did not like her. Jealousy, particularly of community member who did 
better than others, was common. Many perceived jealousy as a negative characteristic of 
the community. Karolina likened the community to children who need to be trained. She 
said that sometimes “hulle val uit” (they fall out) and point fingers, but then “hulle kom by” 
(they correct themselves). 
Cultural displays or performances were an option for some beneficiaries to earn money. 
Like San crafts, San dances appeal to many tourists and there is a market for cultural tourism, 
potentially also at these group schemes, but their success would depend on transport, among 
other things. At the time of the visit to Skoonheid, Gabriel’s wife was away in Windhoek 
earning money with a San dance troupe.
Seamstress at Bernafey Craftswoman at Drimiopsis.
Livelihoods after Land Reform: Namibia country report (2010) ● 153 Section B ● 6. Group Resettlement Schemes
6.3.2.3 Piece work
Work on other farms remained the most important source of income for beneficiaries at 
Drimiopsis and Skoonheid. Some beneficiaries or their family members had permanent 
jobs, and others did piece work. Farmers sometimes recruited people at the projects for 
short-term labour, but usually the people went out to find work. Disputes between workers 
and farmers were frequent. Although new labour legislation gives farm workers specific 
rights, including a minimum monthly wage, the remoteness of many farms makes it easy for 
farmers to flout the law, leaving the workers vulnerable, and this applies particularly to San 
workers. It is against this background of vulnerability that being an official beneficiary of a 
group scheme, or even just a relative of an official beneficiary, provides a sense of security. 
If workers lost their employment, they returned to Drimiopsis or Skoonheid and waited 
for the next employment opportunity. These schemes therefore served as labour pools for 
the commercial farming sector, and in some cases also the FURS and AALS farms. This 
amounts to reproducing a cheap labour system that ignores basic legislation.
Although in short supply, full-time or piece work on commercial farms was the most 
accessible option for beneficiaries of these schemes to generate income. However, for San 
people at Drimiopsis, this was fraught with problems. Although many commercial farmers 
were said to pay their workers reasonably well, many others did not, which often resulted in 
a dispute. The Skoonheid resettlement committee started a system of recording the names 
and details of commercial farmers who came to the project to recruit workers. In this way 
the committee was able to keep track of which community member had gone to which 
farm. If the farmer defaulted, the committee knew where to find him. 
Karolina explained that farmers went to Drimiopsis looking for piece workers, but the 
beneficiaries often found it difficult to negotiate a wage that would enable them to sustain 
themselves on the job and to bring something home. Some farmers treated their workers well 
by paying well and returning them to the project, but others, including Herero employers, 
did not want to pay once the work was completed, and certainly did not return the workers 
to the project. Many people worked for Hereros but found it difficult to make ends meet 
with the wages they paid. When they got sick on the job, they were dumped at the hospital 
and relatives had to struggle to get them home and feed them.
Elias was grateful for the opportunity to live at Drimiopsis, but complained about the lack 
of income-generating opportunities there. He planted his own vegetables, but they did not 
bring him much income. He often searched for “stukwerk” (piece work) on neighbouring 
farms to get some income. He normally walked from farm to farm asking the farmers for 
piece work. In recent years it had become more difficult to find regular piece work, and 
during the rainy season it was very scarce. Piece work usually included clearing fire paths 
and mending broken fences – tiresome and low-paid jobs. Normally he left his house at 
the beginning of the week, and walked down the main road visiting each farm to ask if the 
farmer had any work for him. At times he spent a whole week searching for work, walking 
up to 60 km away from the project. Temporary employment often meant that he was not 
given proper accommodation and had to stay on his own in a makeshift shelter in the bush. 
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Having no cash reserves, he often had to ask for an advance on his wage to buy food to eat 
while living in the bush. He commonly received a net wage of N$300 to N$400. With this 
income he bought food and clothes for his family. His income did not last long; the process 
of searching for piece work began again within a few days. Elias had a strong desire to 
break this cycle of poverty to which he had been subject for most of his life. His biggest 
wish was to have access to credit and land in order to raise cattle and make a living from 
cattle farming, but none of these things had materialised to date. He felt that government 
was prioritising the San when it came to providing financial support to buy cattle.
Alfons had gone out to work only once since settling at Skoonheid in 2000. If employers 
were to go to Skoonheid to look for workers, he would sign up, but he was no longer going out 
to look for employment, his reason being that was too little to be had. He saw other people 
at the project go out and return without having found any employment. He considered it a 
waste of time, and would rather spend his time in his garden.
Apart from the beneficiaries who did not want to go out to look for work due to the high 
opportunity costs, there were others who could not do so due to illness. John at Drimiopsis, 
for example, was only 51 years old but rheumatism prevented his going out to work. Without 
a pension and unable to do farm work, he did not have enough money to visit the clinic.
6.3.2.4 Shops 
Beneficiaries at Drimiopsis and Skoonheid were dependent on shops for their basic food 
and other requirements as they did not produce enough food to sustain themselves. There 
were three shops at Drimiopsis. One, owned by an Oshiwambo-speaking man, was located 
on the project land, and across the road was another, owned by an official beneficiary of 
San/Damara descent. The third shop, which was not on the project land, was owned by an 
official of the Department of Forestry, an Oshiwambo-speaking woman, who was granted 
permission to establish the shop, on condition that she did not sell alcohol. This permission 
was reportedly granted by a Development Planner of the MLR in the Gobabis regional office. 
A general complaint among beneficiaries was that prices in all three shops were too high. 
Sometimes they went to commercial farms to obtain basic foodstuffs at lower prices. Due 
to a general shortage of cash, beneficiaries made use of credit at the shops. For many this 
implied a neverending cycle of indebtedness and impoverishment: as soon as they obtained 
their pension or income from employment or craft sales, they had to use it to pay off their 
debt, which left too little money for buying food until more money came in, which meant 
asking for credit at the shops again.
Business opportunities for beneficiaries were very limited, mainly because of the low levels 
of education of most beneficiaries, the lack of surplus capital to invest in even the smallest 
shop or another activity, and the difficulty of marketing goods due to the long distances to 
markets and a lack of transport.
Rudolf, an official beneficiary at Drimiopsis, established a small shop when he settled on 
the scheme in 1991. Since then he had combined livestock farming, crop production and the 
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shop as a livelihood strategy. He was born in Gobabis in 1962 to parents of San and Damara 
descent. He completed Standard 2 (today Grade 4) and left school at the age of 10 or 12. For 
the next five years he stayed at his mother’s house, not engaging in any activities. At age 17 
he started to think about what he could do for a living without having to engage in waged 
labour. Avoiding waged labour was a “political decision”, he said, as he felt that the wealth 
of the whites should have been his wealth. He therefore decided to work for himself and 
saw an opportunity for business. He started his business by selling sweets and bubblegum 
from his mother’s house. A demand for candles and matches arose and he added these to 
his line of goods. In addition he sold old bottles which children collected for him in return 
for sweets and bubblegum. The bottles were sold to a white man.
He first went to Drimiopsis not to settle there but to be with the ‘woman of his life’. At the 
time he was informed that government would provide food, a house and a coffin to people 
who resettled. He decided to resettle because government would do everything for him, 
and indeed he received a house, food and blankets.
As there was no shop at Drimiopsis at the time, he decided to set up shop there, and started 
trading from his tent. After initial opposition from the project manager employed by the 
MLRR, Rudolf formally applied in 1994 for a license to run a shop at the scheme and was 
granted one, on condition that he would not continue trading from his tent, but rather build 
A shop at Drimiopsis
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a shop from corrugated iron or bricks. He sold his goats, and with the proceeds of N$1 000 
bought 18 corrugated-iron sheets and built his shop. In 1996 he replaced the corrugated 
iron with bricks, constructing the brick building himself.
Progress was slow as he had to feed his children from the income generated from the shop. 
A six-month stint in the police cells awaiting formal charges of alleged rape set him back 
even further. The charges were never formally laid as it turned out that there was no case 
against him. When he returned to Drimiopsis he concentrated on his shop again.
On settling at Drimiopsis in 1991, he had no livestock but only his trading business and 
about N$2 000 in a savings account. With this he bought some chickens. They bred well, 
and when they were big enough he sold them. With the proceeds he bought two lambs 
which he gave to his oldest child’s mother’s grandfather in Skoonheid to look after.
Apart from the lambs he bought, some people paid him with goats for goods they bought 
in his shop. At the time there were many more people at Drimiopsis, i.e. 500-600. Most of 
them had been evicted from commercial farms and were staying temporarily at Drimiopsis. 
When people ran out of money for buying food, he accepted goats as payment. By 1994 he 
had accumulated 36-38 goats, which he sold to build his shop. Thereafter he invested in 
more goats whenever he had money, and accumulated about 15 goats.
In 2004 his wife contracted TB. By this time they had separated but she was still living 
at Drimiopsis. In the same year she received a few of the cattle donated to the scheme by 
the Roman Catholic Church, which would earn her a small income. Their daughter was at 
school and their young son was at home with Rudolf. Looking after his estranged wife in 
hospital as well as the children and shop became too much of a burden, particularly as he 
had nobody to look after his goats. He was unwilling to ask community members to look 
after the goats as he felt that they could not be trusted; they would take the goats out to 
drink at the water point and forget about them. He therefore decided to sell the goats and 
buy stock for the shop with the proceeds. Since 2004 he had not bought livestock again. 
Once his children had completed their schooling he would consider livestock ownership 
again. Should his son drop out of school, he would be available to look after livestock. 
Rudolf’s livelihood strategy was to buy and sell assets, e.g. buy goats, let them multiply and 
then sell them. He ascribed his present “verwaarloos” (poor state) to both his own negligence 
and his former wife’s TB. He no longer had any savings. His shop generated a turnover of 
about N$1 000 per month, of which he used N$600 to buy new stock and kept N$400 to 
feed himself and the children, leaving nothing for further investment. He was considering 
cultivating crops in the garden plot given to him in 2008 to generate more cash.
One of his competitors, the Oshiwambo-speaking woman employed by the Department 
of Forestry who opened a shop at Drimiopsis, focused on selling trees to the community 
rather than foodstuffs, but she had opened a cuca shop in her house where she sold some 
foodstuffs. His other competitor was the Oshiwambo-speaking official beneficiary who 
owned the shop across the road from Rudolf’s shop and stocked a small range of foodstuffs.
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When Alfons settled at Skoonheid in 2000, he established a small shop in a corrugated-
iron structure which he added onto his house. Selling his goats from time to time provided 
some cash to buy stock for the shop. He sold up to three goats at a time at auctions, to which 
he transported the goats in his donkey-cart. In 2007 he closed the shop as it was no longer 
proving profitable, mainly because he was no longer permitted to make use of government 
transport free of charge to get goods from Gobabis to the shop. When the cost of transport 
became unaffordable, he was forced to stop his trading activity. Since 2007 he had also not 
sold any goats, but there was no reason to do so as his own dryland field and the communal 
garden gave him enough food.
The MLR prohibits the sale of alcohol on resettlement schemes, and during the field visit there 
was no evidence of cuca shops or people being drunk at Skoonheid and Drimiopsis. However, 
a few people stated that alcohol was in fact being produced and sold on the premises, i.e. 
some people brewed and sold “bushman tombo” when they needed cash to buy food. The 
tombo was made from sugar, cooked maize meal, crushed beans and a particular root. 
6.3.2.5 Investments
Very few people at Skoonheid and Drimiopsis were able to invest in the land, let alone acquire 
some livestock, mainly because they never had enough cash. Pensions served only to pay 
school fees and buy necessities, and the income from any employment found was too low 
to provide even for basic necessities, let alone livestock purchases. 
The story of Bernadine, one of the first people to settle at Drimiopsis in 1989, illustrates the 
situation. At an advanced age but still not an official pensioner, her husband was employed 
for a while on a farm looking after the livestock of a person who worked in Gobabis. For this 
he earned N$200 per month and some mealie-meal, but the cash did not suffice to cover 
basic necessities and life was a constant struggle. Then, a medical condition prevented her 
husband from working anymore, and Bernadine, also elderly by that time, could no longer 
work, so all they could do was grow crops in their own garden for their own consumption.
As one of the first settlers at Drimiopsis, Bernadine worked for many years in the communal 
garden, but did not draw an income from that work: the money generated from the garden 
was deposited in a bank account and used to buy coffins for beneficiaries who died. On 
reaching pensionable age, Bernadine and her husband received a total of about N$900 in 
pension money every month, but this did not suffice for buying goats. They used a large 
portion of the pension money to pay off their previous month’s debts for mealie-meal, 
tea, meat and soap, and the rest went to supporting their children and their schoolgoing 
grandchildren. It was impossible to save any money for other necessities and emergencies, 
let alone investments. Only one of their children, a son who worked on a farm, sent money 
or food from time to time as his children were at Drimiopsis. 
The quantitative survey found that most individual households in the group schemes, having 
extremely limited material resources including cash, were forced to buy basic foodstuffs at 
local shops on credit, and hence lived in a perpetual cycle of credit and debt.
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6.4 Livelihood trajectories
For the group schemes in Omaheke, only one typical trajectory was identified, this being 
the ‘welfare’ trajectory. The ‘ideal’ trajectory presented below is based on the National 
Resettlement Policy (MLR 2001) and was formulated for the purpose of illustrating the 
gap between policy and reality.
6.4.1   The ‘ideal’ trajectory
Farm worker
Becomes a land reform beneficiary in a group resettlement scheme
Attains self-reliance (food production or other income-generating activity/ies)
According to the National Resettlement Policy (ibid.: 7), beneficiaries are “expected to 
be self-reliant and self-sufficient by the fourth year except in the case of existing natural 
phenomena, e.g. drought or other disasters”. In addition, “… training programmes … [are] … to 
facilitate the resettled to realise their full potential in pursuing a higher level of livelihood”.
The ‘ideal’ trajectory had not been realised on any of the projects visited. Beneficiaries 
remained dependent on government grants such as pensions or off-project income streams 
from full-time or part-time employment (piece work), primarily in the commercial farming 
sector. Also, beneficiaries received little or no training at all to “realise their full potential in 
pursuing a higher level of livelihood”.
The fact that the ‘ideal’ trajectory had not been attained on the group schemes by the time of 
the study does not imply that it is unattainable. The ‘ideal’ trajectory has been included in 
this section merely to set a benchmark from which policy-makers can assess the success 
of future policy implementation. The ‘ideal’ trajectory could also feature a combination of 
best practices as described in the trajectories below.
6.4.2   The ‘welfare’ trajectory 
The ‘welfare’ trajectory begins with the beneficiary being employed for most of his/her life 
as a farm worker. Most beneficiaries on the group schemes sampled had worked on one or 
more farms at some stage, and most conforming to the ‘welfare’ trajectory had worked on 
several farms. The next stage in the trajectory entails the loss of employment. Reasons for 
this included being made redundant or being retrenched due to ill health, old age or the sale 
of the farm or transfer of ownership. Other common reasons for farm workers losing their 
job are disputes with employers over wages and alleged theft. In some cases, conflict with 
fellow farm workers led to the decision to leave a farm and face unemployment. 
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Farm worker
Loses job / unemployed
Becomes a land reform beneficiary in a group resettlement scheme
Engages in income-generating activities outside the group scheme
Struggles to survive
Depends on state remittances and/or donor support
The third stage of the trajectory entails a former farm worker settling on a group resettlement 
scheme. There are two ways in which this stage comes about. Either, the former far worker 
formally applies for resettlement and is granted the right to settle on a scheme as an official 
beneficiary, or a former farm worker settles on a scheme ‘illegally’ or without formally 
applying because he/she is unemployed and has no other option. Many in the latter situation 
utilised family ties to stay on a scheme permanently. The MLR has turned a blind eye to 
such ‘illegal’ or informal settlement in the knowledge that the people concerned had no 
alternative. An example of the MLR’s leniency is the Kanyemba Street informal settlement 
at Drimiopsis. 
The fourth, fifth and sixth stages of this trajectory see the beneficiary finding it impossible 
to make a living on the scheme due to limited income-generating opportunities, taking on 
piece work outside the scheme, but still struggling to survive due to a lack of opportunities 
for piece work and/or low remuneration and/or ill health or old age, and ultimately becoming 
dependent on state and/or donor support.
The experiences of beneficiaries conforming to this trajectory have been more or less the 
same. The majority in both schemes in Omaheke arrived at the scheme with few assets. 
Some had been able to accumulate small herds of livestock while working on commercial 
farms. Where farm wages allowed, they bought small stock, one head at a time. Some had 
received livestock as part of their remuneration, and about three received some livestock 
from their employer when the farm was sold.
Many beneficiaries who had accumulated livestock while working on a commercial farm 
arrived at the resettlement scheme without any livestock because they had been forced to 
sell it to tide themselves over while unemployed. Once settled at Drimiopsis or Skoonheid, 
they worked in the communal gardens. Until 1998, all beneficiaries on these schemes were 
supported with government food aid, provided that they worked in the communal gardens. 
Many people hailed the first few years as the best years on the schemes because of the food 
aid. When it stopped, they began to struggle, enthusiasm for communal gardening waned 
and many dropped out of this activity. Income from piece work and itinerant employment, 
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monthly pensions and limited remittances from employed family members became the 
main sources of support. Starved of cash, only a few people, predominantly pensioners, 
were able to acquire small stock.
Benjamin, a 76-year-old beneficiary at Skoonheid since 1991 is a case in point. As a farm 
worker he accumulated a small herd of goats thanks to farmers giving him a goat from 
time to time on top of his wages and food rations. He could not remember how many he 
had, but by the time he settled at the scheme, he did not have any goats. He had sold all of 
them because livestock proved to be a liability when looking for work: most farm owners 
did not want to employ people with livestock, or otherwise they limited the number of head 
that workers could keep. He was not able to save any of the proceeds from the sales as he 
had to sustain himself during spells of unemployment.
Having neither livestock nor money on settling at Skoonheid, he helped to debush land for 
the communal garden and then helped to cultivate the garden. In return he received food 
rations and produce. When the food rations were stopped in 1998, he received only rations 
from the garden. He stopped working in the garden in 2000 as he wanted to rest, but still he 
received some rations from the garden thanks to the local Resettlement Committee taking 
a decision to continue supplying garden produce to old people even though they no longer 
worked in the garden. In 2008 he received his own small portion in the garden, i.e. a plot 
of about 0.05 ha. He bought seed with his pension money and grew vegetables there, and 
stated that one good harvest enabled him to feed himself for a year.
Accumulating livestock on group resettlement schemes was fraught with risks and threats. 
The most important of these at Drimiopsis and Skoonheid were the presence of poisonous 
plants and stock theft. Some pensioners were able to buy goats. A few years after setting at 
Skoonheid, Benjamin had used some pension money to buy 3 goats. These increased to 6 
but then decreased to 2 in 2008. One reason for this loss was the presence of a poisonous 
plant at Skoonheid referred to as slangkop (snake head). Benjamin said that most people 
there had lost their few head of small stock to this plant. Skoonheid was said to be suitable 
for cattle and sheep, but not for goats. In a few cases, stock owners lost their livestock to 
thieves. William, one of the victim’s of theft at Drimiopsis, arrived there in 1992 with 22 
goats, all of which, along with his 2 horses, were stolen, so he stopped farming livestock.
Compared to the Omaheke group schemes, the Hardap schemes had more beneficiaries 
who originated in communal areas. Born and raised in communal areas, they left in search 
of employment, and many ended up as labourers on commercial farms. Thenceforth, their 
trajectories were very similar to those of the beneficiaries in Omaheke. Another regional 
difference was the ethnic composition of beneficiaries on the group schemes: in Hardap the 
composition was more heterogenous than in Omaheke.
Hendrik, of Nama descent, was born in 1952 in the Hoachanas area in today’s Hardap 
Region. He had worked for most of his life on one commercial farm in the region, which 
was sold to the government in 2000. Though asked to stay on to look after the farm and 
its infrastructure, which he did for a while, he was never offered permanent resettlement 
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there. Instead, the MLRR advised him to resettle at Westfalen, and he moved there with 
his wife in 2002. The Ministry’s office in Mariental allocated to Hendrik a single camp of 
approximately 200 ha where he kept about 43 goats and sheep as well as 2 horses.
Absolom, aged 27, had lived at Westfalen since 2004. He hails from Ohangwena Region 
in northern Namibia, and was raised in the village of Ongenga located close to the border 
with Angola. He did not receive any form of schooling. After moving to Hardap, he found 
temporary work in Mariental as a grocery packer. He applied for resettlement at Westfalen 
with the expectation of becoming self-employed. At the time of the field visit, he had no 
livestock and spent most of his time working in the communal garden. He was not married, 
but lived with his partner and their three children in a house built for them by the Ministry.
His partner also worked in the garden. With the help of Ministry officials, the scheme was 
selling its garden produce in Mariental and Windhoek.
A few individuals, mostly in Hardap, were able to accumulate small numbers of livestock 
from the proceeds of the communal gardens. Magdalena, aged 32, hails from a village in 
Oshana Region in northern Namibia, and was resettled at Westfalen in 2000. By the time of 
the field visit she had not received any papers from the Ministry as proof of resettlement. She 
was single with a 4-year-old daughter who lived with her. Since being resettled, she had 
accumulated a few goats which she kept in a kraal close to her house. She would sell some 
of them whenever she needed income, but had not slaughtered any for own consumption. 
A good harvest at Westfalen.
Crops damaged by water problems at Bernafey.
Water provision at Westfalen.
A good harvest at Bernafey.
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6.5 Evaluating outcomes
Did access to land through group resettlement schemes improve the livelihoods of the 
scheme beneficiaries? The answer is not straightforward, particularly in view of the fact 
that for many beneficiaries, access to land meant much more than simple economic factors.
There can be no doubt that for the vast majority of beneficiaries of group schemes, a major 
benefit of resettlement was that they obtained rights to a piece of land on which they could 
have a secure home of their own. Resettlement meant not only access to a piece of land, but 
also the provision of a small brick house with basic amenities and access to potable water. 
Moreover, as official beneficiaries, they were eligible for state support, in particular food aid.
However, in terms of socio-economic improvements of livelihoods in general, the group 
resettlement schemes have not proved successful. The vast majority of the beneficiaries 
were not able to produce surpluses in the communal gardens which might have enabled 
them to start accumulating productive assets such as livestock. In addition, an incessant 
lack of cash characterised most households, and this led some beneficiaries to sell their few 
assets – mostly small numbers of livestock – in order to buy food and other basic necessities. 
But also, by their own admission, a number of households sold off assets and sank deeper 
into poverty due to excessive use of alcohol, as the following two life histories reflect. 
Whatever the contributing factors may be, the vast majority of beneficiaries still regarded 
themselves as poor; their livelihoods had not improved in any significant way.
Karolina and her husband had not experienced any livelihood improvements since their 
resettlement. Their only possessions when they settled at Drimiopsis were a donkey-cart 
and two horses. They expected to move forward, but 18 years later they still had nothing. 
In 1991 they sold their donkey-cart due to hardship. In the early years they wasted a lot of 
money on alcohol, but then stopped drinking with the help of a pastor. Karolina speculated 
that had they stopped drinking sooner, they may have had some livestock at the time of the 
study. Her husband earned a little money through piece work which helped them to buy 
food.
John expected his life to take a turn for the better after he settled at Drimiopsis, but this did 
not happen. There were too many people there and things were “deurmekaar” (confused). 
He had arrived there with 6 goats, 2 dogs and some chickens. He had 8 goats at the time of 
the field visit, but wanted to be moved to another place because theft was a big problem at 
Drimiopsis. He was a heavy drinker before resettling, but had stopped since being “bekeer” 
(converted). His employer had advised him to use his money to buy goats, which he did, and 
his hope was to go on increasing his goat herd. He intended using the money generated 
from his garden to accumulate goats to a level that would enable him to slaughter a goat 
once in a while.
The evidence presented throughout this section on group resettlement schemes suggests 
that much of the failure of these schemes must be ascribed to the communal gardening 
model. Dissatisfaction with this model was apparent in both Hardap and Omaheke. Among 
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the major issues identified in section 6.2.1 concerning cultivation were that (a) people who 
hardly ever worked in the communal garden claimed part of the harvest, and (b) those who 
worked in the garden never received any cash from the sale of the produce. Disputes that 
arose in connection with the communal gardens not only posed an economic threat to the 
schemes, but also impacted negatively on the social fabric of the resettled communities.
With the support of a livelihood support programme in Drimiopsis and Skoonheid, these 
concerns were addressed by replacing the communal gardens with individual plots for 
cultivation. Although these plots were very small, many beneficiaries regarded them as a 
positive step towards improving their living conditions. For the first time since the inception 
of the two schemes in Omaheke, beneficiaries who engage in gardening will be able to see 
financial returns for their labours. Whether or not the individualised gardening model will 
indeed improve living conditions on these schemes remains to be seen.
The permanent shortage of cash on the group resettlement schemes made it impossible 
for most beneficiaries to improve their livelihoods beyond a basic minimum – in monetary 
terms probably below the national poverty datum line. The cash shortage placed many 
beneficiaries in a downward spiral of poverty. Many pensioners, for example, appear to 
have been continuously indebted to local shops: their pensions did not suffice to buy food 
for a whole month, so they obtained food on credit, paid off the debt when the next pension 
came in, spent the rest on other basic necessities, had no money left for more food and so 
bought on credit again, thereby perpetuating the ceaseless cycle.
In other cases, the need to generate income by going out to work impacted negatively on 
agricultural output. Some beneficiaries were caught in a situation where, having planted a 
few crops, they could not look after them as they had to leave the scheme to do piece work 
to obtain cash for food, so the crops wilted or died.
The absence of cash created a perception among group scheme beneficiaries that life 
on commercial farms was better than on group resettlement schemes. John’s wife, for 
example, stated that people on commercial farms had an income, a constant supply of food, 
tractors and cars which they could use whenever needed, and no problems with water. 
She said that they were “fat on the farm”, whereas at Drimiopsis they “suffer and struggle 
too much”. It was only because her husband got sick that he stopped working. They moved 
to Drimiopsis to live on their own and make a living for themselves, but life was not good 
there. It would have been much better if they had their own cattle post, as Drimiopsis was 
“too urban”. In the evenings young people threw stones at them and their goats were stolen 
out of their corrals. They felt that if they could live slightly apart from the other settlers, 
things would change and the future would be bright. Yet, despite these difficulties, they felt at 
home in the community and saw Drimiopsis to be “our place”. 
It would be erroneous to interpret the perceptions of John and his wife as singing the 
praises of agricultural employment. Their comparison between commercial farms and 
group resettlement schemes points instead to a serious structural problem in the manner in 
which group resettlement has been conceptualised and implemented. A minimum level of 
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asset accumulation has to take place for beneficiaries to become self-sustaining producers 
who no longer depend on government and other external inputs, and this accumulation has 
not materialised in close to 20 years since the schemes were established.
Nonetheless, the vast majority of beneficiaries on group schemes, especially in Omaheke, 
were grateful that government had given them a secure place to stay. The importance of 
this was well articulated by Karolina at Drimiopsis who said that the government “het ons 
opgetel” (picked us up) by providing the land as well as houses which keep them properly 
sheltered from the rain. If the government had not devised such a plan, she did not know 
what would have happened to them. They could now go out and look for work if need be. A 
secure home at Drimiopsis or Skoonheid gives them protection especially where disputes 
arise with farmers, e.g. over remuneration, since these are homes to which they can return 
without fear of having to roam around, homeless and desperate, in search of more work.
Does all this imply that the group resettlement model should be discarded altogether? The 
simple answer is no. The primary reason for considering the continued implementation of 
group resettlement – albeit in a very different form – is social rather than economic. For 
as long as rural people face losing their place of residence and having no alternative place 
of residence on account of becoming unemployed, government should offer a land-based 
welfare model to assist them. Arguably, the group resettlement schemes have performed 
this function all along. With a different production model, the beneficiaries of a restructured 
group resettlement approach would stand a better chance of producing food.
What this research has shown is that many poor people opted for resettlement not because 
they wanted to climb the economic ladder and become successful commercial farmers, 
but because, primarily, they needed a secure place of residence (see also von Wietersheim 
2008). This raises the question of the needs and aspirations of the rural poor, including farm 
workers. No systematic attempts have been made to determine these. Such an investigation 
is very likely to establish that many of the applicable people are not interested in obtaining 
a 1 200 ha piece of land on which they are expected to engage in farming as a business. 
For those who do not aspire to this, group resettlement offers a solution in so far as it 
provides basic services and access to a small piece of land on which to keep some livestock 
and grow a few vegetables.
Related to the question of needs and aspirations are the questions of how the failure (or 
success) of group resettlement is defined and assessed, and whose standards are being 
applied. It is indisputable that the monetised agricultural outputs of group resettlement 
schemes in the study regions have been less than when the farms were farmed by a white 
commercial farmer, even though the state has invested large amounts of money in those 
schemes, including for proper housing and other infrastructure. But can it justifiably be said 
that these schemes have failed, considering that close to 150 people in Omaheke alone are 
officially receiving some basic social services and have the opportunity to raise livestock 
and/or grow small amounts of food, where previously only a fraction of that number were 
supported on the same land? The answer depends on the objectives of land reform and 
resettlement, and ultimately, perhaps, on the perceptions of the beneficiaries themselves.
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Clearly, converting productive agricultural land into land that accommodates a welfare-type 
production system carries distinct opportunity costs, but these costs must be determined 
rather than assumed in evaluating the potential of group resettlement as a welfare measure. 
Not addressing the needs of the poor also has a cost that has to be established.
The above should not be construed as an uncritical plea for the continuation of group 
resettlement schemes as we know them. There is considerable room for improvement. This 
LaLR study has documented some of the problems experienced with group resettlement 
from the perspective of beneficiaries, and the solutions being implemented to remedy those. 
It will be very important in this regard to monitor the individualisation of gardening to 
ascertain whether it has the positive effects expected. Also, support in terms of training, 
agricultural inputs and marketing should be investigated with a view to furnishing an 
appropriate post-settlement support package.
The marketing of produce is likely to be the most intractable issue due to long distances to 
markets. An option that should be investigated is that of establishing group resettlement 
schemes closer to urban areas both large and small. More specifically, a systematic assessment 
is required to determine the feasibility of establishing group resettlement schemes close to 
small rural settlements such as Kalkfeld and Kamanjab, for example.
To pre-empt an immediate and overhasty rejection of this recommendation, it is acknowledged 
that there is a risk of group resettlement schemes becoming squatter camps. The proposed 
assessment should therefore include determining whether it is possible to prevent the 
development of such a situation. One possible way to reduce the risk of such a development 
is to allocate individual land rights to beneficiaries. In addition, involving the beneficiary 
communities through community management structures may assist in controlling access 
to such land. Controversial as it may seem to some, the impact of the Basic Income Grant 
(BIG) on the sociology of the informal settlement at Omitara may hold valuable lessons for 
future group resettlement schemes.
LaLR fieldwork at Bernafey.
Government visit to Westfalen.LaLR study – interview with community at Bernafey.
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7  RETHINKING ‘VIABILITY’: 
REFLECTING ON THE 
RESEARCH FINDINGS
The prevailing model for land reform and resettlement in Namibia consists of small-scale 
commercial farming units. According to the National Resettlement Policy, the minimum size 
of a farm should be in line with the minimum size of a viable commercial/subsistence unit 
in any agro-ecological region, hence the minimum in the higher rainfall areas is 1 000 ha, 
and in the more arid southern regions it is 3 000 ha. Beneficiaries are expected to become 
fully self-sufficient on these units.
Viewed in terms of its own objectives and criteria, the current small-scale commercial 
farming model does not appear to be commercially viable or financially sustainable. This 
observation is borne out by rough gross margin calculations.
Under optimal climatic conditions and with the best possible farm management skills, a 
stocking ratio of 1 LSU per 15 ha is not likely to yield a gross margin exceeding N$37 500 
per year on a unit of 1 000 ha and N$60 480 on a unit of 3 000 ha. Although this net 
farm income is considerably higher than the poverty datum line of N$15 747 for a family 
of 5, it is not clear whether these gross margins leave sufficient capital to maintain and 
replace farm infrastructure after living expenses are subtracted. To put this concern into 
perspective: N$36 000 is just about enough to buy wire and poles for about 3 km of fencing, 
but it is not enough to replace a windmill, which cost N$45 000 in January 2009. While these 
expenses are unlikely to be incurred every year, they do suggest that if FURS beneficiaries 
are held responsible for the maintenance and development of farm infrastructure, they will 
not be able to achieve standards of living much above the official poverty datum line.
In addition, this study confirmed that there has been little differentiation in the livelihood 
paths of most beneficiaries. Options for exploring different livelihoods paths were severely 
limited in Hardap and Omaheke. The livelihoods of FURS and AALS beneficiaries centred 
around extensive livestock farming. With few exceptions, having their own piece of land is 
of great importance to beneficiaries, not only because they love farming and rural life, i.e. 
a question of lifestyle, but also, very importantly, because their own piece of land enables 
them to better control and manage their livestock.
Only a few women on the two group resettlement schemes in Omaheke had taken up craft 
production for marketing as a livelihood strategy, but their success depended on external 
assistance to acquire the necessary materials and market the finished products. Even where 
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such external support was available, the incomes derived from crafts sales appear to have 
been very small.
The benefits derived from utilising natural resources were also very limited. Hardap offers 
very little veldkos, and firewood appeared to be the natural resource most commonly used 
there. Although Omaheke offers more veldkos, beneficiaries of the group schemes gathered 
only limited amounts just after the rainy season. The significance and success of veldfood 
gathering as a livelihood strategy depend on rainfall and the size of the land area accessible 
to the gatherers. FURS and AALS beneficiaries derived benefits from utilising a local tree 
to produce droppers for fencing.
Piece work on commercial farms is another livelihood option available to resettlement 
beneficiaries, but the findings of this study suggest that it was almost exclusively group 
scheme beneficiaries who fell back on piece work, and only from time to time rather than 
continuously. None of the FURS beneficiaries appear to have resorted to piece work.
The dependence of most beneficiaries on extensive livestock farming, and the absence of 
viable alternatives for full-time farmers, made them vulnerable to external shocks, especially 
drought. Just about all of the farmers reported big stock losses due to drought. The AALS 
farmers, by virtue of having full control over their land, should have been able to mitigate 
the impact of drought, but this point was never explicitly discussed in the interviews. It is 
reasonable to assume that FURS beneficiaries are more vulnerable to drought than AALS 
beneficiaries because their small units do not allow for the flexibility in range management 
required to minimise the impacts of drought.
Group resettlement schemes, and particularly those in Omaheke accommodating mainly 
San beneficiaries, undoubtedly provide some protection against external shocks. Their own 
food production may have contributed a measure of protection, but it was primarily 
government’s food aid programmes that prevented them from starving. In a very profound 
way, Skoonheid and Drimiopsis have been welfare projects more than anything else.
The predominant model for land distribution implies that the basic agrarian structure in 
Namibia remains intact. It could even be argued that in its current form, land redistribution 
perpetuates some of the more repugnant features of settler colonialism. Many beneficiaries 
of the AALS and FURS depend on cheap labour to survive financially. Examples have been 
cited of farm labourers employed by land reform beneficiaries being paid amounts that are 
well below the minimum agricultural wage. To the extent that group resettlement schemes 
such as Drimiopsis and Skoonheid constitute cheap labour pools, they help to reproduce 
labour relations which are exploitative and not in line with Namibia’s labour legislation. 
To conclude, it should be pointed out that all of the livelihood improvements attained by 
land reform beneficiaries have been attained at the expense of hundreds of former farm 
labourers who lost their employment, their place of residence and their access to land after 
the state bought the applicable commercial farms. To this day, there still does not appear to 
be an explicit policy statement on how these workers should be compensated.
Section B ● 7. Rethinking ‘Viability’: Reflecting on the Research Findings
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8  POLICY IMPLICATIONS
The purpose of this chapter is to reflect on some of the findings of this LaLR study in order 
to determine ways in which the Namibian land reform programme could be redesigned to 
facilitate more effective land use and economic growth. It should be stated at the outset 
that the agro-ecological conditions in different parts of the country, the low densities of 
settlement that flow from these conditions and the concomitant long distances between 
resettlement farms and urban service centres pose serious challenges to commercial small-
scale farming. More specifically, options for alternative and complimentary livelihoods 
outside the conventional extensive livestock farming model are limited. 
8.1 Models for resettlement
An important point that emerged from this study is that in principle, the FURS and AALS 
models of extensive livestock farming on individually owned pieces of land have satisfied 
the interests of a significant proportion of Namibia’s previously disadvantaged population. 
A major advantage of this model is that it enabled livestock owners on communal land 
to leave the communal production system to farm on their own piece of land instead. This 
had concrete benefits for these farmers, such as improved control over their livestock, 
which enabled them to improve breeding methods and reduce stock loss due to theft and 
uncontrolled roaming.
Although the majority of the interviewees were satisfied with the redistributive land reform 
process, there is reason to believe that the prevailing land reform models in Namibia are 
limited and restrictive in terms of the activities that beneficiaries can undertake. With 
the possible exception of a few group resettlement schemes, the models cater for extensive 
livestock farming only, on either a small scale (i.e. the FURS route) or a large scale (the 
AALS route). For resettlement purposes, the MLR assesses land offered to it primarily with 
regard to its suitability for extensive livestock ranching. AALS farmers select their own 
land for acquisition.
The findings of this study suggest that the prevailing model for resettlement is too narrow 
and not well matched with the needs, aspirations and expectations of many beneficiaries, 
particularly those who have few assets. Current land reform thinking assumes that every 
potential beneficiary intends to become a small-scale or large-scale farmer, but this study 
has found that their needs, aspirations and expectations are more differentiated than is 
commonly acknowledged in the public discourse on land reform and resettlement.
One key finding is that many beneficiaries valued access to resettlement land not primarily 
because they intended to farm commercially, but rather because resettlement on state land 
gave them a permanent and secure home, notwithstanding the fact that none of them had a 
Livelihoods after Land Reform: Namibia country report (2010) ● 169 Section B ● 8. Policy Im lications
formal lease agreement. Many people in the sample, and indeed in the wider community 
of beneficiaries, were pensioners, not all of whom had ties to a communal area. Without 
resettlement, they would not have had a secure place of residence as well as access to a 
small parcel of land for their few goats or cattle. Resettlement thus provided residential 
land and the opportunity to cultivate a small garden and keep some livestock. 
Many people who wanted access to a secure piece of land primarily for residential purposes 
either were not granted any upon applying, or, if their application was successful, obtained 
access to a farm unit of 1 000 ha or more. Invariably, those applicants who had no intention 
of becoming farmers also lacked sufficient assets, particularly livestock, to utilise the land 
optimally. In earlier years especially, little attention was paid to applicants’ suitability for 
resettlement. Did they have enough livestock to farm optimally on the land to be allocated? 
Did they have the required farming skills and access to agricultural support services to put 
them on the road to success? Many did not have any of these things and were effectively set 
up to fail. This failure took several different forms. For example, many who had no regular 
source of cash income, such as a pension, sold more livestock at cash-strapped times than 
they could produce, and this practice, particularly where combined with regular periods 
of drought, made them gradually poorer on resettlement land.
There is a need to revisit the issue of resettlement models for small-scale farmers. Though 
opportunities may be limited, options other than extensive livestock farming need to be 
identified and pursued to enable previously disadvantaged Namibians with the requisite 
skills to produce more food. For example, the potential of small-scale irrigation to increase 
food production for own consumption and urban markets remains largely unexplored. 
In recent years, smallholdings with irrigated vegetable gardens close to towns have been 
waived as unsuitable for resettlement.
If land reform is expected to reduce poverty levels, the needs of people categorised as ‘poor’ 
must be identified much more accurately in order to develop models that properly address 
them. This assumes that a clear definition of poverty exists. Does a person who is resettled 
with 20 LSU fall into the same category of poverty as a person with no assets at all? What is 
abundantly clear is that poor people without any farming assets, or with only a few, can be 
resettled only with generous government support in the form of grants. The financial and 
economic feasibility of such an approach needs to be assessed.
It has been noted in this report that the group resettlement approach as implemented thus 
far is fundamentally a welfare intervention to support unemployed farm workers who have 
no place to go. It may be necessary to develop this approach into a more coherent strategy 
to support landless rural people who need a place of residence with the option of keeping 
a few livestock and cultivating a small garden. The feasibility of establishing such group 
schemes adjacent to small rural centres needs to be assessed.
Any redesigning of resettlement models will have to be accompanied by a review of the 
beneficiary selection criteria. This review has been going on in the MLR for the better part 
of two years, and a draft is being discussed at the highest political and government levels.
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The current model needs reviewing and redesigning for another reason which pertains to 
the minimum farm sizes recommended for the southern and northern parts of the country. 
Gross margin calculations for small-stock farmers in the south (3 000 ha) and predominantly 
cattle farmers in the central and northern regions (1 000 ha) raise two key issues. 
In the first place, the minimum farm sizes recommended for the north and south are 
inherently unequal in terms of economic potential. Contrary to conventional wisdom, the 
gross margins potentially attainable by small-stock farmers in the south are approximately 
68% higher than those attainable by cattle farmers in the north. This is because beneficiaries 
settled on 3 000 ha in the south are able to keep 30% more livestock than cattle farmers can 
keep on 1 000 ha in the north. Cattle farmers in the north can keep a maximum of 67 LSU 
at a stocking rate of 15 ha per LSU, whereas small-stock farmers in the south can keep 100 
LSU (if 600 SSU are converted to LSU). In many cattle farming areas, bush encroachment 
has contributed to the relatively low carrying capacity (Werner 2009).
Secondly, the recommended farm sizes have placed a ceiling on the numbers of livestock 
that beneficiaries can own, and the numbers are far too low to enable them to ‘graduate’ 
from resettlement farming to large-scale commercial farming under the AALS. Taking 
the figures above, for example, the maximum of 67 LSU for a cattle farmer is less than 
half the number required to qualify for an AALS loan. The current situation does not give 
resettlement farmers the option to accumulate sufficient numbers of livestock for a viable 
commercial operation. 
Finally, the gross margins cited above suggest that the small-scale commercial farming 
model currently being implemented under the National Resettlement Programme may not 
be financially sustainable. This becomes clear when provision is made for depreciation and 
the costs of replacing capital assets. To put this argument bluntly, the replacement of a 
windmill on a 1 000 ha unit in Omaheke will require more capital than the entire gross 
margin for one year. At current prices, the materials needed for a 1 km fence would cost 
about N$11 000. The entire gross margin would enable a beneficiary to erect a 3.5 km fence 
at the risk of not eating for a year, let alone paying school fees.
A thorough rethink on resettlement models is required. Not only is the predominant model 
very narrow and unlikely to match or meet the needs, aspirations, expectations, assets and 
skills of beneficiaries, but also it is inherently unequal in so far as it gives beneficiaries in the 
south a much better chance of making money from livestock farming than their counterparts 
have in the north. The current model also makes it impossible for full-time beneficiaries to 
accumulate sufficient livestock to become full-fledged large-scale commercial livestock 
farmers as the land sizes place very low ceilings on the numbers of livestock that they can 
keep. 
A number of options for land reform in the freehold farming areas were developed in 
1990 for the National Conference on Land Reform and the Land Question. These will 
not be discussed in detail here, but only mentioned as options for further consideration. 
One is to purchase freehold farms adjacent to communal areas. This would enlarge the 
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communal areas at minimal costs for infrastructural development. The main cost would 
be compensation for the farm owners, much like the FURS entails. This option would assist 
poorer communal stock owners who feel that their access to grazing is severely constrained 
(RoN 1991: 344). Two other options were group farming and co-operative ranching. However, 
it was pointed out that getting the members of group farming projects to make corporate 
management decisions is problematic, and it was said that very few group ranches survive. 
Based on the current research, it also appears that the vast majority of FURS beneficiaries 
are unlikely to buy into any group-based farming approach. Another model, which has 
been tried in South Africa but not widely discussed, entails joint ventures.
8.2 Joint ventures
Joint venture projects have been a common feature of land and agrarian reform in South 
Africa for some time. These usually involve, as one party, former farm workers who have 
land rights or are land reform beneficiaries eligible for a government subsidy, and as the 
other party, an established commercial farmer or company. The motivation for entering 
into a joint venture for agricultural production is that land reform beneficiaries have access 
to capital and land, while established commercial farmers or companies have expertise 
that empowers the land reform beneficiaries (Mayson 2003: 1).
There are arguments for and against joint ventures which need not be discussed here, but in 
any case it should be borne in mind that partnerships between resettlement beneficiaries and 
the private sector (i.e. commercial farmers with donor funding) have been virtually non-
existent in the Namibian land reform process. In fact, the involvement of the commercial 
farming sector in the resettlement programme through joint ventures appears not to have 
been contemplated at all when the MLR drafted the National Land Reform Policy.
Should joint ventures come to be regarded as a viable option for broadening the range of 
livelihood options for resettlement beneficiaries, the South African model of equity sharing 
could be considered.
Equity sharing entails that resettlement beneficiaries on a farm pool their grants and invest 
in the farm by buying equity or shares in the farm. Typically, the beneficiaries and the 
commercial farmer form a trust through which they invest funds in their joint venture. 
The beneficiaries, while continuing to work as resettlement beneficiaries, become entitled 
to representation on the board and thereby participate in strategic decision-making on 
management. One of the most important management decisions is approving the budget, 
which includes setting wages and wage increases.
Joint ventures offer several positive effects which other models do not offer: they enable 
beneficiaries not only to remain employed but also to share in decision-making and profits, 
which tends to increase labour productivity, and they retain the commercial farmer’s 
managerial skills to the benefit of all, while simultaneously transferring managerial skills to 
the beneficiaries through a capacity-building programme.
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In South Africa the equity-sharing model has come to predominate in land reform in the 
high-value agricultural sector. It gives beneficiaries access to and control over the means 
of production while concurrently providing economies of scale and managerial expertise. 
Among the preconditions for implementation of an equity-sharing project are (Hamman 
2002):
 z the inherent viability of the farm;
 z very good labour relations;
 z a willingness to share in the wealth and in decision-making, and a commitment to doing 
so; and
 z a capacity-building programme to support workers.
The initial ability of beneficiaries to buy equity derives from their access to government 
subsidies or access to credit facilitated by donor funding. According to Agribank, financing 
of joint ventures, such as between a commercial farmer and an AALS resettlement farmer, 
could be arranged.
8.3 Tenure security and access to credit
Issues of tenure security do not affect all land reform beneficiaries equally. 
AALS beneficiaries register freehold title over their land and are therefore the undisputed 
owners of that land. Title enables them to use their land as collateral if they need credit.
For FURS beneficiaries, the absence of secure formal tenure is a major issue. Although the 
Agricultural (Commercial) Land Reform Act of 1995 (ACLRA) provides for 99-year leaseholds, 
the process of issuing lease agreements to beneficiaries on 190 farm units across the country 
commenced only in mid 2009 (Die Republikein, 18.5.2009). To date, of all the farms sampled 
in this study, only Grootrooibult and Drimiopsis have been included in this ongoing process.
While the commencement of this process is a most welcome development, a number 
of questions relating to tenure rights on resettlement farms remain unanswered. Exactly 
what legal rights are conveyed to beneficiaries through these 99-year leases? Are these 
leases renewable? Will the families of lessees be able to inherit the properties as a matter 
of right, or will lease transfers have to be approved by the MLR? Can these leases be sold 
or traded? If put up as collateral for loans, can banks or financial institutions foreclose 
on these leases? Can beneficiaries be ejected from their leasehold for bad behaviour? It is 
also not clear whether restrictions on livelihood options contained in earlier drafts of the 
lease agreement have been retained. In terms of these restrictions, any deviation from the 
land use specified in the lease agreement requires the MLR’s prior approval, and the same 
applies for the erection of a permanent structure.
Many FURS beneficiaries interviewed in this study had similar questions regarding their 
land rights. Most demanded that they be given a formal document setting out their rights. 
Security of tenure motivates them to develop their land, and it ensures inter-generational 
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stability, meaning that spouses and children would not be impoverished by the death of a 
parent or partner.
For FURS beneficiaries to become successful small-scale commercial farmers, it is imperative 
that the lease agreement provides for maximum flexibility in the management of the land, 
subject, of course, to the national legislation on natural resources.
Despite the fact that no lease agreements had been registered by the time of writing, FURS 
beneficiaries have been able to obtain loans from Agribank since 2009. In December 2009 
the bank approved 202 loan applications, committing a total of N$12.9 million. To satisfy 
the bank’s requirements, the applicants had to provide proof of ownership or an allotment 
letter (New Era, 18.12.2009).
8.4 Post-settlement support
Closely related to the issue of tenure security is that of post-settlement support. Economic 
productivity on farms that changed hands under the country’s land reform programme 
can be considerably increased if beneficiaries are given more support. Many of the AALS 
farmers interviewed demanded support similar to the support provided to white farmers 
before Independence.
The story of subsidy support provided to white farmers during the pre-independence era is 
well known. Not only did they enjoy favourable repayment rates on their bank loans, but also 
they received additional financial assistance and support services to develop infrastructure 
for their farming activities. A major criticism of Agribank’s AALS is that post-settlement 
support is virtually non-existent. It is suggested that Agribank review its post-settlement 
support to AALS farmers.
This study has found that many FURS beneficiaries were allocated land with infrastructure 
that did not suffice to enable them to farm successfully. In many instances, boundary fences 
were non-existent or dilapidated, and there were no internal camps. Most pressing of all 
infrastructure issues was that many beneficiaries did not have their own boreholes and 
therefore had to share water with neighbours, which gave rise to tensions and disputes in 
many cases. 
The MLR has acknowledged these problems and has started to address them. In late 2008 it 
commissioned a study on post-settlement support (Werner 2009), and is now considering 
mechanisms for implementing an infrastructure support grant. This will be a once-off grant 
to bring all beneficiaries to the same minimum level of farm infrastructure. Any further 
infrastructure development will have to be financed by the beneficiaries themselves.
To support this process, we recommend subsidising the development of infrastructure on 
AALS and FURS farms, by way of Agribank providing additional financial assistance to 
cover the development and maintenance of existing infrastructure. Emerging farmers in the 
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study sample also complained about the interest rate escalating over the 25-year payback 
period, the current rates being too high and the grace period being too short. We therefore 
recommend extending the grace period for full-time AALS farmers to five years, and 
lowering the escalating rate of interest thereafter.
8.5 Livelihoods for farm workers
The point has been made in this report that all of the livelihood gains resulting from land 
redistribution have been achieved at the expense of farm workers who lost their employment 
when the government bought the applicable commercial farms. In a very real sense, this 
amounts to solving one problem by creating another. The plight of farm workers who lose 
their employment as a result of land reform needs to be addressed as a matter of urgency. 
In the past it was left to beneficiaries to deal with labourers on their land. This situation is 
clearly untenable and needs to be properly addressed at policy level. In dealing with this 
issue, it will be necessary to test the assumption that all farm workers are keen to farm in 
their own right, and are by definition better qualified than other applicants to do so. If this 
is not the case, it will be necessary to determine forms of compensation for farm workers 
that do not involve the allocation of a 1 000 ha unit of land.
8.6 Integrating resettlement planning into 
   agricultural planning
Land reform and resettlement policy should be a component of a broader policy on agricul-
tural and rural redevelopment. This would ensure not only the success of Namibia’s land 
reform programme, but also the continuing prosperity of its commercial agricultural 
sector. Currently, the resettlement programme planning is characterised by the practice 
of first allocating land to beneficiaries and then thinking about strategies to assist them. 
The implementation of policies and strategies is often lacking. Another need is to develop 
plans for environmental reconstruction of degraded commercial and communal farmland. 
Therefore, greater emphasis should be placed on environmental and land reform policies 
in order to provide for the rehabilitation of overgrazed and bush-encroached land that has 
environmentally degraded the value of land. The groundwork for such reconstruction of 
suitable agricultural land can provide jobs for labourers as well as equip them with skills 
which they can use later to increase the agricultural production potential on resettlement 
farms.
Financial assistance in the form of an Environmental Investment Fund (as provided for in 
the Environmental Investment Fund Act 13 of 2001) or the Land Reform Acquisition and 
Development Fund (as provided for in the Agricultural Commercial Land Reform Act 6 of 
1995) should be given priority to help with the rehabilitation of degraded land. Obviously, 
land with a low carrying capacity cannot provide meaningful livelihood options for land 
reform beneficiaries. 
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8.7 Building capacity
Developing and strengthening capacity for informed decision-making by all stakeholders 
should be a priority. Group scheme managers on most of the existing projects do not have 
technical and managerial skills, the exception being the coordinator of the Skoonheid group 
resettlement scheme. None of them have a background in agriculture. It is unclear what 
criteria the MLR applies when appointing project managers to resettlement projects, but 
there are no apparent educational qualifications. It is recommended that project leaders be 
educated in the social sciences or agricultural sciences, and that they be trained for the task 
of managing a resettlement project.
In addition, building the capacity of resettlement scheme beneficiaries by means of suitable 
skills training courses would greatly enhance efforts to develop the schemes efficiently. In 
Hardap and Omaheke, resettlement farmers have expressed a need for practical training 
on technical issues, and some feel that they have inadequate management knowledge and 
skills. In response, established farmers have offered training in breeding, selection, animal 
husbandry, infrastructure maintenance, supplementary feeding, rangeland management 
and overcoming cash-flow problems, as is currently being provided under the Emerging 
Commercial Farmers Support Programme (ECFSP).
Service providers, together with established farmers, should provide information, advice 
and guidance to each prospective emerging farmer before he/she buys a farm in the area. In 
addition, appropriate skills training should be a prerequisite for every prospective AALS, 
FURS and group scheme beneficiary.
Finally, any land reform planning and post-settlement training should incorporate aspects 
of water resource management. Namibia’s aridity calls for a joint consideration and close 
adjustment of land and water issues. In line with Namibia’s various National Development 
Plans and the provisions of the new Water Resource Management Act of 2004 and Water 
and Sanitation Policy (2008), the land reform planning and capacity-building strategies 
should address the need for integrated land and water management. Since land and water 
linkages are an important issue in all activities relating to rural development and the 
management of natural resources, this issue deserves a stronger and more explicit emphasis 
in future land reform planning and capacity-building strategies.
8.8 Improving co-ordination
Better co-ordination of land reform planning is needed in Namibia. Regional land reform and 
resettlement planning is still undertaken mostly by central government, which often leads to 
a breakdown in communication or in the flow of information required for proper planning. 
Partnerships between government, the private sector and civil society at regional level could 
effectively ensure their co-responsibility and accountability for their regional resettlement 
programmes, and directly empower the resettlement beneficiaries to participate in planning 
and to manage their resources effectively. 
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The National Resettlement Policy provides that a number of government ministries should 
carry a responsibility for co-ordinating action plans in a particular area to ensure that 
sectoral partners in government and NGOs are involved with these plans (MLRR 2001a: 
10). For example, the MLR’s main responsibility is to finance the resettlement programme, 
while the MAWF is responsible for, among other things, training resettlement beneficiaries 
through its Directorate of Extension Services. However, discussions with beneficiaries 
and ministry officials in Hardap and Omaheke revealed that a lack of co-ordination and 
communication between these two ministries has often hindered the implementation of 
agricultural training programmes for resettlement beneficiaries.
Over the years, the MLR has contracted NGOs and donor organisations which offer a wide 
variety of one-week courses designed to provide knowledge and skills to semi-skilled and 
unskilled employees and rural communities. For resettlement communities, however, skills 
training has often entailed just a one-off session on basic skills, and there is no data available 
for assessing the effectiveness of these. In addition, the MAWF extension services appear to 
prioritise the training and service needs of communal farmers, and contract out to private 
contractors the provision of technical services to resettlement projects. This clearly shows 
that despite the government’s pledge to empower beneficiaries to become self-sufficient, 
the beneficiaries have to rely on external services to resolve what is often a minor problem. 
Beneficiaries at the group schemes of Bernafey, Westfalen, Skoonheid and Drimiopsis stated 
that the MLR does not allow them to repair broken equipment themselves, but rather appoints 
a technical team to undertake repairs, which usually involves hiring private contractors.
Land reform support service systems need to be strengthened, or established where they 
do not exist. This requires a sound information base and a thorough analysis of agricultural 
support services, and effective promotion activities for land reform support delivery. 
Of particular importance will be the linking of the various information sources and the 
actual exchange of information within the key government institutions and their regional 
structures. This applies mainly to the MLR, the MAWF and Ministry of Environment and 
Tourism, but also to the applicable non-governmental institutions.
8.9 Improving infrastructure
Financial co-operation between the government, donor organisations, the NGO sector 
and the private sector should be directed to support the development of infrastructure 
relating to land reform. Of particular importance will be the poverty-reducing effects 
of the infrastructure investments, and broadening and diversifying the scope for rural 
production. Through the infrastructure provided as well as the promotion of alternative 
income-generating options, resettlement communities will be able to take advantage 
of new opportunities and comparative benefits based on different resource endowments. 
Land reform beneficiaries need assistance with appropriate infrastructure in their efforts 
to generate sustainable increases in production in both the crop and livestock farming sub-
sectors.
Livelihoods after Land Reform: Namibia country report (2010) ● 177 
Many resettlement projects are located far from big towns or trade centres. Resettlement 
beneficiaries complain that they rarely know what goes on in the rest of the country because 
they do not receive daily newspapers, television or radio reports. This isolation negatively 
influences the economic activities of most resettlement project communities. For one thing, 
it makes the marketing of products very difficult, not least due to a general lack of access 
to transport. This lack also makes it difficult for beneficiaries to get in touch with family 
and visit other communities. Most beneficiaries also complained about the lack of public 
transportation to and from the resettlement projects. But again, poor transportation is a 
problem throughout rural Namibia.
Whatever measures are taken to improve infrastructure on the resettlement projects must 
include measures to improve communication and transportation infrastructure. In this 
regard, it is well worth considering the option of locating resettlement projects closer to big 
towns and trade centres, which would make communications and transportation much 
easier and cheaper, as well as make the projects more attractive and more efficient on the 
whole.
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